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CSCE Committee Urges Armenian Withdrawal From Kelbadzhar

NC2804174293 Paris AFP in English 1715 GMT 28 Apr 93

[Text] Prague, April 28 (AFP)—The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe urged Armenia Wednesday [28 April] to withdraw its forces from the Kelbadzhar corridor to Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, which they captured earlier this month.

"Such a withdrawal is the first essential step towards the revival of peace negotiations," said a high-ranking official of the CSCE's emergency committee here.

With the support of 17 member states of the 52-nation CSCE, Azerbaijan called the committee into session Monday to discuss recent Armenian advances in the southeast of the Azeri republic.

Armenia, which western diplomats said was fairly isolated in CSCE circles at present, has tried to link a withdrawal from Kelbadzhar to its demands for a ceasefire around Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian-dominated enclave in southeast Azerbaijan. "These two issues are tightly linked," a Russian diplomat told AFP.

When Armenian forces seized the Kelbadzhar corridor, which links Nagorno-Karabakh to the Armenian republic, it was condemned by Turkey for "aggression."

More than 5,000 people have been killed since 1988 when Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh launched a rebellion against Azeri rule. But a provisional ceasefire that went into effect midnight April 19 has been holding.

Azerbaijani Spokesman Comments

MK2904114493 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Apr 93 p 1

[Unattributed report under the "Military Diplomacy" rubric: "Nagorno-Karabakh under Russia Jurisdiction? Baku Surprised at Marshal Shaposhnikov's Statement"]

[Text] Your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent was told by an official Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry spokesman that the CSCE Senior Officials Committee has been holding a session in Prague since 27 April to discuss the possibility of a stable cease-fire in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict zone.

In the meantime Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, made a statement that leads one to assume that Russian high commanders intend to become actively involved in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. In an interview with INTERFAX on 26 March, Shaposhnikov said: "...Two scenarios are possible. The first one proposes, on consent from both sides, the reinstatement of the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast as part of Azerbaijan. The second one proposes a transfer of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to Russian jurisdiction. In the latter case representatives of both Armenia and Azerbaijan would be included in the local administration. Observers in Baku reflect: Why did the commander in chief have to make a statement suggesting that Azerbaijan voluntarily transfer part of its own territory "to Russian jurisdiction for a certain period of time?" Some in Baku are inclined to interpret Shaposhnikov's words as a trial balloon of sorts launched in order to elicit the world community's reaction to the possibility of this plan's being realized.

Before flying out to Brussels to take part in a conference of military commanders of NATO member countries, Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov expressed anxiety over the fact that according to unofficial information, the NATO command is working on a plan of strategic intervention to resolve crisis situations in CIS "hot spots." Marshal Shaposhnikov intends to find out to what extent these reports correspond with reality.

Meeting Ends 'in Failure'

LD2904191193 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1800 GMT 29 Apr 93

[Text] An extraordinary session for Nagorno-Karabakh in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ended in failure in Prague. It was blocked by the official refusal of the Armenian representative to pull out Armenian troops from Azeri territory. After the end of the session reports came about the beginning of a partial withdrawal from Azerbaijan. At diplomatic talks Armenia insists on a permanent ceasefire agreement as the condition for the full withdrawal of its troops.

Council of Europe To Mediate Between Baltics, Russia

LD2904095093 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 0900 GMT 29 Apr 93

[Text] The Council of Europe offered to mediate in order to improve relations between the Baltic states and Russia. This was reported to the Baltic News Service by Tunne Kelam, deputy speaker of the Estonian parliament. It was agreed in principle at the session of the Political Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, which took place this week in London, that Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Russian delegations to the Council of Europe would meet in Copenhagen. Three Political Affairs Committee members—Chairman Gerhard Reddemann of Germany, (?Heltemans) of Belgium, and (?Esbertsen) of Denmark—would also take part in the meeting. The meeting now depends on the Russian side, stated Kelam.

Results of Minsk CIS Summit Analyzed

PM3004105993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Apr 93 First Edition p 1

[Report by Mikhail Berger: "CIS Is Maturing to Level of CIS"]

[Text] The meeting of heads of government of the CIS states has ended in Minsk, and if Russia's public opinion were not so deeply absorbed in the results of the referendum, the results of the Minsk meeting might fully lay claim to being sensational.

The CIS states agreed on what they once wanted least of all and feared most. It is a case of common coordination organs, any attempt to create which was initially assessed as an attempt to preserve "imperial structures," and any organization is primarily an apparatus and executive organs.

As we know, in Minsk a provision was approved on the coordination and consultative committee and on the executive secretariat of the CIS. And if the CIS is indeed destined to exist in some form or other then its real birthday should be considered the day these documents were signed.

And even in a sphere as delicate and painful for any young state as money circulation the sides seem to be close to reaching agreement. At least Viktor Gerashchenko, head of the Central Bank of Russia, stated that the CIS countries are prepared to create an interstate bank to implement multilateral transactions.

Today it is hard to say whether everyone fully shares the viewpoint of Vyacheslav Kebich, who chaired the Minsk meeting and stated that we have already become mature enough for a union (economic union, that means), but there is no doubt that the experience of broken relations and the agonizing clearing up of problems of mutual payments and deliveries have clarified for many people what were already obvious facts: The new independent states of the Commonwealth are sentenced to economic cooperation which, if it is sensibly organized, promises more considerable benefits. I believe that the leaders of the states and the leaders of the governments understood this clearly even before, but until their parliaments and voters felt for themselves all the burdens of the divided existence of a once unified economy, both active and moderate supporters of the CIS had no political opportunity to embark on such agreements.

We must also realize that to a considerable degree the rapprochement of positions on the question of economic integration is taking place on the basis of the CIS countries' need for Russian raw material and the abiding greater or lesser dependence of the new states' monetary systems on the Russian ruble. And the freer a state is in that sense, the more restrained its participation in the building of a new economic union. A graphic example of that is Turkmenia which, INTERFAX reports, did not sign a number of agreements.

Understandably, the signing of agreements does not guarantee the effective operation of the new CIS coordination organs. As we know about 300 agreements on various issues have already been signed within the CIS framework but the fulfillment of many of them cannot be deemed satisfactory, but to a certain extent the ineffectiveness of agreements on individual issues was in fact connected with the lack of common coordinating organs. We should also bear in mind that the CIS has "in reserve" many vexed issues of great destructive force. What is the worth of the foreign debt problem alone, which Russia and Ukraine are quite unable to decide among themselves, or the special position of ukraine regarding the regime for trade with Russia? There is also a considerable danger that despite their readiness they will not succeed in reaching agreement on credit and financial relations and the governments will spend a long time yet accusing each other of exporting inflation.

Nonetheless the Minsk meeting showed the possibility in principle of creating an economic union even for definitively independent states.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 30 Apr

LD3004055993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0537 GMT 30 April 93

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow April 30 TASS—NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA carries an article today dealing with the attempt of a constitutional reform in Russia. Touching upon the reforming of the constitution, the newspaper writes: "most probably, the president's opponents from the soviets (legislative authorities) will be clever enough not to use this method, which is rather primitive. They may try for the second time what they did with the referendum of April 25: snatch the initiative from the president and adopt a new constitution themselves."

ROSSISKAYA GAZETA, publication of the Russian parliament, carries the text of President Yeltsin's speech at the expanded meeting of the Russian council of ministers, as well as the text of the speech made by Chairman of Parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov. Commenting on the recent referendum, the newspaper writes: "+It is neither Yeltsin nor Khasbulatov, neither the government nor the parliament that won the referendum. It is the commonsense of the people who do not want a civil war."

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA carries an article entitled "Reform In Progress." It says that the priority task for today is to replace the old constitution with a new one, because the old one is "dragging the state backwards." The newspaper publishes as well an article by Yevgeny Anisimov, headlined "Mercury as Red as the Cover of the Party Membership Card." It deals with the scandal over the export of "Red Mercury" from Russia.

"The president has summed up the results and outlined the strategy," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA writes, assessing

the results of the recent referendum. "Unfortunately, we have come to realise on the basis of our own experience that changes never go smoothly," the newspaper points out. "The only comforting thing is that the disintegration of Russia, so much spoken about, used so often for intimidating people, has not taken place."

TRUD describes the results of the referendum as a "surprise for opponents of the reform." The newspaper quotes the president as saying that he regards the results of the referendum as a direct assignment coming from the people, which he cannot fail to put into effect.

"Factors sufficient for a civil war in Russia have been accumulated in the northern Caucasus," chairman of the council of nationalities of the Russian parliament Ramazan Abdulatipov said in an interview, published by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA today. He pointed out that some historic facts, for example the deportation of whole nations and repressions against them, acute contradictions over the territorial issue, which have existed for centuries, and thousands of recent border conflicts are an irritating factor for the "hot heads" in northern caucasus.

According to Abdulatipov, there is not a single territorial or national entity in the northern Caucasus whose borders were not changed dozens of times over the past one hundred years. Clan interests of a patriarchal type are very strong in the region, which also promotes the polarization of society.

"The most important thing now is to counteroppose disunity,+ Alexander Shabanov writes in PRAVDA. "The authorities are encouraging the existence of numerous communist parties, because the organisations which are not united pose no threat." The chairman of the executive committee of the Moscow City organisation and member of the presidium of the central executive committee of the Russian communist party believes that the situation in the country has worsened to the extreme, and that a civil war has been started already on the outskirts of Russia.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIA carries an article by Ioann, metropolitan of St. Petersburg and Ladoga, in which he gives an assessment of the current situation in Russia.

Commentator Assesses Clinton Presidency

LD2904131593 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0800 GMT 29 Apr 93

[Commentary by Igor Rudnev; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] What do people in the United States think of the work of the current master of the White House? Just over half of Americans approve of Clinton's actions as U.S. President in the first 100 days of his administration according to the results of a public opinion poll carried out by the Gallup Institute.

[Rudnev] In his election campaign, Bill Clinton promised first and foremost to improve the economy of the country through the development of medium-sized businesses, cutting spending on the administrative structure, and reducing military spending. Clinton did not promise the sweet life, and he did not conceal the fact that he would be instituting tax increases. These measures, as you know, aroused great resistance in Congress. The Republican senators did not let through the President's economic proposals aimed at creating new jobs, saying this would only lead to an increase in the budget deficit.

The President has also come up against difficulties in the conduct of foreign policy. One example is the statement by Congress that Clinton's intention to use military force in Bosnia-Herzegovina could turn into a new Vietnam. After that, the President was obliged to say he would not authorize such action until three strict conditions were met: the purpose must be clearly set out before the American people; there must be a strong likelihood of success; and the action must win the support of the public. In the view of experts, the new administration's contribution to the talks between Israel and the Arab states has been more successful. This demonstrates that Washington intends to play a more decisive role in seeking out ways of unravelling key knots in talks, including self- determination for Palestinians and peace between Israel and Syria, as well as Lebanon.

Observers are noting that the Clinton administration has achieved significant progress in relations with Russia and other CIS countries. The U.S. President was one of the first to welcome the referendum results and confirmed his adherence to cooperation with President Yeltsin and providing economic support for Russian reforms. However, as a statement from a high-ranking official in the U.S. Treasury Department notes, the decision to give Russia aid will come up against stubborn resistance in Congress. [video shows assorted clips featuring President Clinton.]

Program for Defense Minister's U.S. Visit Outlined

PM2904150793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Apr 93 p 3

[Mikhail Pogorelyy report under "From Our News Bureau" rubric: "Russian Defense Minister Will Visit United States in May"]

[Text] According to information from diplomatic sources, the visit of Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation minister of defense, to the United States, which was agreed during the Vancouver meeting of the two countries' presidents, will begin 26 May and will last a week.

A high-ranking diplomat who wished to remain anonymous reported that during the visit Pavel Grachev will have talks with U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin; General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and U.S. Congressional leaders. It is proposed that the main topics for discussion will be questions of likely cooperation between the U.S. and Russian armed forces in conducting peacemaking operations, the possibility of organizing joint exercises, and the intensification of military personnel exchanges, including military educational institution students. Another problem is that of preventing dangerous activity which can potentially cause incidents and human casualties. It is also planned to discuss the possibility of activating direct cooperation between the Russian Defense Ministry and the U.S. Defense Department.

U.S. Aid To Disable Nuclear Munitions Cited

PM2904152993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Apr 93 p 3

[Kirill Mikhaylov report: "Nuclear Disarmament Through Joint Efforts"]

[Text] Russian and U.S. scientists and technical specialists have jointly developed special containers to ensure the safe storage of the fissile materials being removed from nuclear munitions subject to destruction. The first batch of 10,000 units is to be manufactured by December 1995.

The development of these containers was a constituent part of the U.S. assistance for the process of dismantling and eliminating the nuclear arms of the former USSR covered by the corresponding treaties (START I and, in the longer term, START II). In accordance with the program approved by the U.S. Congress, approximately $50 million is being allocated to creating the said containers and a further $15 million to deploying actual storage premises for radioactive weapons-grade materials.

In addition, the United States is supplying Russia with protective reinforced "blankets" to ensure the containers' safe transportation to the permanent storage sites. The first batch (684 out of 2,500 "blankets") has already been delivered to our country. The railroad cars which will convey the dangerous freight are being reequipped for the same purpose. The U.S. Administration is allocating $20 million for these needs. Precisely 115 of these cars will be delivered to Russia as early as this summer.

West Seen Identifying With Too Narrow Elite

PM2904112993 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Apr 93 pp 1, 3

[Yuriy Glukhov article: "Kremlin's U.S. Card"]

[Text] "There must be an end to concessions. I have a somewhat heavy heart in connection with our abstention in the Security Council"—these were the first words that Mr. Kozyrev uttered in a Radio Liberty interview after carrying out the "voting rite."

Note that he at once set the tone of the future propaganda. Defeat for B. Yeltsin was ruled out a priori. An unfavorable outcome was presented in advance as the result of cheating. Long before the results were summed up. This aim worked. Without waiting for the official results, U.S. President B. Clinton, for example, was quick to send his congratulations to the Russian leader on his "outstanding victory."

"The chief thing is that this victory not be stolen," Kozyrev said while still at the ballot box, "because the Bolshevist manner and, in general, the red-brown manner is thieving and juggling." As we see, our hero has never climbed down from his favorite red-brown hobby-horse. Many people ask themselves this question: What is this—an obsessive mania a la Forrestal or notorious anuresis a la Kashpirovskiy [television psychic, healer]? Neither. It is deliberate disinformation so as to manipulate international public opinion. The opposition is said to have the very qualities that, to judge from A. Rutskoy's report, are more than characteristic of the Russian president's entourage itself. This was the case recently with his scandalous speech in Stockholm and continues to be the case now. This creates an unfavorable international information background around Russia and a distorted picture of what is happening in the country.

But this is by the by. Let us return to the foreign policy aspects, to the decisive tones, to the steel that has made itself heard in the voice of the maker of grand Kremlin policy. What does his desire to lighten his heart and to renounce abstention promise Russia?

The UN Security Council decision to toughen sanctions against Yugoslavia—the very sanctions on whose vote the Russian representative abstained—came into force Monday. NATO is drawing up plans for military operations against the Serbs. Does Kozyrev's mood not signify readiness to participate in them? In PRAVDA pages Marshal Shaposhnikov has just indignantly rejected the options of cooperation with the NATOites as madness, although he at once turned up at the Brussels session of the NATO Military Committee.

In that case were Churkin's shuttle diplomacy and his talks with the Serbs just camouflage so as to gain time and not take unpopular actions before the outcome of the referendum? Note that Kozyrev's decisiveness contrasts with the ever increasing indecisiveness and doubts of others who are conscious of the danger of plunging into the bloody Yugoslav quagmire.

British Prime Minister J. Major, for example, has made it clear that he is opposed to military interference in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to him, the situation in this former Yugoslav republic is very complex. Bosnia cannot be compared with northern Iraq, for example. The events developing there are similar to Vietnam or Beirut, and we must take this into account, Major declared.

The primitively oversimplified approach to the Yugoslav internecine strife, when the Serbs were being accused of all mortal sins and when precisely they became the victims of one-sided sanctions, is collapsing. The West is beginning to see the light. The entire world press has carried reports of the brutalities perpetrated by Croats a few days ago during attacks on Muslim settlements in central Bosnia.

So, is Kozyrev mistakenly getting into a car which many people are already getting out of? Of course not. The decisiveness he is displaying is a response to the support which Washington gave to the Russian president before the referendum so as to strengthen his positions.

The international response elicited by the referendum results still has to be assessed, for the weather in Russia largely influences the climate in the world. But certain quite serious conclusions can be drawn already.

Kozyrev and the democrats have succeeded in monopolizing relations with the United States and the West by fanning fears of "Cold War" times. They have created a false impression of the situation in Russia and of the essence of the struggle over the reforms by blackening the opposition—which has also affected the internal situation.

There has been speculation on the imaginary anti-Americanism of the opposition, although even the most radical members of the opposition, with a single exception, support the development of relations with the United States. It is a question only of a truly equitable partnership.

There has been scaremongering about the communist threat in the event of an opposition victory, whereas Yeltsin and his entourage have demonstratively paraded their anticommunism, and yet the myth of the "empire of evil" was buried during the time of Gorbachev. Its artificial resuscitation pursues only ill-intentioned ends.

Criticism of the START II Treaty was portrayed as frenzied aggressiveness, although its opponents come out against the accords in their present, hastily prepared form. I am sure that none of them would refuse to undertake the 100-percent destruction of nuclear weapons with the United States, but on parity principles. And so forth and so on.

The constant cultivating of a sinister aura around the opposition has left its mark. Being painted in the colors

of an internal political struggle, the development of relations with the United States and the West is assuming distorted and even dangerous forms. Instead of serving the peoples—which is an objective necessity—it is placed at the service of the interests of narrow groupings. Instead of being a stabilizing and constantly developing factor not dependent on the political situation, cooperation with the West is constantly linked with a particular figure. National interests are sacrificed to personal ambitions.

It is a question not only of the looting of foreign aid on a huge scale and the conclusion of dubious deals and contracts—which casts doubt on the very possibility of normal economic and other cooperation with Russia. It is a question of playing the U.S. and Western card in resolving national and internal problems. The weaker the positions of the Kremlin authorities, the more frequently they resort to this.

The need arose to exert pressure on Ukraine in settling the nuclear litigation—and an appeal to Washington followed.

It is necessary to show concern at the fate of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic region, which Moscow has abandoned to the mercy of fate—and there is an appeal to send international observers, although we know perfectly well how the United States acts in defense of its own citizens.

Demands were made to show determination in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict—importunate invitations to the "blue helmets" followed.

An economic collapse is approaching—and all hopes are pinned on resuscitators from "the seven," who hold consultations first in Tokyo, then in London.

I could cite as many examples of this kind of helplessness as I like. Moreover, the scale of the demands for help is growing, as in Pushkin's tale of the golden fish.

After the referendum Kozyrev started speaking of "instilling order until the next elections of people's deputies" and of "making firm leadership a material reality." But on what terms? Whereas at the apogee of his popularity Yeltsin received 42.8 percent of the votes of the entire electorate in the presidential election, with the present victory in the referendum he received approximately one-third. The split in society has deepened. Presidential power has weakened.

Does it not mean, according to Kozyrev, that the tightening of screws is conceived with international participation? For it is known that Yeltsin has already made soundings in case a state of emergency is introduced in the country. The ground has been prepared in the West, and the referendum results can be interpreted as giving carte blanche for corresponding actions.

With all the West's biases toward particular political forces in the country, I would like to warn against the temptation to interfere in our internal affairs. Russia is not a banana republic. As a diplomat remarked recently, it cannot be a pocket state. There is no such pocket.

'Reliable Sources' Say Churkin May Attend Talks on Bosnia

LD3004112593 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1049 GMT 30 Apr 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] Moscow, April 30 (TANJUG)—Russia attaches great importance to the meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina which will be held in Athens on May 1 and 2 and, as TANJUG learned in reliable Moscow sources, special Russian envoy for the Bosnian crisis Vitaliy Churkin could attend the talks.

At the invitation of the co-chairmen of the conference on former Yugoslavia, the Athens meeting will be attended by the leaders of the three warring sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Moslem, Croat and Serb), the presidents of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, and of Croatia (whose 50,000 soldiers are taking part in the war in Bosnia).

With the mediation of Greek Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis, they will discuss options for a political solution to the war in Bosnia and the crisis in former Yugoslavia.

Russian Foreign Ministry sources said that the Athens talks could be an important step towards the efforts for reaching a peace in former Yugoslavia.

The sources did not reject the possibility of realizing Moscow's proposal that the representatives of the five permanent Security Council members meet in Geneva on May 5 to discuss the possibility for settling the Bosnian crisis.

Churkin Announces Christopher Visit for Talks on Yugoslavia

LD3004122193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1114 GMT 30 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Sergey Krylovich and Sergey Nikishov]

[Text] Moscow April 30 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher will arrive in Moscow late on May 4, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin said at a briefing for Russian and foreign journalists in Moscow today.

On May 5, Christopher is expected to hold talks with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and meet with President Boris Yeltsin.

According to Churkin, the talks will focus on the problem of Yugoslav settlement.

Churkin on Efforts To Resolve Yugoslav Crisis

LD3004143393 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1230 GMT 30 Apr 93

[Text] The information and press department of Russia's Foreign Ministry held a briefing for Russian and foreign journalists on current issues of international policy today. Vitaliy Ivanovich Churkin, special presidential representative and Russian Federation deputy foreign minister, spoke at the briefing. Here in particular is what he said on a settlement in Yugoslavia:

[Begin Churkin recording] In the last few days extremely intensive contacts have taken place on the entire complex of questions connected with the situation in the former Yugoslavia. As far as we are concerned, I would single out two directions relating to the contacts. First, contacts with Belgrade and with Bosnian Serbs, and the second direction relates to contacts with many leading members of the international community who are in the first place interested and who most actively take part in international efforts to settle the Yugoslav crisis.

As far as the Serbian side is concerned, as the date of 26 April came closer when the new sanctions against Yugoslavia were to come into force, and did come into force, we said that the Serbian side must take a resolute step toward peace, and we directly recommended, in particular, that of course the agreement reached earlier on Srebrenica should be observed, with regard to the fact that a UN contingent will continue to be located there—Canadian, the well- known Canadian battalion. So what are the results of this dialogue of ours?

Well first I think that one has to note the fact that both the Serbian side, the Bosnian Serbs, confirmed that they intend to continue to seek a political solution; that they are not leaving the talks, as sometimes they stated before, and, second, there followed—indeed, although at the last moment—that is, literally just a few hours before the assembly of Bosnian Serbs was due to adopt a decision with regard to the Vance-Owen plan—there followed, in our view, a very important appeal by the three most influential politicians in Yugoslavia—Yugoslav President Cosic, Serbian President Milosevic, and Montenegrin President Bulatovic—to the Bosnian Serbs, with a firm call to accept the Vance-Owen plan, with certain amendments about which they held talks up to that point with Lord Owen.

Not least among the points I have mentioned, one has to note that the agreement on Srebrenica is being observed as a whole.

As for our contacts with other participants—these most complex international efforts to settle the Yugoslav conflict— as you know, a number of public statements were made, including an official statement by the president, and alongside the public statements there was one by Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Ivanovich Kozyrev.

The essence of our policy lay in the following: There appeared—and has long been in action since 26 April, and has become stronger—a kind of pressure component in the international community's strategy to settle the crisis. All the same, however, we absolutely firmly proceeded from the fact that this pressure component—and it is an objective fact—must be supplemented with an intensive diplomatic component. [end recording]

Article Views 'Balkan Trap for Russia'

MK2904074093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 18, 2 May 93 (Signed to Press 27 Apr) p A7

[Yuriy Davydov article under the rubric "Three Authors": "Balkan Trap for Russia"]

[Text] Failed international efforts to settle the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and the lack of trust between the mediators and warring groups compel a critical interpretation of some of the initial premises of the peacemaking organizations' approach to the Yugoslav war.

Serious errors of judgment were evidently made by both Western and Russian politicians in their assessments of the motivating forces in the conflict. Ideological motives prevailed in these assessments. Many experts saw the conflict in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia primarily as a clash between the Communists (advocates of the old), and their opponents (advocates of renovation); that is, people oriented toward the Western system of values. Listed unconditionally among the former were all of Serbia and Montenegro, where a pro-Communist orientation of the leaders and society was seen to prevail; listed among the latter were the other Yugoslav republics.

At the same time, Yugoslavia's tragedy was not preordained in 1945, when the Communists came to power in Belgrade, but rather in Versailles in 1919, when this artificial entity was blessed. The overestimation of the ideological aspect of the conflict resulted, first, in largely ignoring the socio-ethnic and historical roots of the conflict, the gap between the poor and wealthy republics, territorial problems, and the problems of ethnic minorities. Second, viewing the conflict in terms of the usual Cold War stereotypes legalized nationalism, which never carried within itself any democratic charge. Nonetheless, it was automatically backed by leading democracies in the West.

One error inevitably led to another. It is usually hard to find who is right and who is wrong in any interethnic conflict. This is especially counterproductive at the height of a crisis when stopping bloodshed is of paramount importance. It is therefore extremely important that peacemaking organizations remain neutral, otherwise faith in peacemaking gets undermined immediately. Plainly, the hasty recognition by the Federal Republic of Germany (and under its pressure by the EC as well) of Slovenia's and Croatia's independence automatically

foreordained Bonn's and Brussels' consequent reaction to Serbia, as well as the latter's attitude to the EC's peacemaking efforts.

This lopsided approach of the parties to the Yugoslav conflict was often the case. In the meantime, all participants in the conflict have been tough and merciless to each other, with no holds barred. While the list of violent actions by the Serbs may seem longer than that of the others, it is primarily because they perhaps had greater possibilities for destruction.

The methods of outside compulsion in this conflict are reminiscent, to a certain degree, of the psychology of the times of rigid confrontation. The main methods there seem to be sanctions, embargoes, blockades. But the policy of compulsion does not work every time, and its effect wears off if used too frequently. As for sanctions, people grow used to them and find loopholes. Sanctions alienate a country from the world community, reducing the latter's chances to influence its behavior, encouraging the masses of people to rally around charismatic leaders whom sanctions drive into a corner and leaving the only alternative as "Patria or muerto" ("Freedom or death") [as published]. Sanctions against Serbia, in the final analysis, worked for Milosevic rather than for Panic and the supporters of compromise.

In international practice, the policy of the stick has usually gone together with the policy of the carrot. Without rejecting the use of sanctions on the whole, one could have made the Serbian leaders understand that had they made compromises, they could have gained something—relaxation of sanctions in exchange for each specific concession, aid in rehabilitation of their economy after the war, deferment of debts, and so forth.

Russian diplomats could have persuaded their counterparts that there was a need for pursuing a more constructive policy line. Not in order to please anyone, or to demonstrate the independence of their foreign policy, but rather in their own national interests: the Balkans are too close to Russia, and historically linked with it. In the event of a military intervention in the Balkans, whatever the excuse, it is Russia that would be the greatest loser. It would not be able to side with Serbia, nor would it be able to support a military action against it. However, while the desire to stay away from the scrap is now to Russia's advantage, should there be such an intervention, it will be to Russia's disadvantage and also cause higher internal tensions. Russia's position in the Balkans will seriously worsen while its relationship with the West will become soured. Therefore, it is in its interests to preclude a situation where it has no worthy choice.

Yeltsin Holds Phone Conversation With Kohl on Referendum

LD2904171593 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1600 GMT 29 Apr 93

[Text] Russia's President Boris Yeltsin had a telephone conversation today with FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The president's press service reports that Yeltsin informed Kohl of the preliminary results of the Russian referendum, and also with regard to measures being planned to adopt a new Russian constitution.

Kunadze in Tokyo Preparing for Yeltsin's Late May Visit

MK2904094693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Apr 93 p 2

[Vasiliy Golovnin report under "Details" rubric: "Secret Diplomacy. Yeltsin's Visit to Japan Could Take Place 25-27 May"]

[Text] Tokyo—The first attempt at secret diplomacy, to which Moscow and Tokyo decided to resort when hastily preparing for a visit by Boris Yeltsin, who has expressed his readiness to visit Japan as early as the end of May, ended in "exposure." Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Kunadze arrived incognito in Tokyo on 25 April to coordinate the dates and program for this trip, staying on Russian Federation Embassy territory. He has had several unofficial meetings with his colleague, Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Kunihiko Saito, trying not to be seen by reporters.

It is difficult to hide anything in Tokyo, however, bearing in mind the quasi-familial, extremely confidential relations that journalists have here with their sources of information in the government, Foreign Ministry, and parliament. On 27 April a major newspaper front-paged the sensation of Kunadze's secret mission. In a matter of hours the news was picked up by all the mass media, and soon the fact of Kunadze's unofficial presence in Tokyo was officially acknowledged by Japanese Foreign Minister Kabun Muto himself.

This story underlines the tension with which the two countries' Foreign Ministries have once again set about preparing for Yeltsin's visit, postponed last September until a better time. Tokyo has long insisted that this visit take place before the upcoming G-7 leaders meeting here in July. It has now also apparently been realized in Moscow that a better time for the visit will not be found. The point is that, against the background of massive support for Yeltsin from the West, as chairman of the current G-7 conference Japan will find it practically impossible to bring too much force to bear on the South Kurils problem, linking this question with economic aid for the Russian reforms. In other words, a unique opportunity has arisen to hold the Russian president's first visit to Tokyo in an adequately quiet atmosphere, a basis finally having been created for further calm progress to be made in the difficult talks on solving the territorial dispute and concluding a peace treaty. The results of the referendum in Russia also create a favorable atmosphere for the visit.

As for the dates of the visit, the end of May is the most suitable time for the Japanese. The point is that at the

beginning of July the entire country, including the government, will be completely engrossed in the celebrations of the crown prince's long- awaited marriage, and the end of this month will be too close to the G-7 meeting, which will force Tokyo to redirect its attention to this event only. Sources report that during the current unofficial consultations the Japanese partners suggested to Kunadze that Yeltsin's visit take place over three days, starting 25 or 27 May. The search for a mutually acceptable formula for the territorial question is also complex.

People in Japan have reconciled themselves to the fact that in the current situation no appreciable concessions on this problem should be expected from Yeltsin. Tokyo, however, for all its current flexibility, will simply not be in a position to gloss over this problem silently during the summit-level talks. In other words, it is necessary to find in advance a variant for discussing the South Kurils subject which would more or less satisfy both sides and would not give the hard-liners in Russia and Japan long-awaited ammunition for accusing their leaders of making excessive concessions.

South Korean President Said Planning Early Visit

MK2904101693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Apr 93 p 1

[Vitaliy Tretyakov report under "Exclusive" rubric: "Kim Yong-sam: 'Reunification of Two Koreas Will Take Place Peacefully After Commonwealth Has Been Formed.' New Republic of Korea President Answers NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Chief Editor's Questions"]

[Text] The South Korean president received me at his residence—the Blue Palace. The meeting, organized with help of the Republic of Korea Foreign Ministry and Information Ministry, took place on the 50th day of the term of office of Mr. Kim Yong-sam, who was recently an opposition leader. Instead of the 15 minutes officially scheduled it lasted three-quarters of an hour, which, in the opinion of the president's staffers, was evidence of the special attention paid to a representative (albeit an unofficial one) of Russia. Before our meeting Mr. Kim Yong-sam had given interviews as president only to THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE WASHINGTON POST, LE MONDE, and to a Chinese newspaper.

Our conversation was unofficial (the text of the written answers to my questions had already been prepared). The president himself asked me many questions, sometimes quite unexpected ones. This one, for example: "What do you think of IZVESTIYA, PRAVDA, and ITAR-TASS?" It seems to me that the question was associated with the fact that all three information organs are requesting an interview with the president.

Mr. Kim Yong-sam noted his special affinity for Russia and recalled his meetings with Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. He received an invitation from the latter to visit Russia and intends to do so at the first convenient opportunity. The South Korean president said that the Republic of Korea shares the line taken by the United States, Japan, Germany, and the other G-7 countries on financial support for Boris Yeltsin's reforms.

Mr. Kim Yong-sam himself has started to implement his own economic reform in South Korea whose aim is to make Korean goods competitive in the world market and to fight corruption (one of the president's colleagues put this more precisely—to fight the old nomenklatura), and all this is to move Korea out of the category of a developing country into that of a developed country. Here a developed country is taken to mean a society that provides a high standard of living and quality of life for most of its citizens. South Korea is relying on Mexico's experience in this sphere.

In the presidential election Kim Yong-sam had the support of 70 percent of the population; now, according to polls, it has risen to 90 percent. Every day local television shows the arrests of corrupt high-ranking officials and businessmen.

I asked the president whether he hopes to retain this level of support from his population for long. Mr. Kim Yong-sam replied that the people's support is a politician's most powerful weapon. Of course it will decline in the future, but I do not think it will do so very soon. I intend to carry out the reforms I have announced for the entire presidential term allotted to me in the voting.

Another question interested me: How are mutual relations now between the president and journalists, to whom, I understand, he is greatly indebted for his success in the election. Mr. Kim Yong-sam replied: Previously I was both criticized and defended by journalists—I have experience in communicating with the press. I think that journalists prefer to criticize the people who are in power, but that is their right.

Incidentally, one of the lines of newspaper criticism of the president is his less than perfect command of Korean (he comes from the south of the country).

And finally, the last thing before the reader reads the actual text of the interview with the president—the problem of the two Koreas' reunification. This question was not broached in my conversation with President Kim Yong-sam, but I discussed it many times with academics and top officials in Seoul. On the one hand they want this unification, but on the other they have great fears that they will be as unprepared for it as the West Germans. Therefore Seoul's official position is that the prospect of full- scale unification is remote and requires the solution of many problems. But, as I learned from certain informed circles in Seoul, the South Korean Government is carefully preparing for unification, working out specific political and economic models for it.

Grants 'Exclusive' Interview

MK2904115493 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Apr 93 p 4

["Exclusive" interview with Republic of Korea President Kim Yong-sam by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Chief Editor Vitaliy Tretyakov in the president's Blue Palace residence "on the 50th day" of his term: "Kim Yong-sam: 'Reunification of Two Koreas Will Take Place Peacefully After Commonwealth Has Been Formed'"]

[Text] [Tretyakov] Mr. President, what is your assessment of current relations between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea? In one of your recent interviews you mentioned that the unification of Korea could be effected gradually, rather than according to the German formula. How do you see this unification process and what are the methods and ways of achieving it?

[Kim Yong-sam] As you know, after the inter-Korean dialogue collapsed at the end of last year it was simply not resumed, because North Korea seceded from the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It seems to me that there is no point in continuing this dialogue unless North Korea resumes its membership in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and accepts the conditions of an inspection on its territory by IAEA specialists. I think that reunification will take place peacefully and that in the intermediate stage there will be a Commonwealth of Two Koreas based on a united nation. To do this, South and North Korea must reestablish mutual trust as a basis for expanding cooperation and exchanges.

[Tretyakov] What do you think about North Korea's secession from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty? According to a REUTER report, North Korea intends to leave the United Nations altogether if attempts to put international pressure on it are intensified, and in this case the DPRK will accelerate the development of its own nuclear weapons on the pretext of self-defense. What do you think: Is such a development of events possible, and what would South Korea intend to do in such a case?

[Kim Yong-sam] North Korea's resistance to the holding of site inspections on its territory, and that country's secession from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, not only hinder the reaching of peace and stability in the northeastern part of the Asiatic region, including the Korean peninsula, but also represent a destructive force capable of proliferating nuclear weapons throughout the world.

With the help of interested countries, however, we hope to find a diplomatic solution to this problem through peaceful means. I think the continuation of the international community's attempts to exert pressure on North Korea with the aim of persuading it to pursue a more reasonable and considered policy are extremely important.

[Tretyakov] Mr. President, you have repeatedly stressed that the eradication of corruption is your administration's chief task. A similar task faces Russia too. How do you intend to solve this problem?

[Kim Yong-sam] An attempt to eradicate corruption is always the main task of states wishing to carry out constructive reforms. Russia can be cited as an example, where a special edict on fighting corruption has been issued and a Committee for Fighting Organized Crime has been formed.

I have already stressed repeatedly that the entire people will have to bear the costs of this fight and that the most wealthy citizens will have to make special contributions. There is a Korean proverb which says that "the cleaner the water at the top of the well, the cleaner the water at the bottom." In accordance with this proverb I am trying to develop a movement to clean the water above all at the top, so that this fight can then be waged on the scale of society as a whole. It is impossible to get rid of corruption without a radical restructuring of consciousness in society. The entire population must be immediately included in a campaign to fight corruption, with the aim of creating the favorable social conditions for building a society in which corruption has no place. Such a society must be geared toward the future so that a decisive and brave leap is taken into the 21st century.

[Tretyakov] Recently a keen polemical debate about the question of the correlation between democracy and a market economy has broken out in Russia. In some cases South Korea is cited as an example. Could you explain your view of the correlation between these two factors?

[Kim Yong-sam] Democracy and a market economy are inextricably linked. If we look at the experience of advanced states, democracy, as you know, respects the individual's freedom and initiative. I have in mind a system under which the people are the master.

When I speak of a market economy I mean an economic system in which numerous entrepreneurs and consumers play a leading role in economic activity. Entrepreneurs make every effort to obtain maximum profit, while consumers have the right to choose goods in order to satisfy their needs. Here the government plays the role of an observer, ensuring that such a market economy functions fairly and freely, and the role of a guiding organ which creates a balance between production and consumption. I would like to stress that even if there were no balance between production and consumption, it would be impermissible for the government to interfere directly.

When our economic forces were weak and gross national income was low, we drew up economic development plans and achieved economic growth under the government's leadership. In this process the government was in charge of creating production capacities, and thus it naturally exercised leadership and control of the market economy, but because we chose an export-led growth

strategy we are always fighting to compete in the world market and so are developing our economy.

In the preceding period of Korea's development, competition sprang up in our country and in general a market economy system was created. From this viewpoint, although there was leadership and control coming from the government, our experience differs from that of a centralized planned economy. At present the scale of our economy has been broadened and the market is being rapidly opened up following the trend toward internationalization. After democratization it became difficult for the government to exercise leadership and control using the former methods. I believe that a democratic market economy system must be created, and this is in fact the fundamental principle for building a "new economy" which I have announced and am putting into effect.

We are striving to become an advanced state by creating democracy in the country's political and public life together with a democratic market economy.

[Tretyakov] Every day Russian-South Korean relations are being developed with increasing vigor. Which areas in these relations do you consider the most important and promising?

[Kim Yong-sam] As one of the four powers surrounding the Korean peninsula, Russia can play an important role in questions of ensuring regional security and peace. As for the creation of the necessary conditions for strengthening the Korean peninsula's security and for the peaceful unification of South and North Korea, it must be noted that bilateral relations between the Republic of Korea and Russia are being developed in the area of mutual cooperation.

We hope that Russia will continue to make a constructive contribution to a real departure from the state of the "cold war" situation on the Korean peninsula. We especially hope that Russia will continue to participate actively in the diplomatic efforts aimed at peacefully solving the North Korean nuclear problem, which has become a serious challenge to stability in Northeast Asia and to the entire world community.

Furthermore, as a country possessing vast natural resources and high-level scientific and technical potential, Russia is playing an important role as a partner in economic cooperation with our country. Although Korean-Russian economic cooperation has not yet reached the desired level, if we take account of the complementarity of our two countries' economies I can see that there is great scope for economic cooperation.

[Tretyakov] Besides Russia, with which CIS members does the Republic of Korea have or would like to have the closest relations?

[Kim Yong-sam] Apart from Russia we are seeking to develop relations with other CIS members. Last December we opened an embassy in Ukraine, and we are now studying the question of opening embassies in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan this year.

[Tretyakov] In your view could Russian capital penetrate the Korean market? Will the Korean Government allow it? The reason for this question is that the opposition is reproaching the present Russian Government for opening up the Russian market to other countries, although they are not allowing Russian firms into their market.

[Kim Yong-sam] If Russian capital flows into the sectors opened up by our government it will receive permission—just like other countries' capital.

In the initial phase of developing the economy we had to go through the problems—currently being experienced by the Russian economy—of opening up the market, and even now it is no easy matter. But I would like to say confidently that a policy under which a domestic market is closed and under which it is believed that entrepreneurs of one's country can do everything cannot be successful. This does not mean that the domestic market can be opened up completely without protection and that other countries' entrepreneurs and goods can be allowed to conquer your country's economy.

I believe that if plans to open up a market are made in advance and are implemented gradually, not only will the entrepreneurs of one's country be able to adapt to competition but the country's economy will also be strengthened. Looking at the Republic of Korea's experience, I can see that the constant desire to open up the market and its gradual implementation, with the main emphasis being put on exports, have been a decisive contribution to our economy's development.

Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Fate of Servicemen in Georgia

LD3004144493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1325 GMT 30 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Krylovich and Sergey Nikishov]

[Text] Moscow April 30 TASS—A total of 46 Russian servicemen were killed and over 100 wounded in 1992 alone in Georgia. More than 6,300 armed attacks at military facilities were registered. Over 100 storages [as received] were captured, head of Russian Foreign Ministry's Information and Press Department Sergey Yastrzhembskiy told a briefing here today.

The official cited facts of lawless actions against Russian servicemen, border guards and members of their families registered over the past month, which caused a sharp statement made by the Russian Foreign Ministry a day before. For instance, the dead body of Airborne Battalion Officer Major Voblikov with seven Kalashnikov bullet wounds was found on April 6 in the area of the Dranda settlement of the Gulripsh region, said Sergey

Yastrzhembskiy. According to witnesses, the officer was killed by Georgian servicemen.

On the eve of March 31 Russian troops civilian Aseyev was shot to death through the door of his apartment by Georgian soldiers without any reason. Major (reserve) Moroz has been humiliated by Georgian servicemen since March, 1993, when his apartment was seized by the Georgians, pillaged and turned into a dormitory. Repeated appeals to the local administration resulted in insults and beating of Moroz and threats of physical reprisal.

On April 1 Georgian servicemen put under fire a service car of Colonel Saiganov. The officer was saved from a reprisal by Russian border guards. On April 5 an ethnic Russian was shot to death by Georgian servicemen in the area of the Sukhumi town market.

Large-scale round-ups in various parts of Sukhumi were reported from March 28 to April 1 to reveal on passports ethnic Russians, Armenians and Greeks. After insults and beating, the detained were forced to dig trenches and remove corpses from the warring sides' confrontation line. Their documents were taken away, which prevented these people from leaving the conflict zone and actually made them hostages.

Georgian servicemen clearly told Russian citizens ten ethnic Russians will be killed for each killed in the Abkhazian conflict.

Sergey Yastrzhembskiy stressed the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi have repeatedly called the attention of the Georgian authorities to the inadmissibility of lawless actions against Russian citizens. Still, the situation has not improved.

Ministry Complains of Treatment of Russians in Sukhumi

LD2904150593 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1400 GMT 29 Apr 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze seems to be facing a fresh problem, prompted this time by the plight of the Russian-speaking community in Sukhumi. The Russian Foreign Ministry said today that instances of unlawful treatment of Russian servicemen and their families had become more frequent. Arrests and even murders were taking place. Moscow regards this as a deliberate attempt by certain forces in Georgia to create an intolerable environment for members of the Russian Army. The Russian Foreign Ministry has protested strongly to Georgia and announced that it intends to appeal to the UN about these events.

Yeltsin Letter Protests Latvian Actions Against Russians

LD3004080093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0718 GMT 30 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Sitnikov]

[Text] United Nations April 30 TASS—The stripping of Latvia's Russian-speaking population of Latvian citizenship and subsequently of the right to choose freely their place of residence creates the basis for ethnic purges in the republic and constitutes a flagrant violation of human rights, says a statement of President Yeltsin, which was circulated on Thursday [29 April] at the U.N. headquarters as an official document of the U.N. General Assembly.

The resolution of the Latvian parliament "on the issuing of provisional residence permits to people, whose stay in Latvia is connected with the temporary deployment of the Russian Armed Forces in the Latvian republic" is depriving a considerable part of the Latvian population of the right to live in the country on legal grounds, the statement says. "Thus, the inhuman policy of pressurizing the Russian-speaking population into leaving the country continues to be pursued by the Latvian authorities."

The statement pointed out that the resolution may affect tens of thousands of people, who lived in the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic on legal grounds and had its citizenship. "The incumbent Latvian authorities have stripped them of citizenship on their own accord, thus violating their commitments that stem from the U.N. convention on the reduction of non-citizenship. Now they are going to deprive that part of the population of the right to a free choice of the place of residence, which is one of the basic human rights. This reveals the intention to revive the conception of "collective punishment", which was denounced on more than one occasion in the 20th century. International law does not allow measures, taken by the state, which lead to the worsening of the human rights situation. Latvia is actually creating a basis for ethnic purges," the statement says.

The world community, the United Nations Organisation, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and human rights organisations, the attention of which has been called more than once to the lack of legal protection for ethnic Russians in the Baltic countries, cannot but denounce new gross human rights violations on a massive scale, which are being prepared in Latvia, the document stresses.

Foreign Ministry Informs Estonia, Latvia on Visas

WS2904075793 Tallinn BNS in English 1759 GMT 28 Apr 93

[Text] Moscow, Apr 28, BNS—The Russian Foreign Ministry at last officially informed Estonia and Latvia of the introduction of the visa regime on May 12.

The corresponding notes dating from April 23 reached the consular departments of the embassies of Estonia and Latvia in Moscow.

According to international practice, the other state is to be informed of the introduction of a visa regime 30 days in advance.

The first informal information about the introduction of the visa regime reached the press in mid-April.

The order of issuing visas has not been determined by the notes. The Russian Foreign Ministry informed BNS that the citizens of Estonia and Latvia can obtain visas on equal grounds with the citizens of foreign states.

Persons who possess the internal passports of the former Soviet Union (even if they are registered in Estonia) can cross the border without visas until February 6, 1995. By that time, all citizens of the former Soviet Union will have to decide whether they wish to be citizens of Russia or not.

Russian Airborne Division Leaves Ukrainian Territory

PM2904114793 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 27 Apr 93

[By Sergey Fateyev and Boris Zamchinskiy; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] The withdrawal of the 98th Belgorod Airborne Division from Ukraine to Russian territory began today.

[Fateyev] One train after another is leaving the Bessarabian steppes in southern Ukraine today, bearing away one of the most illustrious divisions, a first wave [pervyy podyem] division, as they are known—these are airborne troops. After Ukraine adopted a course of taking the troops and arms on its territory under national control 18 months ago, the overwhelming majority of the personnel in the Belgorod Division refused to take the oath to the Ukrainian people. Initially its opposition was no less fierce than that of the Black Sea Fleet. It needed the maximum restraint and the ability and will to listen to one another in order to arrive at the only correct solution in this situation, namely to share out the division in a fraternal way. [addresses V.N. Stepanov, deputy commander of Odessa Military District] What will Ukraine be getting?

[Stepanov] It will get the bulk of the equipment and arms. The fixed-term NCO's and men are Ukrainian citizens; they are serving here and will remain here.

[V.A. Sorokin, deputy commander of the Russian Airborne Division] I think that we will continue to maintain our links.

[Fateyev] A good example of how the most serious and most acute military problems in relations between Russia and Ukraine can be resolved. [Video shows trains carrying freight under cover, tank loading operations, interviews.]

Additional Battalion Sent to Tajikistan

MK2904130693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Apr 93 p 3

[Oleg Panfilolv report under "Opinion" rubric: "Russia Sends Another Battalion to Tajikistan. Military Contingent Could Be Increased"]

[Text] Unlike other proposals emanating from the president's apparatus, on 27 April the Russian Supreme Soviet fairly quickly adopted a decree on sending an additional battalion to Tajikistan to "reinforce the body of peacekeeping forces."

As has been learned from news agency reports, when addressing the deputies Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev stressed that Russia has a certain "area of special responsibility and special interests in Tajikistan." He also added that there are around 200,000 members of the Russian-speaking population in Tajikistan, which, it must be assumed, was one of the reasons for sending additional weapons and soldiers there. Nothing was said about whether the Russian-speaking population is being subjected to persecution from either side. The same agencies report that there are already battalions from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan in Tajikistan. The Kazakhstani Supreme Soviet adopted a similar decree on 14 April, but is not rushing to send its own battalion, while Kyrgyzstan withdrew its battalions from Badakhshan three weeks ago. Only Uzbekistan is preserving its presence: personnel and equipment, including military aircraft from Andizhan and helicopters of the Kagan Regiment near Bukhara.

Changes in the Russian military in Tajikistan have also taken place on the border. Following the sudden transfer to Moscow of Major General Vitaliy Gritsan, 47-year-old Major General Anatoliy Chechulin, who previously served at Border Troops headquarters in Moscow, was appointed the new commander of the Russian Border Troops group in Tajikistan. Gen. Gritsan attributed his transfer to a change in the political situation. It is known that he tried to assess events in Tajikistan carefully, giving preference to an internal political settlement. Gen. Chechulin has also stated that "the language of the gun is short-lived," assessing the situation on the border as very complex. According to him, "the preconditions for its becoming less tense do not exist."

A change in command is hard to explain at the moment. Gen. Chechulin will possibly be better able to resolve the situation. From 1951 through 1964 he lived in Dushanbe, and from 1984 to 1987 he was commander of the Moscow Border Troops Detachment (Tajikistan), in the very place where battles have been going on for almost a month.

Another factor being encountered by the warring forces in Tajikistan has been introduced. While accusing the opposition of attracting Afghan mujahidin into their ranks, government formations are using mercenaries from among the "wild geese" who are earning money in Karabakh, Abkhazia, and the Dniester region. The mercenaries are giving interviews which have been published in several publications—from Russia's TRUD to America's NEWSWEEK. Refugees fleeing from southern areas are also recounting the mercenaries' brutal actions.

The situation in Tajikistan has now acquired the features of a contemporary war. Nobody knows how it will end. It can only be assumed that, judging from the absence of a reaction from the Russian leadership to human rights violations, for example in neighboring Uzbekistan, Moscow will turn a blind eye to the Tajik refugee situation. Russian democrats are also unlikely to heed appeals from likeminded people from the East. On the other hand, in order to protect itself from a potential enemy, Russia will guard the Tajik-Afghan border as its own, supporting any regime that agrees to offer its territory as a buffer zone. Of the army formations it is mainly Russian and Uzbek military personnel who are taking part in the combat operations in Tajikistan: their own soldiers are either badly trained or do not want to fight against their own brothers and co-religionists. Sooner or later the single faith factor could play its part, and Russian politicians cannot be unaware of this. It is unlikely that Russian military intelligence officers cannot see that the current Tajik Government's opponents are not a pathetic bunch of extremists, and that if the entire Tajik people supported the current leadership (as claimed by Premier Abdumalik Abdullodzhanov), it would be unlikely that the republic's territory would now look like a theater of military operations.

In many areas differences have appeared among People's Front members, who often express their dissatisfaction with the aid of assault rifles—in Gissarskiy and Leninskiy Rayons and in the former Kulyab Oblast. The main reason for the conflicts is the distribution of posts. Large opposition forces are concentrated in Afghanistan. The longer the confrontation drags on, the more new and purely Tajik mujahidin will appear in opposition ranks. If Russia does not act as an intermediary in establishing civil peace, it will have to send its battalions increasingly often, like in Afghanistan in the eighties.

Khizha Reports on Defense Conversion to European Parliament

LD2904193693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1918 GMT 29 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Shashkov]

[Text] Brussels April 29 TASS—The European Parliament has held hearings on the problem of conversion of military industry in Russia and aid to Russia in this sphere. The hearings were held on the initiative of the Parliamentary Commission for Foreign Affairs.

The majority of participants in the hearings voiced the idea that the success of the conversion of a part of Russia's military industry to civil use is the key element which can play a decisive role in the revival of the Russian economy.

Russian Vice-Premier Georgiy Khizha addressed the parliament, saying that Western countries have realistic intentions to help Russia carry out the conversion by providing funds raised as a result of cutting military expenditures. Khizha said that the Russian Government believes the most efficient way is to encourage joint activities by Western and Russian companies, aimed at the re-orientation of the military industry to the output of civil production with the help of equipment and technology provided by Western partners and by using the latest achievements of Russian defence enterprises.

In this connection great importance is being attached to the participation of the Russian industrial complex in the international division of labour. Khizha pointed out that Russia's defence industry incorporates the best enterprises and possesses powerful scientific and research potential. The achievements of defence industry, including on the world level, can be efficiently used for peaceful purposes.

However, Khizha pointed out that in order to use the potential of Russia's defence complex, it is necessary to ensure conditions for the sales of its products on the world market, create equal conditions for competition, lift restrictions on the sales of new technology and distribution of export quotas.

Khizha noted that at present, Russia has legal grounds for the implementation of major international investment programmes. The East-West programme of military conversion can become one of them, Khizha said. In his opinion, the time has come when Western enterprises can participate in Russian conversion projects on a programme basis.

A programme of privatisation for 1993 is to contribute to this process, since under this programme, a considerable number of defence-related enterprises are subject to conversion, Khizha said.

He pointed out that at present, Russia has all the necessary organizational, legal and conceptual prerequisites for the practical implementation of Western plans to give Russia real aid in the conversion of military industry.

Comments on Western Aid

LD2904195093 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1600 GMT 29 Apr 93

[By correspondent Mazheyka; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Officers from the Western Group of Forces in Germany have been invited to the hearings on problems of conversion in Russia, but the delegation itself is made

up of captains of industry. More simply, the military-industrial complex. The problem is a extremely topical one: Ministry of Defense orders have been massively reduced by 60 percent, while the optimum rate for conversion is no more than six percent. [Video shows Russian officers at conference, captions read: "Europarliament, Brussels" and "Footage from the Europarliament TV corporation"; camera cuts to show Mazheyka interviewing Russian Vice Premier Georgiy Stepanovich Khizha]

[Mazheyka] Georgiy Stepanovich, how does the West see conversion Russian-style?

[Khizha] Well, the West is showing a lot of interest. Help from the West, and participation by Western firms, particularly by Western private firms, and help from the EC, so to speak, is so far minimal and highly ineffectual. Of course, everybody is expressing concern at the fact that such a development of events and the sort of conversion we are having could lead to lamentable results in the whole world as well as in our own country.

Political Issues

Further Reportage on Expanded Session of Government

LD2904165793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1603 GMT 29 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Ivan Ivanov and Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow April 29 TASS—The Russian Council of Ministers has held a meeting in the Kremlin today focusing on various aspects of socio-economic development of the Russian Federation in the first quarter of 1993 and the current tasks and the course of the execution of the government's plan of actions on the implementation of economic reforms in 1993. The council meeting has also considered the main directions of the government's regional policy in accordance with the clauses of the federal treaty. Taking part in the meeting were Russian President Boris Yeltsin, members of the government, the leadership of the Supreme Soviet, leaders of the republics within the Russian Federation, territories, regions and autonomies of Russia.

Speaking at the meeting, President Boris Yeltsin said that it was being held in a principally new political situation - when the preliminary results of the nationwide referendum had been summed up. Boris Yeltsin stressed Russian citizens had confirmed their confidence in the president and government. "But the foremost result is that the Russian people are supporting the policy of profound radical reforms being carried out by the president and government since 1992. This is a sensation of the referendum, a big surprise which the Russian people have delivered to the opponents of reforms. Now our task is to justify the confidence which has been given to us," Boris Yeltsin said.

"All should understand that the president and the government and the policy of reforms now have popular protection. The decisions which contradict the people's will, no matter by whom they were made, from now on will not be implemented and should be abolished. The Congress and the Supreme Soviet ought to make up their minds: Whether they support the course of the president and the government or whether these bodies will confront the people directly," the Russian president emphasised.

The major task now, the president continued, is to strengthen the first signs of stabilisation which are beginning to appear. Only on this basis, Boris Yeltsin believes, is it possible to create the conditions for a stable rise in the people's standard of living.

In a report on the socio-economic development of Russia in the first quarter of this year, the current tasks and the course of the execution of the Council of Ministers' plan of actions on the implementation of economic reforms in 1993, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin stressed that "the Russian Government sets itself the main task of achieving national accord in its economic policy." The head of the Russian cabinet characterized the current economic situation as an "unsteady balance and stagnation of the crisis". To stabilize the situation, more active and clear actions of the government are needed, the Russian premier believes.

According to Viktor Chernomyrdin, top priorities in the Russian Government's economic policy in the near future include social support of the population, the struggle against inflation, the realisation of the privatisation programme, raising the extent of control in the state sector of the economy, selective support for prospective production and guaranteeing of Russia's territorial integrity on the basis of the federal treaty. The forthcoming tasks of the government for May-June 1993 include the "suppression of inflation at any cost" and the introduction of strict orienting points in credit and monetary policy", and others, the Russian premier noted.

Speaking on the second item of the agenda, Vice-Premier Sergey Shakhray said the strengthening of the Russian economy, the development of federalism and local self-government should become top priorities in the regional policy of the Russian Federation at the present stage. The observation of these priorities will make it possible to preserve Russia as a single state, create conditions for the development of a "normal market economy" and ensure comparable people's living standards in different regions of the country.

Chernomyrdin on Economic Reform

PM3004101593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 30 Apr 93 p 2

[Excerpts from report by Viktor Chernomyrdin, chairman of Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government, at 29 April Council of Ministers session: "Viktor Chernomyrdin: 'Processes of Reforming Our Economy Have Largely Become Irreversible'"]

[Text] In its practical work the government proceeds from the actual situation and from the actual potential which it possesses. If we approach the determination of economic policy from this viewpoint, we must note at least two aspects.

First, an important part of the road has been traveled, and the processes of reforming our economy have largely become irreversible.

Second, we should advance vigorously along the road of reforms, only now without jerks or revolutions. We must consistently adjust the work of the new market mechanisms and reduce to a minimum the problems of the transitional period. The results of the 25 April referendum create the necessary political preconditions for this. The people supported the president and advocated the policy of reforms. This enables us to act more decisively and to advance more boldly.

What the Government Did During the First Three Months of 1993

At the previous enlarged session of the Council of Ministers 11 February we made a joint effort and drew up the Government's Action Plan for 1993. It embraces the whole package of questions of the economic reform.

Among the most important measures implemented so far I should name the decisions adopted on the agro-industrial complex, on the population's social protection, on the conversion program, and on trade and economic relations with CIS countries. Special attention was devoted to the development of small business and to state support for it. The federal "Housing" program was examined and approved. Decisions on improving foreign economic activity were adopted.

Although the plan is being monitored constantly by the government, I must say frankly that it is being fulfilled unsatisfactorily. The main "debtors" include the Ministry of the Economy, the State Committee for the Management of State Property, the Goskomprom [State Committee for Industry], and the Ministry of Transport. The biggest misgivings, however, result from the implementation of measures in the sphere of financial and monetary-credit policy. The Ministry of Finance is coping worst of all with its commissions. We realize that these are extremely complex questions which require the adoption of concerted decisions with the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet.

While justly criticizing the Ministry of Finance, at the same time we cannot fail to see that the Central Bank of the Russian Federation bears a large share of the responsibility. It is the Central Bank that is holding up the preparation and coordination of documents on improving the system of transactions and regulating enterprises' mutual obligations, on increasing sanctions against banks for holding up bill payment operations, on using enterprises' funds to clear payment arrears, and a number of others. The result is the diminishing effectiveness of the efforts being made to curb inflation.

An analysis of the current economic situation shows that the main trends which took shape in the social production sphere last year have continued during the first four months of this year. Stabilization of the average monthly volumes of industrial production has been observed for eight months, and in the first quarter this indicator was approximately 2 percent higher than in the fourth quarter of last year.

Does this attest that we are already emerging from the crisis? Not in our opinion. For the level of industrial production that has taken shape during these months remains extremely low: It is 19 percent below the first quarter of 1992.

Assessing the overall economic results of the first quarter, it is possible to say that the present economic situation can be characterized as an extremely shaky temporary equilibrium, which it would be more correct to call "stagnation of crisis." We are convinced, however, that, given efficient and correct actions, the government will be able to stabilize the situation.

Most Important Avenues of Deepening the Reform and Changes in the Tactic of Implementing It

In which avenues do we see the need to define more precisely the policy that is being implemented?

First, the **social thrust** of economic policy is being strengthened. It should be acknowledged that very, very little was done last year for the social orientation of the reforms. Hard though it may be to recognize this, we simply do not have the right to take on obligations that cannot be fulfilled. We do not have the potential to support everyone or to restore everyone's former living standard and actual income and savings within a short time. But we must act!

Second, a very important priority of our policy is **the consistent struggle against inflation and the instilling of order in the financial and monetary-credit sphere**.

Third, we will continue the work on implementing the Privatization Program, and at the same time we will take effective measures to **enhance manageability in the state sector of the economy**.

Fourth, the government is introducing new elements into its **structural policy**. The essence of the new approach is to ensure selective support for production, for progressive structural changes, and for points of future economic growth while keeping within the confines of the existing limited resources.

Fifth, substantial changes are being made to **regional policy**. Here our key task is to preserve and strengthen the integrity of the Russian Federation, underpinned by full-blooded realization of the Federation Treaty.

Strengthening the Social Thrust of the Government's Activity

The scale of social support at all levels is not all that small today: A number of decisions in the sphere of raising living standards and stepping up social protection for the population have been adopted since the beginning of 1993 at a total cost of 9.7 trillion rubles [R] (including R6.3 trillion from the budget).

Following the adoption of decisions establishing a new minimum for labor remuneration, wage rates in the budget sphere were increased twice. The pay of servicemen and of privates and command personnel of internal affairs organs and the sizes of child allowances and compensation payments were increased twice. Pensions and their minimum level have been increased as of 1 May 1993, and the social problems of students and postgraduate students have not been forgotten.

It should be stated frankly that not all measures to maintain and raise the population's living standards were coordinated between the president, the Supreme

Soviet, and the Council of Ministers. Sometimes we were simply faced with a fait accompli. No one is opposed to increasing wages, pensions, grants, and allowances. But such decisions must be worked out in advance in the government.

The main task is to better target social support. The least well-off sections of the population must undoubtedly take priority. Pensioners and large and incomplete families will be given assistance not only in the form of monetary payments but also by means of providing them with a certain minimum of vital necessities at affordable prices.

One of the most acute and painful issues in the social sphere is the protection of the population's monetary savings. Here the general line consists in bringing interest rates on savings bank deposits closer to a positive level. We will try to restore, at least partially, the population's savings which have been "eaten away" by inflation.

Questions of labor remuneration also demand attention. It is necessary to even out the unfounded discrepancies in the level of earnings in the extracting and processing sectors, as well as between individual regions. The corresponding commissions have already been given to the Russian Ministry of Labor.

The government will also implement measures aimed at maintaining the levels of labor remuneration in sectors in the budget sphere with due regard for the change in the cost of living index.

Anti-Inflationary Policy and Financial Stabilization

Experience has shown that the main condition for an effective anti-inflationary policy in Russia can only be comprehensive influence on both component processes of the formation of market prices—supply and demand. This influence should be exercised at the initiative of the state in the following main directions.

The paramount task is to slow down the growth of the money mass.

Interest policy is becoming an increasingly important instrument of money and credit regulation. To this end it is planned gradually to extend the Central Bank's operating prime rate to all the credits it issues, consistently bringing it closer to the point where it is ahead of the inflation level. The task of restoring the reliability of the payments system and reducing settlement deadlines is an urgent one.

Another very important element in influencing demand within the framework of anti-inflationary policy is the reforming of the budget system, the consistent reduction of the federal budget deficit through the consolidation of the revenue base and the reduction of expenditure. For this it is planned to introduce amplification to the budget for 1993 on the basis **of a program of tough economic stringency in federal budget expenditure.**

In implementing **taxation policy** in 1993 the government sees its main task in improving the procedure for levying existing taxes and primarily value-added tax. So far taxation discipline is at an extremely low level. On instructions from the government proposals are now being prepared for improving the taxation system and consolidating tax discipline.

A special role in achieving financial stability belongs **to the consolidation of enterprises' financial position.** The government has decided to go halfway to meet enterprises, relieving them of taxation on their own profit if it goes to swell working capital. The work of the interdepartmental commission for enterprises' financial recovery is being resumed. We shall also use **anti-inflationary measures of influencing supply.**

One of the most important is **the development of markets which are new for modern Russian conditions—markets for housing, real estate, land, and the funds of privatized and joint-stock enterprises.** Already these markets have a large potential and could divert substantial volumes of cash and noncash money, substantially reducing the tension on the market for traditional goods and services.

Implementation of Privatization Program

The most important tasks in 1993 will be:

—the completion of the process of small-scale privatization;

—the acceleration of the transformation of large and medium enterprises into joint-stock companies;

—the extensive implementation of voucher auctions including regional and interregional auctions;

—the reduction of various bans and restrictions on privatization.

With a consideration for the experience of 1992 the government considers it essential to embark on a substantial expansion of the rights and potential of regions in implementing privatization and to consider more carefully the features of their entry into the market.

Having issued privatization vouchers we must now ensure Russian citizens the necessary conditions for selling them, giving everyone the opportunity to exchange his vouchers for shares by the end of the year.

In this connection it is essential to resolve a number of questions for the intensification of social guarantees in the course of privatization. The government will pay special attention to the creation of a network of specialized investment funds which accumulate citizens' privatization vouchers and to the improvement of information about the possibilities for using privatization vouchers.

Structural Policy, Support for Production and Entrepreneurship [subhead]

An active structural policy based on clearly revealed priorities is becoming one of the main avenues in the activity of the government, ministries, and departments.

Considering the extremely limited nature of financial resources and the need to combat inflation, the government's structural policy will be strictly selective. We shall issue funds only for economically well substantiated, highly effective projects. That is the only method accessible to us for combining support for production with the monitoring of inflation.

The agrarian sector remains the focus of our concern. It is suffering more than the others from inflation but after all the majority of farms are still working in the old style, in the way to which they are accustomed. Therefore, in speaking of stabilization we must not forget the need for in-depth agrarian transformations.

We are not marking time: Over two years of reforms Russia's citizens have received twice as much land as they had before the start of the reform. The desire to have one's own peasant farm is not abating, there are already 230,000 of these farms.

As early as this year we must expand the front of the agrarian reform and give the peasant an outlet onto the market and curb industry's monopolism.

We shall support all spheres of the peasant cooperative movement in production, credit, and insurance.

Current Tasks

We must now clearly outline our immediate tasks, which must be resolved in May-June.

The most urgent task is the suppression of inflation. Inflation must be suppressed come what may, at any price. We cannot allow ourselves to have inflation of 20-30 percent a month.

In the struggle against inflation it is essential to continue the practice of establishing tough guidelines for monetary and credit policy. We have already agreed with the Central Bank on the limit of up to 30 percent for the growth of credits in the second quarter. I consider it essential to approve limits for credits expansion for the third quarter of 1993 of 20 percent and in the fourth quarter of no more than 15 percent.

By the end of June we must decide what to do with **prices for energy carriers.** This subject has become almost a forbidden one. But it does exist, yet we are afraid to touch it. Again policy is beginning to prevail over th economy. We must prepare proposals for prices for coal, elaborate a regime of liberalization suited to the present situation in the national economy, calculate all possible consequences, and make a decision. There is an urgent need to liberalize prices for coal with compensation for coal workers from the budget for the difference between the market price of coal and the real expenditure over a certain period. Balanced decisions on oil and gas are also needed.

On the problem of nonpayments. We must immediately adopt a package of documents on the normalization of settlements. But it should be clear to everyone that there will be no indexing of working capital. The quantity of money in the national economy is already sufficient. Everyone must learn to work in a competitive market, learn to earn money.

I shall make a separate mention of **bankruptcies.** We talk a lot about it but there is so far no working mechanism. Neither the State Committee for the Administration of State Property nor the Ministry of the Economy nor the Ministry of Finance has yet suggested an effective method of defining bankrupts nor specific targets nor specific deadlines. But delaying with this matter means causing even greater harm to the economy.

We must investigate attentively the entire **institutional backup for reform.** Primarily the ministries. We must ascertain which of them are unnecessary and may consequently be abolished. In general in a normal market economy there are just a few actual economic ministries: ministries of finance, of the economy as a whole (frequently including foreign trade issues), labor and social questions, and science. But how many of them are there in our country? We must seek out at every stage of the reforms suitable managerial decisions and make new institutions directly connected with the main link of the economy and working with enterprises on a commercial basis the government's representatives.

The results of the referendum demand that we advance resolutely and uncompromisingly. The Russians' reply to the referendum's second question is a clear demand from the people that the economic reforms be continued. But it is an advance, a trust which we all still have to earn. And by our work we will prove that this trust was not placed in us in vain.

Chernomyrdin, Shakhray on Priorities

LD2904212993 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1906 GMT 29 Apr 93

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Viktor Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Council of Ministers, said that the Russian Government sees its main objective as being to achieve national accord in economic policy. He delivered a report on the results of the country's social and economic development in the first quarter of this year. He set out the Council of Ministers' action plan for the further implementation of the economic reforms.

[Begin Chernomyrdin recording] We have been given a further credit of trust which we must use to bring the Russian economy into a working regime that will make it possible in essence to stabilize the lives of our people.

For we need results that will make it possible to confidently, firmly, and reliably see and move toward the intended aims. [end recording]

The premier described the economic situation which has arisen today, and I quote, as a fragile balance and stagnation in crisis. What are needed to stabilize the position, he said, are more vigorous and clear actions by the government. The chairman of the Council of Ministers cited many data on the state of the economy of Russia in the first quarter. In particular, the budget deficit was over 10 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. Credit investments are provided mainly by emissions. Particular disquiet is being caused by the overall reduction in the extraction of fuel and power resources. The extraction of oil has fallen by 15 percent, coal by 10 percent. Output of agricultural produce is declining and the number of cattle is falling.

Viktor Chernomyrdin named among the priorities of the government's economic policy for the near future social support for the population, the struggle against inflation, the implementation of the privatization program, and also raising the level of control in the state sector of the economy.

[Begin Chernomyrdin recording] We must now clearly define our immediate tasks which must be resolved in May and June. We are realists and so we understand very well that only frivolous people could provide an improvement in the situation in a couple of months. This is in essence impossible, but by concentrating on priority areas we can in a short period bring economic stabilization closer. The most urgent task is to curb inflation. Inflation must be curbed at all costs, whatever the cost. We cannot allow ourselves to have inflation running at 20-30 per centper month. [end recording]

Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray stressed that strengthening the economy, federalism, and local self-rule are the three mainstays of Russia's regional policy. He noted that the implementation of these priorities are capable of preserving Russia as a united state, creating conditions for the development of a normal market economy, and ensuring a comparable standard of living for the population in various regions of the country.

The results of the referendum, Sergey Shakhray said, revealed that the transformations were not proceeding at an equal rate in the various regions. Today, taking account of these results, the government should pay particular attention to those territories where less than 50 percent of the electorate came out in favor of the socio-economic policy of the Russian leadership. It is necessary to draft special programs for these territories to intensify the process of reforms.

The vice premier spoke in favor of stepping up the search for forms of cooperation between the center and the subjects of the Federation.

[Begin Shakhray recording] The following variant may be of interest: To include in the collegia of the ministries representatives of regional and interregional associations which, overall, embrace virtually the whole territory of Russia. [end recording]

Sergey Shakhray noted the importance of the cadre aspect of regional policy. It is necessary to restore the circulation of qualified cadres at the federal level, he stressed.

The debate on the reports continued behind closed doors.

Cabinet To Enhance State Role in Economy

LD2904082793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0754 GMT 29 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow April 29 TASS—"The results of Russia's socio-economic development in the first quarter of 1993 show that the resolute switchover to market mechanisms is on the whole correct and has already yielding definite results. However, this course has to be substantially corrected by resolutely enhancing the state's influence on the economy, by stiffly coordinating the economic efforts of all the executive authorities, and by promoting a state- regulated economy", this is pointed out in materials drawn up by the Russian Economics Ministry and handed out to members of the Russian Council of Ministers, meeting here today.

The document says that "attempts to influence the economy by purely monetary methods have not yielded effective results". Hence, it was found necessary to correct the economic policy in the first quarter of 1993. The purpose of this correction is to "enhance the state's influence on economic processes, particularly on material production".

State support to enterprises was effected in 1992 and in the first quarter of 1993 in the form of target budget allocations and various financial, tax, credit and foreign economic privileges. This backing, the document says, was given not on the basis of a comprehensive mutually coordinated plan, but by satisfying separate requests for support, constantly received from individual enterprises and regions.

The government is now faced with the task of going over from financial injections into individual enterprises and regions to the elaboration of a comprehensive plan to enhance state influence on the country's socio-economic development, the materials of the Economics Ministry stress. This plan will constitute a separate chapter on measures to enhance state influence on the country's socio-economic development, included in the forecast on Russia's socio-economic development in 1994, now being drawn up by the government.

In order to enhance the effectiveness of state economic management, the Economics Ministry moves to urgently draw up and endorse a programme of the government's and Central Bank's "anti- inflationary actions, directly linked with efforts to reduce the budget deficit, to render

social support to the population and restructure the economy. The handed out materials also stress the need to select the most effective factories, regions, fuel, power, food and transport enterprises, scientific and technical complexes, as well as military plants that are now being regeared to civilian rails, requiring prompt and maximum financial support. The urgent measures, proposed by the Ecomomics Ministry, also include tough control over the fulfilment of 1993 targets for the output of various goods and over the fulfilment state needed works, steps to raise the legal and financial responsibility of banks for the timely handling of payment documents, and measures to set up a system of state entrepreneurship in the country.

Socioeconomic Measures Approved

LD2904194993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1817 GMT 29 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Ivan Ivanov and Sergey Podiyapolskiy]

[Text] Moscow April 29 TASS—At its today's meeting in the Kremlin, the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation has approved in principle a draft resolution on the socio-economic development of the Russian Federation in the first quarter of this year, the current tasks and the course of the execution of the government's plan of action on the implementation of economic reforms in 1993. Summing up the discussion on these issues, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said that after an appropriate elaboration he would sign this resolution within the next few days.

A 15-page document says that in the first quarter of 1993 the rates of industrial production fall went down, and a tendency for a gradual achievement of a certain balance between demand and supply took shape. "However, the country's economy is still in a crisis state. The majority of branches of the national economy continue to maintain negative tendencies which formed at the end of 1992, the struggle against inflationary processes has not been carried out to a full extent, and a living standard of the main part of the population continues to decline," the draft resolution runs.

Taking into account the miscalculations made in conducting economic reform and the sharpening of the social and economic crisis, the government "considers it necessary to introduce some alterations in separate directions of the economic policy and tactics of implementing reforms." The gist of these changes, the draft resolution says, is to "strengthen the course of reforms, switch over to balanced and realistic decisions which will take into account the strengthening of a social factor, make credit and monetary relations and anti-inflationary policy more active, to raise the extent of control over the national economy, and change a structural policy."

A section of the document, dealing with a social policy, stresses that the main criterion of measures on the further reforming of the economy, the depth and the rate of implementing all the components of economic reforms will be the stabilisation of the people's living standards in the country.

When improving the mechanism of social protection of the population, special attention should be paid to the "stabilisation and improvement of material conditions of people's life, and the orientated state support for the most socially vulnerable sections and groups of the population," the draft resolution recommends. The document also considers it necessary to work out and submit to the parliament bills on the regulation of payment for labour in Russia, living subsistence wage, and the acceleration of the preparation of proposals on protecting people's deposits to savings banks.

In the field of a financial and budget, credit and monetary policies the draft resolution stressed the need to concentrate the activities of the government together with the Central Bank of Russia on the implementation of a "complex of practical measures ensuring the consistent movement towards the financial stabilisation, the reduction of a budget deficit and a credit emission, curbing the inflation, the normalisation of monetary circulation and strengthening of the rouble." For this purpose it is considered necessary to conduct radical reforming of the budget system of the Russian Federation, specifically on the basis of the comprehensive strengthening of the income base of budgets of all levels, the maximum reduction of secondary expenses and subsidies, and a stage-by-stage transition to non-inflationary methods of covering a budget deficit. It is also planned to unify a tax regime for all the subjects of economic management with the abolition of economically groundless privileges, to a maximum extent simplify the order of tax collection and ensure a strict control over the observance of tax discipline.

With the aim of raising the level of control over the national economy, the Russian Ministries of Economy and Finance are commissioned to work out within a month's time a complex of interconnected measures on the strengthening of state influence on the economy.

In the field of foreign economic activities, the ministries and departments concerned, as well as state corporations because of the unsatisfactory situation with export deliveries for state needs and purchases in critical imports, are ordered "to take measures for the unconditional ensuring of top priority deliveries of goods for the state needs at the expense of enterprises' export quotas for the purpose of securing social protection of the population." They are also assigned to establish effective control over exporting strategically important commodities and excluding cases of their sale on foreign markets at dumping prices.

The most urgent current tasks of the government for the second quarter of this year are considered to be the financial stabilisation and the reduction of inflation rates "at the expense of strict economies of expenditure

in the federal and regional budgets, strengthening their budget revenue base, streamlining the system of granting subventions, tax and other state privileges, and strengthening financial discipline." The draft resolution also stresses the need to take urgent measures to "stabilize industrial and agricultural production."

Changes in Cabinet Called For

LD2904213593 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2020 GMT 29 Apr 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] At a government sitting today, Russian President Yeltsin outlined several points of his action program following the referendum.

He stressed that the results of the vote in support of the president and the government show that the reform policy is now defended by the people, and Yeltsin declared that decisions that ran counter to the will of the people, whoever might adopt them, should no longer be implemented and must be annulled. As the president put it, the legislators must make up their minds: either they back the policies of the president and the government, or they embark on a confrontation that is now with the people.

According to Yeltsin, the actual government will correct the mistakes committed in its work. Several representatives of the president have already hinted that there may be modifications to the composition of the cabinet. There are persistent calls for this from the president and from his most radical supporters, the leaders of the committee of democratic organizations. They have already expressed the view that Central Bank chairman Gerashchenko, Deputy Prime Minister Khizha, and Transport Minister Yefimov should be removed from the cabinet.

Mechanism for Federative Treaty Approved

LD2904191693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1859 GMT 29 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Ivan Ivanov and Sergey Podyapolskiy]

[Text] Moscow April 29 TASS—The Russian Government approved on Thursday the documents drafted by the commission set up to work out a mechanism of implementing the federative treaty and to delimitate powers between Russia's federal governing bodies and those of the subjects of federation.

The documents submitted by the commission include a draft resolution by the government on a procedure for the creation and functioning of regional divisions of Russian ministries and agencies. Under this document, these divisions are to form part of Russia's executive branch of government and to operate under the guidance of the corresponding federal bodies in coordination with the regional executive bodies. The said divisions will help the state to regulate the socio-economic development of the subjects of federation.

Another draft resolution backs a proposal to establish coordinating councils under the key ministries, which are to include top ministerial officials and representatives from the subjects of federation.

The government also approved of the commission's approach to a problem of powers to be vested in regional executive bodies in the sphere of licensing certain types of activities on their territory.

'Decisive But Consistent Policy' Urged

LD2904191493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1816 GMT 29 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Podyapolskiy]

[Text] Moscow April 29 TASS—Today's enlarged meeting of the Russian Government recommended the president to pursue "a decisive but consistent policy", Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray told a news conference at the close of the meeting. Apart from the government ministers, the meeting was attended by representatives of the subjects of federation and the country's different regions.

According to Shakhray, the meeting was held in a calm and businesslike atmosphere. "There was no disagreement as to whether implement reforms or not", he said. [sentence as received] A number of speakers at the meeting came out for adjusting personnel policy so that, in full compliance with the referendum results, to dispose of those who, being vested with power, have been balking the reforms. Speaking about another specific feature of the meeting, the deputy prime minister noted that "it may go down in history, because none of its participants criticized privatization".

Shakhray also told reporters about a partial redistribution of duties among the deputy prime ministers. From now on Yuriy Yarov will be in charge of social problems, while Shakhray himself will be responsible for regional policies in addition to ethnic affairs.

Chernomyrdin Interviewed

LD2904190393 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 29 Apr 93

[Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin by correspondent Natalya Chernyshova on 29 April in Moscow; introduction by Chernyshova; from the "Novosti" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Chernyshova] I will point out on my own account that today's great day of executive power, if one bears in mind both the president's meeting with the subjects of the Federation and the government session, was marked by a general decisiveness. So, after Viktor Chernomyrdin's main report, we asked him to answer our questions.

Viktor Stepanovich, I have been asking you for a long time when the program would appear. It was published today. Is that connected with the situation that has taken shape within the country?

[Chernomyrdin] It is connected above all with the fact that we, nevertheless, have sorted a few things out more or less thoroughly. And, of course, it was very important for us to determine the criteria for this year, 1993. They are far from simple, as you have heard in the report, but in the end we have now firmly determined what we need to do.

[Chernyshova] You are giving very many rights to local government. Will that not lead to the country's becoming ungovernable?

[Chernomyrdin] That does not frighten me at all. On the contrary, I am sure that, if we define more precisely what should be done at regional level, we will only gain from that.

[Chernyshova] A contest has now arisen between the executive and the legislature about who will promise more benefits for the people. Is one to understand in your speech that, nevertheless, such unchecked and uncalculated promises to the Supreme Soviet will be somehow modified with executive power?

[Chernomyrdin] I think that is the greatest misfortune, incidentally. What is needed here is not a contest but sober calculation. If decisions are taken, then we need to receive something. As for what has now been done, said and published, there will certainly be no back-tracking, but from now on all long-term questions will be strictly calculated.

Yeltsin Appoints Soskovets First Deputy Premier

LD3004101093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0942 GMT 30 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[Text] Moscow April 30 TASS—The Russian president has decreed to appoint Oleg Nikolayevich Soskovets to the post of first deputy chairman of the Russian Council of Ministers, the president's press service reports.

Soskovets is 44 years old. His career was mostly linked with the Karaganda iron and steel plant, where he rose from plate roller to director-general in the period from 1971 to 1991. Soskovets is a metallurgical engineer, graduate of the Karaganda iron and steel plant's institute. He worked on the staff of the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy beginning from April 1991 and became first vice-premier of Kazakhstan in 1992. Soskovets was appointed chairman of the Russian Committee for Metallurgy in 1992. His wife is an economist. They have two children.

A testimonial signed in CPSU TIMES (1991) notes that USSR people's deputy Oleg Soskovets "has proved to be an advocate of broader economic independence for enterprises, an opponent of dictate from superior organisations". These qualities give grounds for hope that the newly-appointed vice-premier will exert efforts to promote market economy and decentralisation. According to a government source, Soskovets will be in charge of the Russian industry.

Soskovets is the third first vice-premier of the Russian government alongside with Vladimir Shumeyko and Oleg Lobov.

Opposition Groups Plan 1 May Rallies Despite Ban

LD2904133293 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 29 Apr 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The opposition National Salvation Front, Workers of Russia Movement, and the Russian Communist Party have announced their intention to hold an antigovernment demonstration on 1 May. These groups announced that they would like to end the demonstration with a meeting on Red Square. In their words, the authorities have not sanctioned the holding of such a meeting.

For its part, the Moscow Federation of Trade Unions has announced its wish to hold a 1 May demonstration in support of economic demands and also to hold a meeting on Red Square. Chernomyrdin and other leading figures have been invited to take part in this event.

Permission for this action has also not been received.

More on Rallies

PM2904175793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Apr 93 First Edition p 1

[ITAR-TASS report under the "News Service Working" rubric: "Opposition Prepares for 1 May Holiday"]

[Text] Despite the Russian President's edict and the ban by the city authorities, a number of opposition parties and movements are planning to hold a rally and procession in downtown Moscow 1 May.

The "Working Russia" movement's press center announced that those attending the rally are intending to assemble in the morning on Oktyabrskaya Square and then proceed to Red Square where the rally will take place. The National Salvation Front, the Russian Communist Workers Party, the Russian Federation Communist Party, the Officers' Union, the "Revival" Party, and others will take part in this event.

Criminal Proceedings Begun in Red Mercury Case

LD2904135793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1330 GMT 29 Apr 93

[Text] The Russian procurator general has begun criminal proceeedings in the case of one of the documents

concerning corruption recently presented to the Supreme Soviet by Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy. The case has been code-named Red Mercury, and the procurator general's investigators are in charge of it. Deputy Procurator General Yevgeniy Lisov told a news conference that more documents presented by Rutskoy are being studied.

Presidential Council Views Constitution

PM3004125593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Apr 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Otto Latsis: "Russian Federation Presidential Council Members Urge No Delay in Adopting Constitution of the New Russia"]

[Text] At its 28 April session under the chairmanship of B. Yeltsin, the Russian Federation presidential consultative council discussed the problem of the new Russian Constitution in the light of the 25 April referendum. These notes are not a report from the session but rather thoughts about what was said there.

As we know, the problem of the new Constitution was not among the questions put at the referendum and it was not there because of the stance adopted by the deputies, counter to the suggestion of the Russian Federation president and counter to repeated previous decisions of the Congress itself. Nonetheless, the discussion in tandem, at the presidential council session, of the results of the referendum and the question of the Constitution was entirely logical and, moreover, the only possible discussion. Because, in the common opinion of all speakers, in the situation which has taken shape since the referendum no other way can be seen other than the speediest adoption of a new Fundamental Law for Russia. At the same time the people's expression of their will has opened up new opportunities for adopting the Constitution.

Before the referendum the Congress had a legal possibility of blocking all attempts to accelerate the adoption of the new Constitution, thus deferring also the solution of the question of its own fate. But since 25 April the presidency has become the only elected federal institution whose legitimacy has been confirmed by the electorate under the conditions of the new state—an independent democratic Russia. Alongside the president the subjects of the Federation are the legitimate primary bearers of sovereignty. Their joint actions can give a chance unique in Russian history: for transferring from totalitarianism to democracy by a peaceful, legal path. The need and the possibility has emerged for beginning a genuine founding process which Russia, in contrast to a number of other republics of the former USSR, has not yet begun: Instituting a new state in place of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, adopting a new Constitution, and instituting new organs of power.

To let slip this chance would be unforgivably to spurn the people's will. Yet there is such a danger. The opposition has already undertaken to express itself on behalf of those who did not take part in the voting: They are allegedly against the president. The parliament speaker has already stated that the vote on the fourth question does not bind anyone to anything, because its results do not comply with the counting rules introduced by the congress itself. In actual fact that means just one thing: The voters' decision is not direct-acting, it cannot be realized automatically and requires further decisions. But if we agreed to proceed from the premise that decisions adopted by a relative and not an absolute majority of voters were invalid then the congress itself would not exist: The majority of deputies were elected by a relative majority.

There is a direct offensive by the reaction trying to usurp power at the last moment. The abolition of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet committee for questions of economic reform and ownership, implemented at the 28 April Supreme Soviet session at R. Khasbulatov's suggestion in violation of all conceivable legal norms was, of course, caused not by the desire to have a commission instead of a committee. The whole point lay with committee chairman S. Krasavchenko, who refused to dance to the speaker's tune. Now it remains to "purge" the Supreme Soviet of S. Kovalev (and a "reorganization" of his committee is already planned) and Khasbulatov's "politburo" in the shape of the Supreme Soviet Presidium will acquire the obedience he wants.

There can only be one answer from the supporters of the reforms: Not to stop making headway for a single day. And that applies not only to the process of the Constitution's adoption. The results of the referendum, which refuted many forecasts, and above all the vote on the second question oblige us to resume our advance in economic policy, suspended by the procession of congresses from December through March. The "yes" to the first question, for instance, can also if you like be interpreted as support in advance, as an expression of hope for future successes for a politician whose personality inspires trust in voters. "Yes" on the second question is support for a specific policy and it obliges us to continue that policy. Halting inflation—that is how I see the immediate response to the voters' expression of their will.

"No one is waiting for sausage to become cheaper tomorrow—they are waiting for resolute actions by the power supported by the people." That phrase from one of the participants in the session perhaps best reflects the course of the debate. And the first thing that must be done is to win the Constitution by democratic means.

Members Urge Fight for Constitution

MK2904121693 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 29 Apr 93 p 9

[Nika Stark report: "Presidential Council Meeting. New Constitution Is President's Chief Aim"]

[Text] Members of the Presidential Council assess the results of the referendum as a convincing victory for the

president. In their view, Boris Yeltsin has now acquired "new and very strong legitimacy." The president, for his part, intends to use this legitimacy to bolster presidential authority and to adopt a new Constitution. Judging from the pronouncements made by various participants of the meeting, Boris Yeltsin may demand in the near future that the parliament revoke the laws and decrees that are aimed at limiting the powers of the president and the government. So, in the very near future we may be in for a new round of tensions in the dialogue between president and parliament.

It was also yesterday that Yeltsin's own reaction to the referendum results was voiced, albeit indirectly; according to his press secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov, the president said that "the referendum results have revealed the birth of a new Russia that calls for a new statehood and a new Constitution." The Constitution must become the president's chief aim for the near future, members of the Presidential Council believe. That Boris Yeltsin does not plan to wait for too long this time is confirmed by the presentation of a draft new Constitution to the heads of republics within Russia, scheduled for today. By all appearances, it is the discussion of the draft Constitution that will be the centerpiece of the expanded Council of Ministers meeting's deliberations. At the same time, according to Presidential Council member Sergey Alekseyev, one of the chief authors of the draft, it is the Federation components that should be the chief sponsors of the adoption of the new Constitution.

Thus, as was predicted earlier by many observers, the main stress in the struggle for a Constitution will be laid on the heads of regions, whom the president intends to turn into an "anti-congressional battering ram." While they are united on the most important aspect of the matter—that a Constitution should be adopted as soon as possible—members of the council have so far differed on the tactics to be employed by the president. According to Georgiy Satarov, who made a report on the political results of the referendum at the council meeting, the first attempt to change the fundamental law should be made "together with the congress;" but, Vyacheslav Kostikov said, the majority of the council members do not support this stand. Obviously, the strong pressure put on the president by his loyalists, who insist that the post-referendum situation should be exploited to the fullest, will evoke corresponding counteraction from the deputy corps. The main strike, in Kostikov's view, will be delivered at the privatization program (which is what was actually done yesterday when the Supreme Soviet deemed the implementation of the privatization program in 1992 unsatisfactory). In view of this, members of the Presidential Council called on Boris Yeltsin to "give his support to Chubays in a decisive manner."

Answering another request by his loyalists—to define finally the status of the disgraced vice president—Yeltsin said that he signed an edict whereby Aleksandr Rutskoy has been stripped of his authority to head the Interdepartmental Anti-Crime and Anti- Corruption Commission. As Kostikov put it, having surrendered both of his duties—agriculture and corruption busting—Rutskoy "is suspended in a vacuum."

Yeltsin-Congress Clash Over Constitution Predicted

LD3004113493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1102 GMT 30 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Yuriy Filippov]

[Text] Moscow April 30—"We are on the brink of a very dangerous collision" between the president and the parliament over their variants of future Russian constitution, according to Oleg Rumyantsev, chairman of the parliamentary Constitutional Commission.

Work on the draft of the new main law is going in two directions which may become opposite, he told reporters on Friday [30 April].

However, Rumyantsev added that both variants coincide for 60 per cent and a "creative discussion" may eliminate contradictions before the Congress of People's Deputies convenes to adopt the new constitution in November.

Rumyantsev opposes quite a few provisions of the presidential variant of the constitution. He is against the right granted to the president to appoint ministers and dismiss the government. This means "to run the economy without bearing any responsibility for that", he said.

Yeltsin's constitution aims to "dissolve the role of the national parliament which represents pan-Russian interests", according to Rumyantsev, who said that the upper chamber of the legislature will consist of representatives of ethnic state entities within Russia which express the interests of a minority of the Russian population.

He critised the draft for its emphasis on "an agreed character of the Federation" in Russia saying that the notion "delivers a blow on the constitutional unity of the state".

Among "original" provisions of Yeltsin's constitution Rumyantsev outlined an early dissolution of parliament in case it fails to form a government. He noted that the rights of the parliament in forming the government are boiled down in Yeltsin's draft to a consent to the candidate to the post of prime minister nominated by the president.

Although most Russians who came to the polls during the recent referendum voted no-confidence in the Congress of People's Deputies, Rumyantsev, in contrast to the president, believes the new constitution should be adopted by the congress "as it represents all subjects of the Russian Federation". The constitutional assembly

proposed by Yeltsin for the adoption of the new main law may lack such a representation, he fears.

Despite all disagreements, Rumyantsev said that the issue of a new constitution is "the only bridge linking the president and the Supreme Soviet" and expressed hope that the adoption of the main law becomes "the field of accord" between the conflicting branches of authority.

Only Congress Can Adopt Constitution

PM2904153193 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 93 p 1

[Interview with Russian Federation Constitutional Court Judge Gadis Gadzhiyev by Viktor Trushkov; place and date not given: "Defend the Constitution—Defend Russia: Eight Questions to Russian Federation Constitutional Court Judge Gadis Gadzhiyev"]

[Text] [Trushkov] Gadis Abdullayevich, the preliminary results of the all-Russian referendum are already known. They can be represented in different ways, depending on how they are calculated. Nevertheless: What is the juridical significance of the affirmative response to the referendum's first question: "Do you have confidence in the Russian Federation President?"

[Gadzhiyev] All in all, the president won confirmation of his legitimacy. But there is no question that this gives him any kind of right to alter constitutional structures or the constitutional status of particular bodies. The referendum did not offer the president such powers.

[Trushkov] However, today B. Yeltsin's supporters are interpreting the referendum results as proof of the president's right, nay duty, to limit the functions of the legislature and to resolutely exclude the Congress of People's Deputies from the process of adopting a new Russian Constitution.

[Gadzhiyev] This interpretation blatantly contradicts the Constitutional Court decision, and it does not stem from the affirmative response by ballot participants to the referendum's first question.

[Trushkov] The president's team asserts that B. Yeltsin received a mandate for the urgent ratification of the new version of the draft Constitution elaborated under his leadership.

[Gadzhiyev] It is simply absurd to raise a question like that. It is absurd to claim that, if you have confidence in the president, you thereby approve a Constitution which the people have not yet read. To formulate such a question undermines the bases of the people's sovereignty in the grossest manner. Even in the most stagnant era, the 1977 Constitution was discussed for seven months. Is it really the case that it has now become possible to talk about confidence in an unpublished Constitution? No, neither the first question, nor the second question, nor any linkage of the two can give rise to any juridical conclusions presupposing amending even the existing Constitution.

[Trushkov] In the last three or four years a somewhat flippant attitude to the Constitution has been observed on and around the national political Olympus.

[Gadzhiyev] This is unfortunate. One journalist recently put a question along the following lines to Veniamin Sokolov, chairman of the Soviet of the Republic: "Our Constitution is like a hooker, going from one man to another. As a deputy, how do you react to this?" The now-commonplace comparison between the Constitution and prostitution is insulting and profoundly immoral. It is strange that this attitude to the Fundamental Law derives from supporters of the American models. You know, when the Americans grant somebody their citizenship they ask just one question only: "Do you believe in the Constitution?" Not "are you familiar with" but "do you believe." That is patriotism. Whatever your attitude to the Constitution, that is your attitude to the homeland.

[Trushkov] Then again, the people have expressed opposition to early elections for the deputies...

[Gadzhiyev] And this applies to both the present and future bodies of deputies. This is the voters' position both in respect of specific deputies with their merits and their shortcomings, and in respect of the institution of people's deputies. The results of the 25 April vote mean that nobody has the right to alter the status of the people's deputies without violating the Constitution.

[Trushkov] This means that nobody has the right to deprive the Congress of People's Deputies of the opportunity to examine and adopt the new Russian Federation Constitution?

[Gazhdiyev] Of course. The right to adopt the Constitution comes under the exclusive powers of the Congress of People's Deputies. And nobody but the Congress can do this in our country. This is quite obvious.

[Trushkov] But what if demands from the current president's supporters to find alternative means of adopting the Fundamental Law start to be realized nevertheless: How will the Constitutional Court react to this?

[Gazhdiyev] The Constitutional Court will act in line with the Law on the Constitutional Court and in line with the Constitution. That is all.

[Trushkov] With the existing Constitution?

[Gazhdiyev] Of course. We have no other.

New Constitution Seen 'Reviving Autocracy'

PM2904113993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Apr 93 First Edition p 1

[Valentin Shapka roundup of comments by Lev Okunkov, director of the Russian Federation Supreme

Soviet Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law, and Professor Boris Krylov, department chief at the institute: "We Will Have A Father-Tsar Under Boris Nikolayevich's Draft"]

[Text] On 24 April 1993 the mass media published the main principles of the new constitution, which—as Boris Yeltsin put it, "combines the best points of the drafts from the Constitutional Commission, the Russian Federation president, and numerous enterprising working groups."

We offer for readers' attention a commentary on the fragments of the draft by Lev Okunkov, director of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law, and Doctor of Juridical Sciences Professor Boris Krylov, department chief at this institute.

[Krylov] These principles have appeared in selected publications—and by no means in full but in extracts.

There are two points. The first relates to citizens' rights in general. The draft states that "the Russian Federation recognizes and guarantees rights and freedoms in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the generally accepted principles and norms of international law." This is probably right, but it should not be forgotten that there are a number of other international law documents recognized by the entire civilized world which go far beyond even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Part two of the draft constitution—or, rather, the articles which were quoted—is devoted to state organs. And this is where we should be focusing our attention. I can immediately conclude that the draft differs substantially from the constitution currently in force as regards the strengthening of presidential power. Say what you will, presidential power—whether it applies to a specific individual or in general to those occupying the post of president—is above all **personal power.**

[Okunkov] The paragraph, generally accepted in world practice, to the effect that people's power constitutes the unshakable foundation of the constitutional system has been removed altogether.

[Krylov] This is of fundamental importance because the people exercise their power through elective institutions. Or directly—in a referendum, for instance.

[Okunkov] The main issue is that the suggested main provisions blatantly upset the balance between the legislature and the executive. Even in such a traditionally strong presidential republic as the United States, which we are writing a lot about today, the president does not have the right to dissolve the parliament. Yet this draft gives the Russian president that right.

[Krylov] And then it is not clear just what "after consultation" means. Does it mean that the chairmen of the Federation Council and the State Duma might disagree about a dissolution but the president could go ahead anyway?! If so, the influence of the representative authorities would be minimized in such an event.

Talking about the breadth of the president's rights, I would like to draw attention to Article 70 of the draft. It points out that the president is the guarantor of the Constitution. Yet he is surely not the only one. Representative institutions and the country's supreme legislative organ should be, and always have been, guarantors too.

It follows from the text of the article that the president determines the entire practice of the functioning of state organs. In actual fact this functioning should be determined by the Constitution and its text.

The president's powers in the sphere of shaping the judiciary increase sharply. Yet this is not a straightforward question of who proposes whom and who appoints whom, because a very great deal depends on the composition of judicial organs.

An innovation is the creation of a Supreme Bench [vyssheye sudebnoye prisutstviye] comprising the heads of the three supreme courts and, furthermore, three federal judges again appointed at the president's behest. That is, the president exerts a major influence on shaping the judicial organs, which in turn obtain new powers. The Supreme Bench, for instance, interprets the Constitution. This right had previously been the sole prerogative of a representative institution.

[Okunkov] It is clear from the published basic principles that the president appoints and dismisses all federal ministers and leaders of federal departments making up the government without any agreement with parliament.

The Federal Assembly's functions are sharply restricted compared with the existing Constitution. This would essentially mean the introduction of a parliament which the president would have "in his pocket." We can see that its functions would include only the adoption of laws and the implementation of certain control functions which are essentially not disclosed. The existing legislative organs (the Congress and the Supreme Soviet) currently have extensive scope for lawmaking activity—the ability to stage a referendum, for instance. Under the new draft this function would belong exclusively to the president—there is no mention of a Federal Assembly.

In the published basic principles of the new constitution the president's functions and prerogatives are extensively revealed, whereas the powers of the Federal Assembly are mentioned only in passing.

This is not like the U.S. and French Constitutions, which consider it more successful to have a symbiosis between a strong presidency and a strong parliament, or the constitutions of dictatorial regimes. In our view, it is one lawful way of reviving autocracy.

From the standpoint of those presidential powers which were selectively but quite fully provided for in the basic principles of the new constitution, they can be described

as **far greater powers than the prerogatives enjoyed by our father the tsar.** The powers of the dynasties of tsars were far narrower.

[Krylov] One other point. Note that the basic principles of the new constitution are attempting to weaken the powers of precisely those organs which have recently disagreed for certain reasons with certain aspects of the policy pursued by the president or organs subordinate to him. The Congress is sent packing, and the representative system as a whole and the Constitutional Court in particular are weakened. The Constitutional Court ought to speak out in defense of the existing Constitution—people are trying to clip its wings.

Constitutional Court's 'Dissenting Opinion' Viewed

PM2904141993 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Apr 93 p 2

[Aleksandr Bykovskiy article: "Price of Dissenting Opinion, or Something About Private Life of Constitutional Court Deputy Chairman"]

[Text] For a long time, ever since the notorious trial in the "case" of the CPSU, I have been observing the career of Nikolay Vasilyevich Vitruk, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court. He attracted my attention because of some special juridical punctiliousness or, if you like, acridity. In him, however, these qualities have successfully combined with emphatic correctness.

Therefore I was not surprised when N. Vitruk expressed a dissenting opinion in respect of the Constitutional Court's ruling on President B. Yeltsin's notorious "Appeal to the People" of 20 March. I will remind you that the Constitutional Court perceived in that appeal gross violations of the current Constitution and ruled that the country's top official had overstepped the bounds of the constitutional field, as it is now fashionable to say.

I also was not surprised at Vitruk's dissenting stance because I have heard it said that a juridical matter is quite a subtle thing, for it is not for nothing that people say: two jurists, three opinions. So Nikolay Vasilyevich's refusal to support his Constitutional Court colleagues did nothing at all to shake the unsullied image of him in my consciousness as a highly professional jurist.

But, alas, certain circumstances connected with the private life of Judge Vitruk recently made me take a closer look at this outstanding figure on Russia's juridical Mount Olympus.

...It turns out that in September 1992 Nikolay Vasilyevich moved—quite providently, as it soon came to light—from a one-room cooperative apartment into the two-room cooperative apartment of his daughter Yelena Nikolayevna Vitruk, where she lived with her young son. She sold her father's one-room apartment.

It has to be said that the philoprogenitive parent did not live for long with his daughter and grandson—as early as November 1992 Vitruk, as a member of the Constitutional Court, was provided with a two-room apartment for one person in the block at 17 Pervyy Truzhenikov Pereulok.

Anyone else would have been only too glad to move. Nikolay Vasilyevich was probably glad too. But, evidently, not entirely glad. For he was reckoning that his daughter would also get a separate apartment in the same block. In this regard he had asked the Constitutional Court chairman to put in a word with the Moscow authorities. The chairman did so back in May 1992.... How could he not do so: Yelena Nikolayevna is divorced and does not work, and the child is small. Incidentally, she was prepared to hand over the two-room apartment she was occupying to Moscow City Hall.

True, as early as 27 July of the same year, on learning of the Vitruks' unexpectedly revealed "scheming" talents in the apartment field, [Constitutional Court Chairman] V. Zorkin had been quick to recall his petition from City Hall, i.e. to declare it null and void. In my opinion, he was right to do so: Although we are living in conditions of wild capitalism, when morality seems to count for nothing, all the same a hierarch of the law and his daughter should not juggle so freely with apartments.

The question of an apartment for Yelena Nikolayevna, however, was still raised (?) 19 January 1993 at a session of the Moscow Government. True, the latter did not deem it possible to satisfy the desire of Themis's servant, and his daughter.

This, I will remind you, was in January. But 16 March the Moscow Government decided differently: to provide Vitruk's daughter with the desired two-room apartment at 17 Pervyy Truzhenikov Pereulok (total area 84.3 square meters, living area 42.7 square meters, value 2.161 million rubles) in exchange for the two-room cooperative apartment (total area 38.6 square meters, living area 24.9 square meters) being vacated and presented to the Government of Moscow. Now one small thing was lacking: Luzhkov had to approve the government's decision. But he delayed...until 23 March.

What is going on? You cannot help starting to think: At first the Moscow Government decides one thing, and then the direct opposite. Yeltsin made his "appeal" 20 March. Vitruk took his "dissenting stand" when the Constitutional Court ruling of 23 March was drawn up, and Luzhkov's directive allocating the apartment to Ye. Vitruk appeared on the same day—23 March....

An amusing chain, is it not? It is noteworthy that before the Constitutional Court session its deputy chairman, so rumor has it, was saying that he intended to vote against the president's innovations, while in fact he took a quite different stand....

Here, too, you learn of other "odd things" that happen to Nikolay Vasilyevich. Thus, 9 February 1993, during

stocktaking in the "Snegiri" rest home and dachas near Moscow, a "ZIL" refrigerator, a "Temp" television set, a reversible rug, a chandelier, and many other things—equipment large and small—were all found to be missing from State Dacha No. 13, with which he had been provided as a member of the Constitutional Court. Although by some miraculous means part of the property has been "returned" to the state dacha, which had been sealed when the shortfall was discovered, the remainder has not been returned, at any rate not through the middle of April. Has it been returned now?

All these veritable detective stories give rise to sad thoughts: Who is actually hiding behind the mask of a legal expert, concerned day and night for the legal irreproachability of legal decisions in the Russian State? What kind of forces are they that decided to bestow on Nikolay Vasilyevich's daughter an apartment worth 2 million rubles? Is this not the price of the so-called "dissenting opinion"?

Yeltsin Edict Ending Rutskoy's Agriculture Role

PM2904115993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Apr 93 First Edition p 3

["Edict of the President of the Russian Federation on Questions of the Management of the Agro-Industrial Complex" carried in the "Official Section"]

[Text] In connection with the introduction of the post of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers—the government—of the Russian Federation responsible for the development of the agro-industrial complex and on the basis of Article 121-7 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, I resolve:

1. To rescind Edict No. 193 of the president of the Russian Federation, dated 26 February 1992, "On the Duties and Powers of the Vice President of the Russian Federation."

To deem Edict No. 718 of the president of the Russian Federation, dated 27 June 1992, "On Organized Measures To Implement Land and Agro-Industrial Reform in the Russian Federation" invalid with respect to the establishment of the rights and duties of the vice president of the Russian Federation.

2. The Council of Ministers—the government—of the Russian Federation is to submit within one week proposals to reorganize and change the subordination of the Federal Center for Land and Agro-Industrial Reform of Russia with a view to removing duplication of functions within the system of the central organs of executive power.

[Signed] Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation

[Dated] The Kremlin, Moscow, 23 April 1993

Edict No. 475

Yeltsin Edict on Government Working Bodies

PM2904120593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 29 Apr 93 p 1

[Russian Federation president's edict No. 564 "On Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government Working Organs"]

[Text] On the basis of Article 29 of the Russian Federation law "On the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government," I decree:

1. That the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government decide independently questions of the change of status, procedure for the activity, reorganization, and abolition of government commissions and other working organs under the Russian Federation Government formed by edicts and directives of the Russian Federation president.

2. That the Russian Federation president's state and legal administration submit, where necessary, proposals on recognizing as invalid the acts of the Russian Federation president published on questions of the creation, composition, and procedure for the activity of government commissions and other working organs under the Russian Federation Government.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin, Moscow, Kremlin, 26 April 1993.

Yeltsin Edicts Appoint, Remove Officials

PM2904105793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Apr 93 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "Appointments"]

[Text] By an edict of the Russian Federation president Major General Anatoliy Ivanovich Kuranov has been appointed deputy general director of the Russian Federation president's Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information.

By an edict of the Russian Federation president Vladimir Vasilyevich Gusev has been appointed leader of the Russian Federation State Taxation Service.

By an edict of the Russian Federation president Yevgeniy Matveyevich Bychkov has been appointed chairman of the Russian Federation Committee on Precious Metals and Stones.

By an edict of the Russian Federation president S.N. Samoylov has been relieved of his duties as the Russian Federation president's representative in Chita Oblast in connection with his reassignment.

By an edict of the Russian Federation president V.I. Yevdokimov has been relieved of his duties as the Russian Federation president's representative in Orlov Oblast in connection with his reassignment.

By an edict of the Russian Federation president A.Yu. Federov has been relieved of his duties as the Russian Federation president's representative in Samara Oblast in connection with his reassingment.

Yeltsin Bans Communist Party Committees From Work Places

MK3004082093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 29 Apr 93 p 10

[Yevgeniy Yanayev report: "Yeltsin Departization Edict. Edict Bans Party Committees at Enterprises and Institutions"]

[Text] **As expected, Boris Yeltsin, taking stock of the referendum results, has launched an offensive against his political opponents. The Russian president's press service stated that an edict has been issued banning the creation and operation of primary organizations, committees, and other organizational structures of political parties in Russian state institutions and enterprises. The press service maintains that the document was drawn up in connection with current attempts to illegally reinstate the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR.**

The edict "On Additional Measures to Prevent Interference by Political Parties and Their Structures in the Activities of State Organs, Enterprises, Institutions, and Other Organizations" in fact reiterates the key provisions of the first "anti-party" presidential edict on stopping the activities of organizational structures of political parties and mass public movements in state organs, institutions, and organizations, issued on 20 July 1991.

The presidential edict is in fact a reaction to the two restoration communist congresses (in February and March) that revived the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It was also decided at these congresses to demand from the Russian authorities that part of the property that formerly belonged to the CPSU be returned. In recent months, communists have also been trying to increase their influence among workers by reviving party committees at factories. Supporters of the president think that these actions are contrary to the Constitutional Court's recent decision confirming the legality of the dissolution of the leading structures of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR.

The new edict confirms the inadmissibility of attempts to restore communist organizational structures in state organs, enterprises, and institutions. As for property formerly owned by the CPSU, the edict contains instructions to the government and local executive organs to publish the decisions they had made regarding the manner of utilization of CPSU property.

'Renewal' Union Dissatisfied With Referendum

LD2904092793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0435 GMT 29 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow, 28 Apr [date as received]—The All-Russian "Renewal" Union, one of the main forces in the centrist "Civic Union" bloc, issued a statement on the results of the referendum. This is a very carefully worded document in which dissatisfaction with the outcome of the voting is veiled and masked with mild language.

"Renewal" says the main result of the referendum is the fact that "the existence of a basis for national accord is now obvious."

"The referendum inflicted a crushing blow on right- and left-wing radicals." By ruling out the option of immediate, pre-term elections, the referendum has effectively made it incumbent on both branches of power to seek a solution to the country's problems within the confines of politics and law, and not outside them, the statement says.

The All-Russian "Renewal" Union hopes for the "restoration of the broad, democratic coalition which thwarted the putsch in August 1991. We hope that the president will summon up the strength to overcome his sense of injury and his political differences with the vice president," the statement also says. "Renewal" sees the main task of the president, the congress, Supreme Soviet, and components of the Federation as being to draft and adopt the Russian Federation's first democratic constitution as quickly as possible, after holding a nationwide referendum.

Deputies Told: Back Yeltsin or Seek Re-Election

PM2904104393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Apr 93 First Edition p 2

[Yelena Musatova report: "Press Conference. Every Respectable Person Should Have No Principles"]

[Text] Strictly speaking, it was criticism of the "inappropriate" branch of power, that is the Supreme Soviet, which was the main feature of the press conference given by representatives of the "Reforms Coalition." Room was even found for this in the introductory section of a speech, when "as yet still extant" was added to the name of the work place of one the participants who was being introduced—that is to say, some Supreme Soviet committee or other.

The journalists were warned that an attack on glasnost is expected in the coming days.

Preserving unity in the ranks of the democrats, which has been achieved recently through a process of campaigning, was described as the main task of "Democratic Russia's" members after the referendum.

At the same time the formation of a coalition government is not only improbable but would be criminal, L. Ponomarev stated.

"We will not proceed along that path," he snapped in a Lenin-like fashion.

The radicals who spoke admitted that on the basis of the referendum's preliminary results, there are no legal grounds for early elections of people's deputies, of which less than half the citizens eligible to vote came out in favor. However, as B. Zolotukhin sarcastically noted, there is also the question of ethics and morality. From which he drew the following "moral" conclusion:

"Every respectable deputy should opt for new elections or support the president."

Referendum Results Seen as Crisis of Federation

MK2804130493 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Apr 93 p 1

[Vitaliy Portnikov commentary under general headline: "Western Leaders Congratulate Boris Yeltsin on Victory, But He Is Not Sure Yet Whether He Should Congratulate Himself"]

[Text] President Boris Yeltsin has suffered a victory without consequences. The voters trust him and do not trust the deputies, but not to the extent that could stop the legislative body's restraining energy. Actually such trust and mistrust were known well before the voting: Otherwise why would the congress of people's deputies have opposed the referendum? Why did the deputies have to "break" the question of confidence in the Russian Federation president down into two—about confidence in Yeltsin the man, and about confidence in his economic policy—in the hope that many voters would vote for a "good" Yeltsin but against his course? According to the old Russian tradition, the tsar is wonderful but his ministers are horrible—a "collective Rasputin," so to speak. And at this point something indicative and unpredictable happened: Not that the electorate, which had voted for the deputies, turned out to be wiser than the deputies, but politically more mature. In other words, the voters have moved far ahead, while the deputies have lingered on at the initial perestroyka period, when the Russian Federation deputy corps, elected almost immediately after the Union corps, was not without reason described as second-echelon politicians. These politicians did not manage to deceive their electors four times in a row, but as for early elections, they picked the right horse. And now the standoff between the authorities will continue even after the nationwide vote. What it will mean for Russia is obvious even from the results of the just completed plebiscite. What really matters is not even the division of the republics and regions into "progressive" and "conservative" ones, but the fact that the civic consciousness of residents of some republics has been "frozen."

The referendum was not held in Tatarstan or in Chechnya, showing clearly that the citizens of these republics are in a different political field, as it were—although the attitude to the referendum in these republics differed. President Dudayev promised support for President Yeltsin, but his republic's voters are apparently more concerned over the confrontation within their own branches of government and their own upcoming referendum. In the months of de facto independence Groznyy has managed to discourage its citizens from taking an interest in everything that happens in Moscow. Just like in Kazan. Tatarstan's leaders did not oppose the referendum, neither did they assist it. And their interests ultimately prevailed.

Even more indicative are the results of the voting in Bashkortostan, where the trust the citizens expressed in their leadership, which raised the question of special treaty-based relations with the Russian Federation, looks even more pronounced against the backdrop of a relatively small number of votes cast for the Russian president. And finally, the president's overwhelming failure in Ingushetia: it is not so much a defeat of Yeltsin's personality as of the deadlocked Caucasian policy pursued by the federal authorities, both branches of government.

While the president and the Supreme Soviet speaker are coming to terms with republic leaders, obviously hoping to preserve Russia precisely via such agreements, the process of change in people's consciousness continues. And this process, given the unending rivalry in the upper echelons of power, can have many more far-reaching implications than the latest referendum. At any rate, the crisis of the federation—at least in its most vulnerable spots—is plain to see.

Court Judge Says Referendum Shows People Back Yeltsin

LD2904103993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1021 GMT 29 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Krasulin]

[Text] Moscow April 29 TASS—"The results of the votes on the first and second questions of the referendum have shown that our people back the president and his policy of reforms. This does not mean that there were no blunders. However, in spite of the existing difficulties, the people do not want a comeback of the old regime," ITAR-TASS was told by Constitutional Court Judge Vladimir Oleynik.

"The people have expressed their will against the background of a confrontation between the executive and legislative branches of government. Their will must be regarded as law both by the president, the congress and the Supreme Soviet, and by all the other administrative structures," Oleynik believes. In his opinion, the executive and legislative branches of government must end the

confrontation, must renounce personal and group ambitions "in order to safeguard Russia's statehood and to go over to a law-governed state".

"Referendums are among the basic components of democracy," Oleynik stressed. "Their results are juridically topmost and do not require any additional interpretation. However, I believe that, irrespective of the referendum's outcome, some political forces may try to challenge its results and appeal for its interpretation to the Constitutional Court. One of our vicious traditions is to treat the law selectively. This is sheer nonsense when done not only by leaders of some political parties, but also by the head of one of the branches of government."

Oleynik said that he had tabled his dissenting opinion during the Constitutional Court hearings "on the all-Russia referendum of April 25, 1993, the procedure for holding it, and the mechanism for implementing the referendum", because he believed and still believes that the results of the votes on the third and fourth questions should have been summed up in keeping with the referendum law, i.e., on the basis of a majority vote of the people taking part in the voting, because "the wording of the questions did not directly call for any changes in the Constitution". This view is shared by Oleynik's four other colleagues. "The results of the vote on the fourth question should be a serious warning to the speaker and the people's deputies," Oleynik said. In his opinion, the deputies, feeling that they have lost the trust of their electors, should stop their struggle for power and for the sake of power", and should voluntarily resign. Perhaps it would be right to hold referendums in the constituencies on confidence in their respective deputies without waiting for the expiration of their terms of office.

Oleynik also noted that there was an increasing tendency towards the Constitutional Court's further politisation, and attempts to draw it by means of various appeals and requests into the interpretation of the results of the referendum. "This is a serious threat to the Constitutional Court as an institution of democracy and an organ of a law-governed state," Oleynik stated.

Appeal of Zhirinovskiy's 'Liberalism' Viewed

PM2904095793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Apr 93 First Edition p 3

[Olga Kondratyeva report: "Playing Until You Have Gray Hairs"]

[Text] The Fourth Congress of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDP] was held 24 April at the Central House of Tourists on the eve of the birthday of its leader, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. The congress was attended by 420 delegates, with guests from the Finnish parliament, the German People's Union, and the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party. The chairman delivered a report on the party's activities and prospects. A leading organ—the Higher Council [vysshiy sovet]—was elected. The head of the party described it as comprising "all men, all young, and all with at least one degree" [u vsekh po poltora vyschikh obrazovaniya]. The party leader formulated its aims unambiguously: "We conceptualists, patriots, and statesmen will be in power within 18 months." It is planned to take power by relatively peaceful means, and there will be few arrests. Some 500 representatives of the Yeltsin team will be sent to the slammer in St. Petersburg, with the figure for Moscow being slightly higher—at around 2,000—and the figure for the rest of Russia being 3,000.

In principle the party advocates the purity of the nation—above all, the Russian nation—but genuine ethnic purity is only possible, as was pointed out at the congress, in a state without wars. In his report Vladimir Volfovich shared with the auditorium the delicate notion that "many women are currently being raped in the course of ethnic conflicts. How can we say that their children are ethnically unsullied in this situation?"

V. Zhirinovskiy devoted a considerable amount of attention to the sad evolution of his main political enemies—the members of Democratic Russia. He is convinced that that party's star is already waning. The Yeltsin era is over. And this does not depend on the referendum result. The results will be juggled around anyway—not that it is important. The president should not be seduced by the seemingly impressive results of the nationwide vote—dying people always claim to feel better than they actually are. Vladimir Volfovich then shared with congress delegates his version of the historical past. In his opinion, the Decembrists were the first Democratic Russians. The political courtesy of the democrats of the time was predetermined by their upbringing in the gentry: They failed to oust the tsar and bring in a constitution—the insurgents obediently left the scene of their political clash. (This is a subtle reference to the thick-skinned nature of today's Democratic Russia members. Once again, reform is not succeeding, but these uncouth intellectuals are in no way leaving their Senate Square—that is, the Russian political arena).

The LDP leader is considerably skeptical and irritated about the transformation of "Democratic Russia" into a nouveau-riche party and its clumsy attempts to pose as the elite of society, whereas Democratic Russia members have cobbled together their political capital by trumpeting their closeness to the people and their "genuine" democracy. Vladimir Volfovich expressed indignation at this crude political metamorphosis in his innately figurative manner: "The Democratic Russia members' main hero now is Andrey Bolkonskiy [character in "War and Peace"]; it used to be Gerasim from 'Mumu.' [reference unknown] "

Liberalism is a bourgeois ideological and sociopolitical trend that unites supporters of the parliamentary system and bourgeois freedoms. It became very widespread in the period of transition from feudalism to capitalism. The changes taking place in the country today could be dubbed a "reverse revolution"—with regard to the 1917 revolution. It changed private property into the people's

property, whereas today the changes are happening in reverse—we are looking for owners for public property. History shows that, at the initial stage of the transition to bourgeois forms of ownership, parties with a liberal inclination consolidate closely with the broad people's masses suffering from absolutism and a lack of democratic freedoms. That is why the stunning result of the vote in the Russian presidential election, when a hitherto little-known party obtained more than 6 million votes, were not so unexpected. The LDP's slogans (Russia's revival, the rejection of shock therapy in the economy, and the upholding of the ideas of social justice), couched in a form that was accessible to and understood by the least-educated strata, attracted the attention of many citizens. The period when Russian liberals had their hands on the controls of power—March through October 1917—was extremely brief. The Octobrists [members of the early-20th-century "October 17 Union" party], progressists [members of the pre-revolution Progressive Party], and Constitutional Democrats were unable to hang on to political power, and the period of liberalization in the country's sociopolitical biography collapsed.

Psychologists recognize the natural condition of people playing out unplayed lifestyle roles at later ages. Thus if, for whatever reason, a child has not had enough sufficient opportunity to play during his childhood, he will continue playing until he has gray hairs—his unlived childish relationships will be transferred to his spouse, colleagues, and neighbors.

The Russian liberal bourgeoisie was a late and unloved child, the country has not played enough liberal games, and this task has returned to us at a new historical stage. As for the fact that our current liberalism is slightly comical... Is not our homegrown stall-holding bourgeoisie not comical in its haste to live? Delayed infantile games always prompt a perplexed smile.

The Zhirinovskiy party's success is a contradictory phenomenon. On the one hand, Russian liberals have been the standard-bearers of reform trends and have tried to place the country's development on a constitutional footing. From this standpoint we urgently need liberalism, since it is always the people who have to pay for revolutions with their prosperity, tears, and blood (as we can see from the experience of the events of recent years). On the other hand the specifics of our historical path could not fail to translate this classic political, historical, and philosophical doctrine into accessible terms. Whatever we may say about our liberalism, it now has "slight overtones of Pinochet and Husayn." That is why LDP members are constantly slipping up in their speeches. At times they advocate the purity of nations, at other times they are for assimilation; at times the CPSU is to blame for all our troubles, at other times it is all a Jewish-masonic plot.

I think that the LDP's popularity will grow. And it is not a question of Zhirinovskiy's unusual political outlook or his tendency to be shocking. Although party members were openly flattering their boss at the congress: "Zhirinovskiy's God-given gifts belong not to him but to Russia. He is predestined to save Russia." The messiah himself was not at a loss for a word: "Had I been a fainthearted sort like Shabad [reference unknown], I would have left the political arena long ago." But let us separate the idea of liberalism from its proponents.

The growth in liberalism's influence has been objectively brought about by the specifics of the period the country is experiencing—the fact that the broadest social strata have been left feeling aggrieved in the course of the country's transformation. It was no accident that the congress delegates included many military men and invalids. But the LDP's fate is wholly in its leaders' hands. If liberalism leans in favor of the ruling elite (and there are plenty of examples of this in history), its leaders will be saved neither by their (admittedly relative) youth, nor by the charm of men in their prime, nor by their extended higher education.

SCSE Trial Defendants Bring 'Action' Against Stepankov

PM2904112193 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Apr 93 p 1

[Aleksandr Golovenko report under "Brief and Clear" rubric: "Stepankov Threatened With Fine"]

[Text] As PRAVDA has reported, O. Baklanov and V. Pavlov, who are involved in "the State Committee for the State of Emergency [SCSE] case," have brought an action against Russian Federation General Prosecutor V. Stepankov and his deputy Ye. Lisov for publishing a book on the materials of a criminal case which has not yet been examined. The plaintiffs maintain that the two litterateurs cited a number of invented episodes which smear the honor and dignity of the accused. The defendants did not turn up on last Monday to testify. In the opinion of the plaintiffs' attorneys, a monetary fine threatens Stepankov if he fails to turn up next time without a valid reason.

Economic Issues

Statistical Board Reports Income, Industrial Output Drop

LD2904152193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1504 GMT 29 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow April 29 TASS—The obtained national income dropped by 19 per cent in the first quarter of 1993 as compared to the same period of the last year, the Russian Statistical Board reports.

Changes of this indicator, statisticians believe, are largely due to the processes occurring in Russian industry. Industrial output had also dropped by 19 per cent during this period as compared to the first quarter

of 1992 (in January—by 22 per cent, in February—by 19 per cent, and in March—17 per cent). The fall fluctuated in the closing months of the last year between 20 and 25 per cent. This means, the board claims, that the recession rates have slowed down in the first quarter of this year.

Oil output went down by two per cent in the first quarter of this year, the production of ferrous rolled stock—by two per cent, cement—by 12 per cent, and sulphuric acid—by 1 per cent. These basic sectors of production have in many ways determined the situation in adjacent branches of the national economy. The situation has not improved in the light and food industries. The output of their basic products has dropped by a margin of 2 to 18 per cent as compared with the previous three months. Nevertheless, the state statistical board notes a slight upward trend, as compared with the fourth quater of 1992, in the production of several types of machines and chemical goods, as well as in the paper and pulp industry.

The drop in the output of metal-cutting machine tools, steel pipes, freight cars, timber, paper, fabrics, cereals, dairy products and many other types of manufactured goods ranged from 40 to 60 per cent as compared to the first quarter of 1990.

The number of loss-making enterprises has increased in all sectors of the national economy. Their share accounted for 21 per cent this March as compared to 17 per cent early last December. Their share in industry amounted to 10 per cent and to 19 per cent in building construction. There are many loss-making enterprises in the communal economy (44 per cent), public utilities (38 per cent), and passenger transport services (31 per cent).

According to data received from the Central Bank of Russia, credit investments in the national economy had reached 9.4 trillion roubles by April 1, a 80 per cent rise since the beginning of the year. The volume of credit investments grew by 2.2 trillions this March as compared to 1.1 trillions in January and 0.9 trillions in February. This sharp increase is explained mainly by loans granted to carry out spring field jobs and by the preterm supply of good to Arctic areas.

Fuel and Energy Minister Views First Quarter's Results

PM2904130593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 29 Apr 93 p 2

[Article by Yuriy Shafranik, Russian minister of fuel and energy, under general heading: "Russian Council of Ministers: What Has Been Done?"]

[Text] In the first quarter of 1993 the calculated production volumes and deliveries of fuel and energy to the Russian economy were mainly ensured. That is the main result. We have passed through the peak winter loads without major breakdowns.

At the same time the tendency toward a decline in production volumes has not been overcome. One can note a certain slowing down in the rates of decline but the fuel and energy complex has not yet reached the lowest point from which forward growth begins.

The gas extraction workers are perhaps the only workers of all fuel and energy complex sectors to be working stably and have not only met consumers' needs but have also exceeded planned extraction volumes for Russia by 0.2 billion cubic meters.

Less coal was mined and less electricity generated than in the first quarter of last year.

The most complex situation remains in the oil industry. Despite a certain overfulfillment of planned oil extraction indicators by 1.2 percent in January through March 1993, comparison with the same period last years shows that extraction volumes declined by 14.5 million tonnes.

It must be said frankly that today producers have no incentives to increase production volumes or the extraction of fuel and energy complex output and resources. We are only starting to create these incentive mechanisms...

Having begun work in the Ministry of Fuel and Energy in February 1993, as minister I set specific key tasks for the immediate future: the structural shaping of economically active subjects of the fuel and energy complex, the elaboration and adoption of a provision on the ministry, with clearly outlined functions for the state organ, the preparation and approval in the government of a package of documents for the oil and gas complex aimed at stabilizing the situation, the development of similar documents for the coal industry, and cadres appointments and reshuffles.

Two months of work have been devoted to these problems and today it may be said that as a whole they have been implemented.

In conclusion I want to say that there is no deadlock or impasse in the work of the enterprises of Russia's fuel and energy complex. On the contrary, there is a certainty, based on a real knowledge of the situation, that the declining tendency will be overcome in the very near future. Of course I should stipulate unless there are any further large-scale political upheavals.

Today the fuel and energy complex is cementing the economy, feeding it raw material and the country hard currency and it can become the linchpin of the national economy's economic resurrection.

Economic Conditions 'Basically Favorable' for Farmers

PM2904102393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Apr 93 First Edition p 1

[Report by Yelena Yakovleva: "The Countryside No Longer Needs Authorized Agents. Because Sowing Grain Is Profitable"]

[Text] Spring field work, which this year in Russia is affected not only by a cold spring but also by a shortage of money to buy fertilizers, fuel, and equipment, is beginning to gather momentum.

The decree signed in mid-April by government chairman Viktor Chernomyrdin "On Additional Measures to Stabilize Agroindustrial Production in 1993" contains a series of measures to ensure that sowing and harvesting are carried out. It lays down the volumes of supplies of the requisite material and technical resources for the countryside. In particular 85 percent, rather than the 50 percent that was collected originally, of the fuel will come from state stocks. And it will be delivered in accordance with special monthly schedules agreed with the Agriculture Ministry. Since top-dressing from the air is very expensive, the government has made a decision to compensate agricultural producers for one-half of the cost.

The mineral fertilizers situation is even more acute. As a result a ban has been placed on exports. There will be Agriculture Ministry representatives at all mineral fertilizer production plants to keep an eye on things.

The government has also created what has now become a traditional instrument: a commission or headquarters to handle sowing and harvesting. "The press always ridicules such entities," Aleksandr Kalinin, chief of the government apparatus agroindustrial complex department, observed. "But there is no need for that, because it is a standard body for resolving interdepartmental problems: Indeed, both the Ministry of Railways and the Ministry of Defense are involved in sowing and harvesting."

But the main thing that has happened in the latter half of April is that the countryside has obtained money. This year there has been no shortage of material and technical resources, but there has not been enough money to buy them.

It is difficult to assess the range of measures adopted by the government. On the one hand, people are now confident that the sowing will be completed and the fertility of the land will be preserved. On the other hand, the awkward thing is that the measures are either "prohibitive," blocking other sectors' access to the market, or "inflationary," pumped full of money from any old agricultural producer—both sound farms and potential bankrupts. The new subsidy system promised by the agriculture minister and the vice premier is in the planning stage at the moment.

Worries about this year's harvest are connected mainly with what kind of weather is expected. The economic conditions are basically favorable. "Growing grain is now much more profitable than livestock raising, so I can definitely say that there will be no reduction in sowings this year," Aleksandr Zaveryukha, vice premier for agriculture, said.

Authorized agents are not needed for the sowing this year, since sowing grain is profitable and no one has to be chivied.

Oil Producers See 'Catastrophic' Decline in Output

MK2904121093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 29 Apr 93 p 5

[Aleksey Makarov report published under the rubric "Oil Producers Union Holds Congress": "Oil Generals Count on Themselves and on Yuriy Shafrannik"]

[Text] The second congress of the Union of Oil Producers that ended late on 27 April finally formulated the position of the Russian oil elite with respect to ways of leading the sector out of a most severe economic crisis. Speeches by congress delegates and an analysis of the decisions made suggest that the "oil generals" are primarily counting on their own resources and the support of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy where key posts are now held by professional oil producers.

Observers point out that Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin, who addressed the congress, failed to reverse the oil producers' sharply negative attitude to the government where the most important posts belong to people from the "Gaydar team" (according to Union Chairman Vladimir Medvedev, the Gaydar cabinet sentenced the oil workers to the "death penalty"). The oil producers have repeatedly stated their loyalty to the present head of the cabinet. However, the tonality and substance of questions put to Chernomyrdin following his speech at the congress (see KOMMERSANT-DAILY of 28 April) clearly point to a mistrust in the premier's ability to change the policy launched by Gaydar and supported by some present cabinet members.

Judging by the speech of Viktor Paliy, general director of Nizhnevartovskneftegaz, Russia's largest production association, this is how the oilmen see the situation in the industry: An incorrect definition of priorities in economic policy (formation of a deficit-free budget at any price) has within a year and a half led to a full cessation of investments and caused a catastrophic decline in the output of oil and oil products. The volume of drilling new oil wells in western Siberia has been reduced by from 2.5 to threefold, as a result of which, according to local experts, the fields are being exploited 12 times more intensively than is normal practice in developing new oil wells. Moreover, the oil producers, in their opinion, are denied the possibility of financing the opening up of new oil wells with their own resources: Over the past year and a half, 80 percent of oil produced in Western Siberia was delivered on state orders virtually free since the accrued sum of approximately 600 billion rubles for these deliveries was never remitted. On the other hand, in selling the remaining 20 percent of the extracted raw materials on the free market, they transferred up to 75 percent of the proceeds to the budget in taxes and duties. The delegates did not hide their

approval of the statement made by Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman Vladimir Ispravnikov to the effect that these "purely populist measures" are aimed at financing the national economy at the expense of underpaying the oil producers. Anatoliy Grigoryev, chairman of the board of the state company Tyumengazgeologiya, who spoke during the debate, stated that owing to the government's refusal to finance these operations, exploratory activities in 1993 have been thwarted and the same will happen in the 1994 season.

Talking in the congress hall lobbies, many delegates stated openly that the catastrophic decline of oil output in Russia will inevitably lead to the import of liquid fuels. This, in the opinion of Russian oil producers, will above all mean that their main competitors—Western oil companies—will get wider access to the deposits in Povolzhye and Siberia. The delegates who said that believe that the government, faced with the necessity of raising hard-currency funds for oil imports, will readily agree to transfer to foreign firms on a concession basis deposits frozen owing to an "artificial shortage of financial resources in Russian oil companies."

Proceeding from their understanding of the situation, the Russian oil producers adopted a number of measures at the congress. Above all, the Union of Oil Producers has been instructed to "participate in the democratic formation of central and regional branches of government." With the aim of organizing activities arising from the Union's charter, its founders unanimously approved a 1993 budget of several hundred million rubles.

In conclusion it needs to be noted that one of the recurring themes in the presentations was the oil producers' hope for substantial support on the part of their former colleagues who are now at the head of the Fuel and Energy Ministry—Minister Yuriy Shafrannik (former general director of the Langepasneftegas production association) and his deputy, Anatoliy Fomin (who only a month ago was head of the Mengionneftegaz association and is now expected to oversee the formation of joint-stock companies in the industry).

Bank Panel Chairman Backs 'Rational Protectionism'

PM2904112393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Apr 93 First Edition p 4

[POSTFACTUM, RIA, NOVOSTI column report: "Variety of Banks Needed"]

[Text] Sergey Yegorov, chairman of the Association of Russian Banks, has stated that at the present stage "rational protectionism with regard to Russian commercial banks is needed," and supported the new rules for the activity of banks with foreign investors in the Russian Federation elaborated at the Central Bank of Russia.

He announced that these rules fix a quota for foreign participation at 12 percent of the total capital of all Russia's commercial banks. According to the Association of Russian Bank statistics, there are 1,700 banks in Russia today—4,000 including branches. However, Yegorov belives that Russia needs to have 10,000-12,000 banks for normal competition to exist in the banking system. Sergey Yegorov again opposed the Central Bank of Russia's "premature decision" to increase the incorporation capital of Russian commercial banks to 100 million rubles. This decision could lead to the closure or transformation of 80 percent of Russian banks.

Food Price Inflation Continues in Mid-April

PM2904144593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Apr 93 First Edition p 4

[Report by Irina Goryacheva of the Russian Government Economic Conditions Center: "The Most Stable Prices in Mid-April Are Those of Bread and Vodka"]

[Excerpt] According to the latest information from state statistical bodies, the general inflation index for the week from 13 through 20 April was 103.2 percent (113 percent since the beginning of April and 215 percent since the beginning of the year).

From 13 through 20 April prices of the main food commodities rose by 3.1 percent (12 percent since the beginning of the month), including regular trade—2.7 percent; and irregular trade—5 percent. Prices have increased at the rate of 3-5 percent per week since the beginning of February. [passage omitted]

Decline in Gold Extraction Continues

PM2904151993 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Apr 93 p 1

[ITAR-TASS report under the "Brief and to the Point" rubric: "Less and Less Gold..."]

[Text] A total of 129.5 tonnes of gold was extracted in the Russian Federation in 1992, a State Committee for Statistics report that has been circulated among deputies in the White House states. This is almost 12 tonnes less than was extracted last year. Moreover, extraction of this precious metal fell by more than 6 tonnes during the first three months of this year compared with the same period last year.

Military Issues

Army Auctions Off Surplus Military Equipment

PM2904084993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Apr 93 First Edition p 4

[Report by Viktor Litovkin: "Army is Again Starting To Trade in Surplus Military Property"]

[Text] After a long interval caused by the ban on the Army engaging in commercial activity, an open auction

for the sale of released military equipment and property will be held 29 April on the territory of the Central Army Sports Club sports complex in Moscow.

The auction will offer everything which is surplus to army requirements today—about 350 types of goods from "Ural" and "ZIL" chassis and "GAZ" trucks, bulldozers, trench diggers, mobile power plants and cutters to ultrashortwave radio stations, mobile kitchens, tourist tents, and leather boots. Ammunition and weapons will not be sold.

"In contrast to previous years," I was told by organizers Aleksandr Ruzhitskiy and Gennadiy Ryazanov, "the auction is being held by the specialized state economically accountable enterprise of the Russian Defense Ministry created in accordance with the president's edict and also by the Central Army Sports Club and the 'Moscow Chamber of Commerce' exchange. There are 71 people working in the specialized state economically accountable enterprise and not one of them serves in the Army, although of course the absolute majority has substantial experience of military service and has a good knowledge of the price and function of the equipment in which it is planned to trade."

The specialized state economically accountable enterprise is subordinate to the Russian Defense Ministry central directorate for material resources and foreign economic relations, which coordinates the course of the sale of military output, while this process is monitored by the Russian state committee for the administration of state property and of course the Russian Defense Ministry main directorate for the military budget and financing.

Thanks to this procedure, my interlocutors told me, servicemen are excluded from the process of commercial activity and the military administration organs do not take part in it and the trade is carried out at open exchange and auction sales so that it will be extremely difficult to suspect officers of any dubious deals.

Previously, revenue from the auctions held by the USSR State Committee for Supplies went into the state coffers and was in no way distributed to the Army. Now it is distributed as follows: Thirty-five percent goes into the Russian Defense Ministry centralized social security fund, 30 percent into the fund for the commanders in chief of the branches of the Armed Forces, and the remaining 30 percent [figures as published] goes to the districts if the district's property has been put on sale.

All monetary assets, including the difference between the starting price and the sale price, will go only to satisfy the social needs of the servicemen and their families, I was told at the specialized state economically accountable enterprise, mainly for the construction and purchase of housing. As we know, in the Army and Navy there are now about 400,000 people without housing and there are no funds for providing them with apartments. In addition the local soviets are in no hurry to return to servicemen the apartment blocks constructed using Defense Ministry money.

It is true that the new organization so far does not expect particularly large dividends. Auctions are a complex matter and it is hard to predict their results. One thing is known—that only buyers in the ruble zone and nearby foreign parts will be able to take part in them. Currency consumers of military output are excluded and the specialized state economically accountable enterprise does not issue licenses for its export. And purchases will have to be collected at the depots of the districts and military units where they are at present.

The starting price is also set by the fund holders, that is the military. The auctioneers do not have the right to reduce it although certain benefits are envisaged for private farmers who are reserve officers.

Ruzhitskiy and Ryazanov told me that the specialized state economically accountable enterprise is prepared to open "daughter" enterprises in each district and fleet, which will enable purchasers to choose the goods which are near to hand, but that is a matter for the future. The auction will show how matters go.

Grachev Comments on Draft Military Doctrine Document

LD2904091693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0500 GMT 29 Apr 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] It is clear that setting foreign policy guidelines is directly linked to Russian military doctrine. Work on this has been completed, and according to Defense Minister Pavel Grachev they will soon be submitted for approval.

[Begin Grachev recording] The first section deals with military policy. It is in military doctrine that we have included all the doctrinal principles that we profess at the present time. In other words: Domestic and foreign policy and our political attitude to various regions—all this is dealt with in this section.

The second section of the military doctrine is purely military: In other words, how and in what manner we will implement our defense doctrine in practice.

The third section deals with the military equipment side of military doctrine; in other words, the resources with which we will implement our military doctrine.

We examined this document at a sitting of the Military Collegium, and it has been sent—with account taken of amendments—to the Security Council for examination. In the very near future there will be a sitting of the Security Council under the chairmanship of the president, and the draft will either be approved or not. If it is

approved we will send it to the Supreme Soviet for examination and endorsement. [end recording]

Salaries of Servicemen, Militiamen To Increase

MK2904075493 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No 11, 27 Apr 93 p 2 (signed to press 26 Apr)

[Aleksey Kirpichnikov report: "Servicemen, Militiamen To Get Richer. But Their Pay is Not for Publication"]

[Text] On 22 April, the government's press service finally made public the fact that three days before the announcement was made the Council of Ministers issued a decree "On Allowances to Servicemen and to Rank-and-File and Commanding Officers of the Internal Affairs Agencies."

It is well known that the salaries lawfully earned by servicemen and militiamen are made up of money paid for the positions they occupy as well as payment based on rank. The former are to be raised 1.9-fold, the latter on the average of threefold. In addition, cadets and other military students will be paid larger stipends. Bonuses and pensions will go up also.

The TASS report describing the key provisions of the decree noted that they "not only increase the level of the servicemen's social protection, but also make possible a gradual transition to the manning of the Armed Forces according to mixed principles." What is meant is a staged transition to a contract basis: In addition to getting uniforms and high-calorie food, a private will be paid by contract around 33,000 rubles [R] a month (11,000 for the rank and another 22,000 for the position), while a conscript will have to put up with only 11,000, which is the smallest salary payable for any rank. Army generals, fleet admirals, and marshals will receive a salary of R42,000 (let it be recalled that aside from that they will be paid 1.9 times their current salary for their positions plus, again, food and uniforms).

Measures to increase allowances payable to Internal Affairs Ministry officers and servicemen, aside from the actual need for averting the pauperization of the militia and the Army, have in the current situation of political confrontation clearly discernible concomitant (main?—A.K.) aims.

As for the bureaucratic execution of the document, two things are noteworthy. The first is that following an established tradition, the decree signed on 19 April was put into effect retroactively—beginning 1 April. The second one is the stamp "not for the press." All attempts to understand what information contained in the decree was not subject to publication have been in vain, the only explanation being that the incumbent head of government wants to reintroduce the tactic employed by Yegor Gaydar's father: To do good in strict secret following the example set by the well-known Timur and his team.

Transfers To Decrease Lack of Internal Troops Officers

PM2904154193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Apr 93 p 1

[Captain Nikolay Chergin and Major Vitaliy Strugovets report under "From Our News Bureau" rubric: "Internal Troops Need Officers"]

[Text] This was stated by Lieutenant General Anatoliy Kulikov, commander of the Russian Federation MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops, at a meeting with Armed Forces Humanities Academy students. In his view the Internal Troops are currently undermanned by approximately 9,000 officers.

In this connection there will be early graduations from Saratov and Vladikavkaz MVD Command Schools, the transfer of officers from the Russian Army, which is being cut back, into the Internal Troops will be considerably facilitated, and the drafting of reserve officers will be permitted.

Navy Revises Sea Exercise Methods To Save Money

PM2904155193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Apr 93 p 1

[Anatoliy Ivanov report: "Kamchatka Flotilla Tactical Exercises: "Trips and Expenditure"]

[Text] Pacific Ocean Training Area—In accordance with combat training plans, the exercise was two-sided. Ten combat exercises were carried out during the "naval battle," using surface vessel and submarine rocket, torpedo, and artillery weapons.

In the past, ships would make voyages alone in order to work out their course tasks before such exercises were performed. But it costs over 20,000 rubles for very hour that a patrol combatant is out, and for a nuclear submarine the figure is 32,000. The ships in the large strategic formation therefore now go out together following thorough basic training. This is one way of saving money, which is scant as it is, and at the same time maintaining combat readiness.

Supreme Soviet

Further on 29 Apr Supreme Soviet Session Proceedings

Khasbulatov Criticizes Kozyrev, Churkin

LD2904103693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0800 GMT 29 Apr 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet is in session today.

[Reporter] Today's morning session of the Supreme Soviet started fairly quietly. The deputies ratified treaties with South Korea, India, and Great Britain. A speech by Deputy Foreign Mininster Vitaliy Churkin aroused a stormy reaction from Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov:

[Begin recording] [Churkin, in progress] ...no true alliance like...

[Khasbulatov, interrupting] We have a foreign minister. I am sorry, one has to be impartial, whatever the regime, whatever the government, whatever president comes to power. He works with national state interests as expressed in foreign policy—and defends them stoutly. You are not complying with this. This makes me conclude that you, too, have quite a lot to learn professionally, along with the foreign minister. [end recording]

[Reporter] The flowing oratory of the joint session of the Supreme Soviet was interrupted when the deputies came to debate the draft resolution on the armed conflict in Yugoslavia, which was sent for further work in the commission yesterday. The deputies embarked upon debating it point by point, having failed to adopt it as a basis. The resolution was then passed with amendments.

ROK Treaty Ratified

LD2904090393 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0800 GMT 29 Apr 93

[Text] The Russian parliament today ratified the treaty on the basis of relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea. It was signed on 19 November 1992 during Russian President Boris Yeltsin's official visit to Seoul. In presenting the document Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Kolokolov stressed that the treaty lays the foundations for qualitatively new relations between the two countries, not only good-neighborly, but those of partners as well.

Treaty With UK Ratified

LD2904094293 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0900 GMT 29 Apr 93

[Text] The Russian parliament today ratified the treaty on principles of relations between the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It was signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and British Prime Minister John Major last November.

The treaty records cardinal changes in relations between the two countries in recent times. It says they are moving from many years of confrontation, mutual distrust, and suspicion to honest partnership and cooperation based on equal rights.

A special section in the treaty is devoted to problems connected with international security and arms control and disarmament.

Bulgarian Monument Dismantlement Protested

LD2904105093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1035 GMT 29 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow April 29 TASS—"The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation has learned with regret that an extraordinary session of the Bulgarian capital's communal council has decided to dismantle the monument to the Soviet Army in Sofia," says a message addressed by the Russian parliament to the Bulgarian National Assembly. Its text was approved by a joint meeting of the Russian parliament's two chambers here today. "The fate of this monument, symbolising the joint struggle waged by the peoples of the two countries against fascism, deeply worries the ordinary people of Russia, who are deeply grateful to the men who had sacrificed their lives for the sake of freedom," the document stresses.

The Supreme Soviet of Russia expresses the hope that the Bulgarian National Assembly will find a civilised way to settle this problem, affecting the historical past and the common spiritual values of the two countries, will decide the fate of the monument to the Soviet Army in Sofia in full accordance with the Russian-Buglarian treaty on friendship and cooperation.

Peaceful End to FRY Conflict Urged

LD2904111993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1055 GMT 29 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow April 29 TASS—The Russian parliament has urged the parties involved in a conflict on the territory of former Yugoslavia to stop hostilities and resolve the conflict through political negotiations.

In a parliamentary resolution adopted at a bicameral sitting on Thursday [29 April], deputies urged the world community and especially permanent members of the U.N. Security Council favouring the use of force to show restraint and take a responsible stand on this matter, as such a step may have serious consequences.

The Russian Government has been instructed to be guided in its actions in the Security Council by parliamentary decisions of December 17, 1992 on taking the necessary measures to prevent military interference and further escalation of the conflict in the territory of former Yugoslavia and of February 18, 1993 urging the international community not to supply arms to the conflict zone and to keep from military interference.

The parliamentary decree says that during the voting in the Security Council on possible military intervention of international forces in the Yugoslav crisis, representative of the Russian Federation should use the right of veto as

such intervention affects Russia's vital interests and can do nothing to help settle the crisis sooner.

Deputies rejected the clause of the draft decree urging political and military leaders of Bosnian Serbs to agree to the proposal in the joint address of the presidents of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro on the adoption of the Vance-Owen plan with necessary adjustments.

Further on Yugoslav Conflict

PM2904185393 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Apr 93 p 3

[Unattributed, untitled report on Supreme Soviet decree dated 29 April]

[Text] In its decree of 29 April, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet has decided:

1. To urge:

the parties embroiled in the conflict to cease hostilities immediately and resolve the problems that have arisen through political negotiations;

the political and military leaders of the Bosnian Serbs to agree to the proposal put forward in the joint appeal by the presidents of Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Montenegro D. Cosic, S. Milosevic, and Bulatovic to accept the Vance-Owen Plan with the necessary amendments;

the world community and particularly the permanent members of the UN Security Council who support the use of force to show restraint and responsibility with regard to this issue, bearing in mind the serious consequences of this step.

2. That the Russian Federation Government is to compel the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry to be guided in its actions in the UN Security Council by the Supreme Soviet's decisions of 17 December 1992 and 18 February 1993. That it be deemed expedient for the Russian Federation representative on the UN Security Council to use his veto when the UN Security Council votes on possible military intervention by international forces in the Yugoslav crisis, on the basis that such actions affect vitally important Russian Federation interests and run the risk of giving rise to a full-scale military confrontation in Europe.

Media Committee To Be Reshuffled

LD2904134893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1249 GMT 29 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow April 29 TASS—The Russian parliament intends to reshuffle its Committee on the Mass Madia, Public Relations, Mass Movements and Public Opinion Studies. The item was put on the preliminary agenda of the chambers' joint sitting on Thursday [29 April].

If the plan comes true, the committee which was an eyesore for the parliamentary leaders, will be transformed into a mass media committee.

Vladimir Lisin, a representative from the "Rossiya" parliamentary group led by Sergey Baburin, will remain its chairman.

International Treaties Law Passed

LD2904151893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1501 GMT 29 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Yuriy Filippov]

[Text] Moscow April 29 TASS—The Russian parliament passed on Thursday a law "On International Treaties of the Russian Federation". The law sets a procedure for concluding, executing and terminating Russia's international treaties. The law also applies to treaties in which the Russian side acts as a state successive to the former Soviet Union.

The parliament instructed the Russian Government to see to it that the ministries, state committees and agencies of the Russian Federation revise and annul within a two-month period all legal acts issued by them that do not comply with the present law.

Report on Media Bill Discussion

LD2904220793

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1930 GMT on 29 April broadcasts a report on today's meeting of the Supreme Soviet's Chamber of the Republic.

The report begins by noting that the chamber, chaired by Ruslan Khasbulatov, discussed changes in the Criminal Code and the mass media. A draft decree presented by President Yeltsin, entitled "On Introducing Into Russian Federation's Criminal and Procedural Codes Amendments and Addendums Related to the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," was discussed in its second reading by Deputy Aslanbek Aslakhanov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Legality, Crime Prevention, and Law and Order.

He stated that the amendments and addendums suggested by President Yeltsin are "directed at protecting the interests of the Russian state in its foreign economic activity, in terms of exports of raw materials, products, and equipment as well as scientific and technical information which may be used for producing arms and military gear. Simultaneously, this draft law foresees criminal responsibility for illegal exports of such commodities. After the first reading of this draft, no suggestions or corrections have been lodged with the relevant Supreme Soviet committee."

Aslakhanov went on to say that a couple of minor editorial changes were introduced by the committee and

he proposed voting for the draft as a whole. Khasbulatov then put the draft to the vote: it was passed with 83 votes for, no votes against, and one abstention. The number of those voting, 84, the reporter says, represents 67.2 percent of the total number of members of the Soviet of the Republic. At this point the video shows the electronic voting results.

The reporter goes on to say that on the second issue, Deputy Vladimir Pavlovich Lisin, who chairs the subcommittee of the Supreme Soviet Committee on interrepublican relations, regional policies, and cooperation, stated that only an economically developed state can support free mass media. He also said that the media should support morality through objectivity and professionalism of journalists. However, freedom of the mass media should not be confused with license or a free-for-all approach, Lisin warned. It is necessary, he went on to say, to change the way the parliamentary Committee for Mass Media is operating. Among other things, it would be expedient to call it the committee on issues related to the mass media, and to have more political forces and parties represented in the committee, so that it mirrors more truly the diversity of the political structure of society.

The reporter notes that a representative of the committee, addressing the deputies, reminded them of the main guidelines of the committee's work, and assumed the deputies that the committee attempts to be objective in its support of different media. He also recalls the positive role the committee has played in setting up new publications.

Khasbulatov reminded the deputies that all policies now should be guided by the results of the referendum: The people instructed the two branches of authority to live in peace, and so be it. Based on Lisin's address, the reporter says, the resolution on the media was passed as a whole.

Decree on Work on May Holidays

PM2904180393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Apr 93 First Edition p 1

[Decree No. 4893-1 of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet "On the Work of Enterprises and Construction Sites on the Holidays 4 and 10 May 1993," dated Moscow, the Russian House of Soviets, 29 April 1993 and signed by Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Chairman R.I. Khasbulatov]

[Text] Having examined the Russian Federation draft law "On Declaring 4 and 10 May 1993 To Be Working Days," submitted by the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. That the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government shall in accordance with labor legislation be entitled to organize work on the holidays 4 and 10 May 1993 at enterprises and construction sites that are provided with labor, material, and financial resources for manufacturing products that are in short supply, consumer goods, and agricultural work, and also for the timely commissioning of construction projects.

2. The present decree shall come into force from the moment of publication.

[Signed] Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Chairman R.I. Khasbulatov

[Dated] Moscow, Russian House of Soviets; 29 April 1993

No. 4893-1

Further on Yugoslav Conflict

PM2904185393 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Apr 93 p 3

[Unattributed, untitled report on Supreme Soviet decree dated 29 April]

[Text] In its decree of 29 April, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet has decided:

1. To urge:

the parties embroiled in the conflict to cease hostilities immediately and resolve the problems that have arisen through political negotiations;

the political and military leaders of the Bosnian Serbs to agree to the proposal put forward in the joint appeal by the presidents of Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Montenegro D. Cosic, S. Milosevic, and Bulatovic to accept the Vance-Owen Plan with the necessary amendments;

the world community and particularly the permanent members of the UN Security Council who support the use of force to show restraint and responsibility with regard to this issue, bearing in mind the serious consequences of this step.

2. That the Russian Federation Government is to compel the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry to be guided in its actions in the UN Security Council by the Supreme Soviet's decisions of 17 December 1992 and 18 February 1993. That it be deemed expedient for the Russian Federation representative on the UN Security Council to use his veto when the UN Security Council votes on possible military intervention by international forces in the Yugoslav crisis, on the basis that such actions affect vitally important Russian Federation interests and run the risk of giving rise to a full-scale military confrontation in Europe.

Supreme Soviet 30 Apr Session Proceedings

LD3004101393 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0800 GMT 30 Apr 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Today the Russian parliament again postponed the examination, started on Wednesday [28 April], of legislation, in the second reading, on the status of ethnic minorities. The document will be worked up in the committees and commissions.

Procurator General Valentin Stepankov appealed to the Supreme Soviet requesting consent to institute criminal proceedings with regard to Deputy Rineyskiy of Khabarovsk kray soviet of people's deputies. It is a question of conflict between the deputy and a correspondent who published material critical of him in the local newspaper. The Khabarovsk kray soviet did not give consent for criminal proceedings to be instituted. Today the Supreme Soviet revoked that decision, stripping Rineyskiy of his immunity as a deputy and thereby giving the court the opportunity to get to the bottom of this conflict.

Today the deputies are to discuss changes in the membership of the committees of the Supreme Soviet. It is known that some of them have been reorganized lately, in particular the Committee for Economic Reform and Property, for the Mass Media, and a number of others. In the afternoon the parliament will work in separate chambers.

Yeltsin Ban on Rallies Not Challenged

LD3004134993 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1100 GMT 30 Apr 93

[Report by correspondent Sergey Suntsov, including recorded statement by People's Deputy Mityukov; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Excerpt] [Suntsov] [passage omitted] Deputy Shashviashvili described the Russian president's ban on May Day demonstrations on Manezh and Red Squares as a violation of civil rights. He proposed that the parliament suspend the directive and ask the Constitutional Court to rule on it. Here is what Deputy Mityukov said:

[Mityukov] I know who wants to rock the political boat by raising this question. But we must take a more professional approach, so we do not once again become the laughing stock of all the people and the entire state. So, I propose that this issue be left off the agenda.

[Suntsov] The Supreme Soviet rejected the proposal that this question should be included on the agenda.

Nationalities Council Views N. Caucasus

LD3004134193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1306 GMT 30 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow April 30 TASS—The Russian Parliament's Council of Nationalities discussed today the implementation of the Russian Parliament resolution "on situation in the Northern Caucasus in connection with Abkhazian developments".

Measures taken by Russian federal power bodies to stop the armed conflict in Abkhazia, which is destabilizing social-political situation in the Northern Caucasus, and justly solve problems, have not been a success, says the chamber resolution.

For instance, the Permanent Commission of Russian People's Deputies to study the situation in the conflict zone and act as a mediator has not started to function.

"The Georgian leadership, taking advantage of inconsistent actions of Russian federal power bodies, is trying to settle the Abkhazian conflict with force methods and unjustifiably accuses Russian troops of non-observation of their neutrality," says the document.

The Council of Nationalities asked the Russian president and the government to boost negotiations with the Georgian leadership on a recent appeal of the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet to the Russian Parliament for normalization of the regional situation. The chamber confirmed further Russian humanitarian aid to the conflict zone population.

The Council of Nationalities called on the Georgian and Abkhazian Parliaments to "show realism in the estimation of the current situation and take the path of its peaceful and just solution on the basis of observation of human rights and rights of all ethnic groups". The deputies addressed the Georgian Parliament with a request to control the investigation of crimes against Russian servicemen, members of their families and Russian property objects.

Travkin Urges People's Deputies To Disband Congress

LD2904223893 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1900 GMT 29 Apr 93

[Report by announcer Aleksandr Shashkov and correspondent D. Pugacheva, with recorded remarks by Nikolay Travkin, leader of the Democratic Party of Russia; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] [Shashkov] Nikolay Ryabov, deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, has refused to comment on the statement by Nikolay Travkin, the leader of the Democratic Party of Russia, announcing his resignation from the post of [Congress of People's] deputy. Nikolay Travkin made this statement on 28 April in connection with the fact that the overwhelming majority of Muscovites had voted for early re-elections of the corps of deputies at the referendum.

[Pugacheva] For Nikolay Travkin, the will of the people is the supreme will. But most deputies do not take the vox populi as an axiom.

[Travkin] It is very convenient to fight for the electorate's interests while staying close to where the goodies

are being distributed. One doesn't want to go too far away from the feeding trough. Then there is the purely mundane consideration—one gets a salary and there are aides—a people's deputy's assistant now gets 40,000 rubles. And then overnight it is supposed to be taken away. So you give it a thought and then decide, yes, one ought to do it of course, but I will wait. Let the president disband the whole thing. And now the president is going to get all sorts of petitions. Tomorrow the [Parliamentary] Coalition of Reform is going to see the president and demand that he take decisive steps and disband [the Congress of People's Deputies]. The president will not opt for disbandment because in itself this step will prove unconstitutional and it has not been authorized by the referendum. But why don't you yourselves speak up? You step forward and disband this much-hated Congress—let's put it like that.

Parliamentary Deputy Prepared To Surrender Powers

LD2904171693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1637 GMT 29 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow April 29 TASS—People's Parliamentary Deputy Andrey Golovin, elected to the Russian Parliament by the Moscow constituency, is prepared to follow the example of People' Deputy Nikolay Travkin, who has earlier surrendered his deputy's powers.

Golovin told ITAR-TASS that he considers re-elections to be "reasonable," although the idea did not win a majority of votes in his constituency.

Parliamentary deputies, who are Muscovites, "can take a joint action to follow suit and schedule elections in Moscow for the fall," Golovin said. He believes it is not expedient to hold general re-elections since only in five regions electors voted for early elections of the deputies' corps.

As far as Mr. Travkin is concerned, Golovin said that he does not believe "it is normal that a representative of the executive power, being the head of the administration of the Moscow Region, performs his duties concurrently with being a people's deputy."

Golovin supported the idea of the liquidation of the Congress of People's Deputies. He said that the Russian Parliament should be extended to be a new, two-chamber parliament. However, a question of self-dissolution of the congress after the referendum "is not on the agenda," he said.

"New elections of people's deputies should be held on the basis of a new constitution which will be adopted," Golovin said.

Privatization Results Deemed 'Unsatisfactory'

MK3004084693 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 29 Apr 93 p 9

[Yelena Kotelnikova report: "Parliament Discusses Privatization Program. Supreme Soviet Unhappy With Progress of Privatization"]

[Text] The parliament will no longer tolerate the fact that privatization policy has slipped out of its control and is being shaped by the executive branch. This is the bottom line of the decree "On the Implementation of the State Program of Privatization of State-Owned and Municipal Enterprises in 1992" passed by parliament yesterday. The document deems the results of privatization unsatisfactory and in effect instructs the government itself to declare check auctions invalid.

According to the decree, the results of the work to carry out the privatization of state-owned and municipal enterprises in Russia have been deemed unsatisfactory. The reason given for this assessment is that "the importance and consequences of privatization in reforming the economic system have not been fully estimated." In addition, the Supreme Soviet considers as a significant flaw the lack of clear-cut coordination between the State Committee for the Management of State Property, the Federal Property Fund, and their structural units. The introduction of vouchers drew a particularly negative reaction from the parliament, because it "created conditions for profiteering and fraud." The deputies judged that as a result "state property is being handed over to private investors for a nominal price."

Anatoliy Chubays, chairman of the State Property Committee, drew the parliamentarians' attention to the fact that the decision by the Supreme Soviet to give a negative assessment of privatization was at odds with the opinion of the people who "voted for reform" on 25 April. Parliament Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, however, did not accept this argument, saying that he did not see any direct link between support for reform and support for the State Property Committee.

Observers note that the decision by the Supreme Soviet was prompted to a large degree by parliament's desire to retake the initiative in devising and implementing privatization policies from the executive branch and to disavow the decisions made by the State Property Committee. What is noteworthy here is the tactic employed by parliament to achieve this end: The Supreme Soviet requested the government itself to "review and repeal all regulations issued by the Russian State Property Committee in violation of the State Privatization Program for 1992." That is to say, the government itself is called upon to declare check auctions invalid.

For its part, however, parliament has not yet called "voucherization" unlawful. This puts in an awkward position the authorities in regions where check auctions have been suspended (for example, Novosibirsk

Oblast)—local leaders pinned particular hopes on the parliament, hoping that it would officially declare the auctions invalid.

Observers note that parliament intends to neutralize the influence exerted by the deputies who side with the president on lawmaking activity related to economic reform. In particular, the Supreme Soviet's Committee for Economic Reform and Property Matters, known for its loyalty to the privatization policy pursued by the State Property Committee and close contacts with the government, was reorganized under yesterday's decree into the Soviet of the Republic's Standing Commission for the Support of New Economic Structures and Privatization. Observers believe that the reason for this downgrading of the committee is related not only to the Supreme Soviet leaders' desire to control its activity, but also the fact that committee chairman Sergey Krasavchenko was actively supporting President Boris Yeltsin on the eve of the referendum.

[Article contains the following boxed passage]

Measures taken by parliament to disavow privatization policies pursued by the State Property Committee [subhead]

—The results of the privatization effort in 1992 have been deemed unsatisfactory.

—The Control and Budget Committee at the Supreme Soviet has been charged with auditing the State Property Committee.

—The government was asked to submit to the Supreme Soviet before 30 May its proposals for bringing privatization-related regulations with regard to the legal means of payment to be used in the process of privatization in line with the law "On the Privatization of State-Owned and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation" and the law "On Named Privatization Accounts (Deposits) in the RSFSR."

—The Supreme Soviet Committee for Economic Reform and Property Matters, which was defending the line of the State Property Committee in parliament, was downgraded, having been reorganized into the Soviet of the Republic's Standing Commission for the Support for New Economic Structures and Privatization.

Ambartsumov Interviewed on Return From Yugoslavia

MK2904115093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 18, 2 May 93 (signed to press 27 Apr) p A15

[Interview with Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, by Igor Nekrasov, published in "Crisis" column: "No Territory Is Worth Fighting For"]

[Text] "No territory is worth fighting for." This is the opinion of Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, chairman of the Parliamentary International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations Committee, who recently returned from a trip to the former Yugoslav republics as head of the first official delegation of the Russian Supreme Soviet.

The delegation comprised another six deputies of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet representing various factions in the Russian parliament: Nikolay Pavlov, coordinator of the Russian Unity faction; Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Glotov, a member of Russian Unity; Igor Mozgo, a member of the Smena-New Policy faction; Major General Georgiy Kuts, with no party affiliation; Oleg Rumyantsev, not affiliated with any faction; and Viktor Sheynis, coordinator of the Accord for Progress faction. They managed to visit the main crisis areas in the republics.

[Nekrasov] Can you say that the aims of the trip have been accomplished?

[Ambartsumov] On the whole, yes, they have. One should not hope for miracles, that we will succeed in stopping the war. But we have succeeded in influencing the leaders of the states of the former Yugoslavia and in expediting the negotiations process. This is why the most encouraging sign was the readiness for direct talks with the Serbs on the part of President Franjo Tudjman and Bosnia-Herzegovina leader Mate Boban, as well as on the part of the opposing side: the Serbs Cosic and Karadzic, who will be favorably disposed to assistance from Russia in preparing for the talks. Everybody is tired of the war, primarily the Muslims and the Croats. Serbia, although not directly involved in the conflict, is obviously suffering the most due to its severe socioeconomic situation.

[Nekrasov] Who then should come across with the biggest concessions in this dispute?

[Ambartsumov] The Serbs, because they have virtually won the war. However, there are limits to concessions. Today the Serbs do not feel secure, not being sure that they will get the "corridors" linking Serbian districts in Croatia and Bosnia with Serbia. If they do get the guarantees, then in my opinion they may sign the Owen-Vance peace plan. But alterations in the map should be specific; this would even include the exchange of territories.

[Nekrasov] Currently, though, the process of unification of Serb territories in Croatia and Bosnia is under way, apparently with the aim of creating a "greater Serbia"....

[Ambartsumov] I believe that if we are talking about Serbian Krajina, the Serbs must achieve their interests within the borders of Croatia, having really firm guarantees from Zagreb which ensure their independence. The ethnic borders in Bosnia and Herzegovina for their part will undergo substantial alterations: Today it is clear that one community will not be able to live "within another,"

as it were. These questions, however, should be decided at the negotiating table, considering various scenarios of exchanges of territories and population. It would be inadmissible in the present situation to resolve the Yugoslav crisis by means of armed intervention from outside, with the use of Western armed forces. And it is totally inconceivable for me that Russians could possibly be involved in this kind of intervention.

[Nekrasov] What then is your vision of a way out of the Yugoslav deadlock?

[Ambartsumov] The cessation of hostilities by all the sides involved, the resumption of the process of settlement, and nonadmission of outside armed intervention. We also favor a revision, or at least an extension, of the moratorium on the latest UN Security Council resolution calling for the total isolation of Yugoslavia. At the same time, being critical of this option, it would be dangerous to pander to our national-radicals.

It should also be remembered that the Serbs are a proud and belligerent people who will not fall to their knees even in the event of intervention. And it is unreasonable for the pragmatic and calculating West to prod them down this path. The West should realize that the present leadership of Serbia and Yugoslavia may be replaced by radical nationalists. At the same time I was never tired of repeating to my Serbian interlocutors, who are indulging in illusions: Russia will never go as far as to unleash a world war on Serbia's account—even in the event of a change in leadership in our country, which, however, is very unlikely. Moreover, this could have far-reaching dramatic consequences also inside Russia itself.

There are no innocents in this war—all sides are responsible. One should avoid, however, a one-sided view of things in which all blame goes to the Serbs. Yugoslavia's sad experience shows that the same kind of mistake was made as the one made by Gorbachev. Efforts were begun to preserve the state by force without first attempting to implement a confederative structure.

Regional Affairs

Moscow District's Final Referendum Results

LD2904173693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1718 GMT 29 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Belskiy]

[Text] Moscow April 29 TASS—Muscovites, who voted in the nationwide referendum held in Russia on April 25, replied to four questions on four separate ballot papers according to the pattern: "Yes", "Yes", "No" and "Yes". This is the general conclusion drawn of the voting held in Moscow, Chairman of the City District Commission Anatoliy Porshnev said at a press conference here today.

According to verified figures, 4.46 million out of a total of 6.95 million registered voters of Moscow took part in the nationwide referendum.

Answering the first question regarding their faith in President Boris Yeltsin, 3.33 million Muscovites replied in the affirmative, and 1.032 million - in the negative. Over 65.6 thousand ballot papers with an answer to this question were declared invalid.

3.09 million people said yes to the second question of the referendum, thereby approving the social and economic policy of the Russian president.

Summing up the results of the referendum held in the Moscow electoral district, participants in the press conference in their statements noted, in particular, that "electoral committees worked in an extremely nervous situation, and observers "became involved in controlling the voting procedure instead of preventing violations of referendum rules and regulations."

It was noted at the press conference that the sum of 620.3 million roubles, which was allocated to the capital by the Central Election Commission for holding the voting, was much exaggerated.

Rostov Oblast Soviet Abolishes Post of Yeltsin Envoy

LD3004113793 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 30 Apr 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Despite expectations and despite the agenda, the 13th session of the Rostov Oblast soviet did not examine the issue of Cossack rebirth in Rostov Oblast. The issue was postponed by deputies yet again, due to having been ill-prepared. Instead, an extra issue was put on the agenda and successfully resolved. The post of the representative of the Russian president in the oblast has been abolished. He and his staff were told to vacate the premises they occupy within a week and to stop their activities on the oblast's territory. In response, Vladimir Zubkov, the Russian president's representative in Rostov Oblast, said he has no intention of obeying the decisions of the oblast session, saying:

[Begin Zubkov recording] I regard this decision by the session as not being serious. I am subordinate only to the president and it is only the president who appoints me. I can be removed from my post only by a presidential decree. [end recording]

Kalmykia Leader's Plans for Economic, Political Development

MK3004083093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 29 Apr 93 p 2

[Vitaliy Yemelyanov report: "President Ilyumzhinov Gives Advice to President Yeltsin"]

[Text] President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov of Kalmykia told a press conference in Moscow yesterday that a top priority task of his policy is to make Kalmykia attractive for Russian and foreign entrepreneurship for which purpose there is a plan to create the first offshore zone on Russia's territory. At the same time the millionaire-turned-president promises that the profit tax will be reduced to 3 percent. To ensure the reforms Ilyumzhinov is determined to take serious political measures, in particular by abolishing Soviet power in Kalmykia. Yesterday the newly elected president shared his plans with Boris Yeltsin in the course of a one-hour meeting.

First, Kirsan Ilyumzhinov intends to organize the self-dissolution of the Kalmykia Supreme Soviet. Corresponding work has been conducted among the deputies and it is expected that at its session tomorrow the Supreme Soviet will dissolve itself. In its place a temporary parliament will be formed including 25 members headed by the speaker. Within two months it is to pass a law on early elections and ensure their conduct. To those "dissolved" deputies who "want to engage in real business activity" and open their own companies, the president is going to provide soft credits from his bank, Steppe. The same fate is in store for political parties: For the period of economic reforms they will be disbanded and reorganized as small enterprises, and will receive credits from Ilyumzhinov's bank.

"After April the Soviets in Kalmykia will be history," Ilyumzhinov told the Russian president, recommending that Yeltsin take similar measures on a Russia-wide scale. Ilyumzhinov is also determined to reorganize the government: out of 40 ministries only five will remain. As for those ministries which he has no authority to abolish without consent from the center, they will also be abolished—according to Ilyumzhinov, he has received Yeltsin's consent for that.

The businessman-president envisions "the republic's self- sufficiency" as the basis of his reforms: rejection of any centralized subsidies on one hand, and transfer to fixed (related only to security, maintenance of the army, and so forth) remittances to the federal budget. Everything in excess of this sum must remain in Kalmykia. This problem will become a subject of the upcoming talks with the federal authorities.

To avoid the further waste of state property during the transfer of power in the republic, Ilyumzhinov has suspended privatization. "I was printing presidential edicts and I had no white paper. Everything was stolen," he said. In addition the young president is going to collect all the vouchers from the Kalmyk population, "take them to Moscow, dump them on the table in the Finance Ministry, and have all these worthless papers exchanged for 'greenbacks.'"

It should be noted that even during the election campaign and especially after the elections, Russian and foreign firms have stepped up their activity in creating their subsidiaries in Elista. For the most part these are Kirsan Ilyumzhinov's traditional partners, who are accustomed to trusting his promises.

[Article contains the following boxed passage]

Information from the Kalmyk Republic Statistics Administration

Territory—76,100 sq. km; population—321,700. Urban population—118,900; rural population—202,800. Ethnic composition: 45.4 percent Kalmyks, 37.7 percent Russians, 1.6 percent Ukrainians; other ethnic groups less than 1 percent.

Previously, 95 percent of the republic's budget was made up by subsidies from the central budget—over 20 billion rubles a year.

The main sector of the economy—livestock breeding (number of sheep—2.833 million).

Subsidiary sectors—plant growing, melon growing, fodder production, vegetable growing.

Capital—Elista (91,700 residents).

The main industrial enterprises are based in Elista: the Caspian engineering plant, the Caspian fish plant, knitwear and garment factories, a silicone and construction materials plant. In other regions of the republic there are mainly small agricultural produce processing enterprises.

Banks—the National Bank (the largest), and a few commercial banks (private farmers' and agricultural banks).

Kalmykia Parliament Expected To Dissolve

LD3004091293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0852 GMT 30 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Gvritishviliy]

[Text] Moscow April 30 TASS—The parliament of Kalmykia, a republic within Russia, is expected to yield to the demand of a newly-elected president and dissolve itself.

The parliament is currently discussing a draft resolution of President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov which envisages the dissolution. Local legislators have already approved the document in principle, TASS learned by telephone from Ilyumzhinov's press office on Friday.

The 30-year old president elected by an overwhelming majority of Kalmykia's population calls himself a capitalist and is set to drastically reduce bureaucratic staff.

In two weeks in office Ilyumzhinov dissolved the government, 40 ministries and reduced the state administration staff 10-fold.

His plans for the near future envisage the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet which will be temporarily replaced by a 25-men strong professional parliament. Ilyumzhinov believes there will be no parliament in the republic in future.

Abdulatipov Briefs Press in Dagestan on Current Situation

MK3004080093 Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian No. 48, 29 Apr 93 (Signed to Press 27 Apr) pp 1, 2

[Press conference by Ramazan Abdulatipov, Supreme Soviet Nationalities Council chairman, transcribed by Roman Badalov under the rubric "From the First Person"; in Makhachkala, Dagestan; date not given: "In What Sort of State Do We Live?"]

[Text] **A press conference held by Ramazan Abdulatipov, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, took place in Makhachkala, capital of Dagestan. Coming to meet with their fellow countryman were the most inquisitive people—representatives of the mass media. The dialogue proved to be interesting and frank.**

[Question] How do you assess today's social and political situation?

[Abdulatipov] It is extremely tense. Part of the blame for it must go to the media, which sometimes are not quite objective in assessing events. In the heat of political battles, leaders of various stripes succumb to unnecessary ambitions oblivious to the most important thing—the priority of Russian statehood. As strange and paradoxical as it is, no one today is able to give an articulate answer to one burning question: In what sort of state do we actually live? Its status has not been specified by either the president or the Russian Congress of People's Deputies. One possible clear answer is that the process of building statehood is proceeding almost spontaneously, and it is poorly controlled. In other words, the law is not respected.

[Question] The North Caucasus today is far from an oasis of peace and accord, which it was only yesterday. It is the venue of the events that were taking place in North Ossetia and Ingushetia, of Chechnya withdrawing from Russia, and so forth. Dagestan in this sense appears to be a "haven," a region where laws are respected, where so far common sense prevails over emotions. What do you think?

[Abdulatipov] Indeed, in this respect, our mountainous republic is a land inhabited by scores of the most diverse peoples and ethnic groups, dissimilar in their languages, customs, and traditions. It remains at this stage a symbol of mutual respect, peace and accord. Without detracting in any way from the merits of peoples in other regions, I would like to note in particular the wisdom of the peoples of Dagestan, their ages-long desire always to respect others. There was a time when I openly criticized the republic's leaders for some conservatism in their activities. But it is perhaps this conservatism, this careful thought given to each step, that has helped the Dagestani peoples move away from dangerous confrontation.

[Question] Ramazan Gadzhimuradovich, some people involved in state affairs—politicians, scholars, sociologists, economists—describe our epoch as an interesting time, a "transition period," and so forth. What is your own assessment? Is it really so interesting?

[Abdulatipov] "Transition period" is a buzzword today. Another popular phrase is "interesting time." But personally I cannot understand, much less accept, these assertions. What is so interesting about innocent people—the elderly, women, children—dying in the flames of interethnic clashes? What is so interesting about the wave of crime sweeping us all? What is, finally, so interesting about hundreds of people of meager means, and the poor suffering from inflation, and a culture dying? I think there is nothing and cannot be anything interesting in it. Therefore state personalities of all ranks, and politicians of all levels, should be extremely cautious and circumspect in what they say and do.

[Question] There is no concealing it, the situation is difficult, one might say unpredictable. This shows up everywhere—politics, the economy, and other spheres of life. There is much talk about "shock therapy"....

[Abdulatipov] Everyone, everywhere speaks nowadays of a situation of deadlock in the country. They also speak of ways out of the crisis. But different politicians, political groups, leaders of different factions and movements have their own point of view on the way out. Some new-wave politicians speak for revolutionary changes in all spheres of life and lay the main emphasis on speeding up privatization, carrying out new radical reforms. In particular, they also propose that the state be debarred from running the economy. All these things are called "shock therapy." It is, I am convinced, dangerous and fraught with the possibility of civil war. This is a road to destruction. All reforms should have as their starting point a social orientation. There is simply no alternative.

[Question] There has been much loud talk about a conflict between the different branches of government. What is it really: a struggle for absolute power, or does it imply something else?

[Abdulatipov] When they speak about the conflict, many err by thinking that a struggle for power is being waged between the president of Russia and the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet chairman. The reality is different. What is the issue? It is not power, not really. It is hard currency, or more precisely, access to it. Hard currency is known to be obtained from the sale abroad of oil, gas, coal, metal, and so forth. Export licenses are granted by executive organizations, not the Supreme Soviet. Parliament, on the contrary, speaks against squandering the country's raw material resources, whereas various groups line their pockets with it. That is the name of the game. The political struggle is only a front. But this is an entirely new topic, a different ground, the reverse side of the behind-the-scenes games.

[Question] In connection with the latest developments—a confrontation between the legislative and executive branches—some foreign radio stations did not miss the opportunity to report that power in Russia has again passed to the communists. Characteristic in this regard is

the statement made on Turkish radio by Azerbaijani President Abulfaz Elchibey. Your comment....

[Abdulatipov] There is currently a general tendency to strengthen legislative authority. This is also the case in Azerbaijan. All of that happens, and cannot but happen, under the impact of the "climate" inside the Russian parliament, the activities of which provide a certain example for the parliaments of Russia's close neighbors to follow. At the same time, all presidents seek absolute power. There is the whole secret of the confrontation.

[Question] What is your attitude to early elections of president and people's deputies of the Russian Federation?

[Abdulatipov] These two questions are interlinked. They cannot be considered separately. These elections should necessarily be held at the same time. But Russia is a country of paradoxes. Everything could be different.

[Question] Your forecast: Is a return to the Communist past possible under today's conditions, and what is your criterion of social justice?

[Abdulatipov] There can be no going back, of course. All that is a thing of the past. But describing the Communist regime as a bygone era, I cannot contend that it did not benefit anyone at all. Now about criteria. I am for a society where there is social justice, where women are not bought and sold as a commodity, where spiritual values are treasured, human rights upheld, and most important, where all ethnic conflicts are solved in a civilized manner, and all laws that have been passed are strictly observed. Any perversion of those questions leads to perversions in the entire system. In its time the party hierarchy perverted the essence of socialism. Today, new-wave democrats are perverting the essence of democracy. Therein lies the entire danger of the moment.

Security Chief Bans Meeting of Groznyy Council Supporters

LD2904143393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1353 GMT 29 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Aleksandr Kharchenko]

[Text] Groznyy April 29 TASS—Supporters of the Groznyy city council, dissolved by Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev on April 28, were unable to hold an earlier planned meeting in the centre of the Chechen capital today. It was banned by Chechen security chief Salman Khasimikov, who is also military commandant of the Chechen Republic. He reportedly did it to prevent provocations and riots. Khasimikov persuaded the demonstrators to move into the square, where Dudayev's other opponents had gathered.

"Our main task today is to avoid provocations, which are apt to trigger large-scale illegal actions," Khasimikov told ITAR-TASS. "My main task is to prevent the killing or wounding of innocent people, to persuade all the opposition forces to begin peaceful negotiations and find a civilised way out of the present crisis."

Commenting on his decision, the security chief stressed that "it is nonsensical to hold three, four or five meetings in one and the same place. If somebody wants to speak up, he can do it on Freedom Square or on Theatrical Square," he stated.

Tatarstan Forces Differ on Referendum Implications

PM2904131393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Apr 93 First Edition p 2

[Boris Bronshteyn report: "The Referendum Did Not Take Place in Tatarstan, But Its Results Are Being Actively Discussed"]

[Text] Kazan—As already reported, in Tatarstan only 22.8 percent of voters turned out for the referendum. The republic's various political forces are interpreting this result each in their own way.

At a press conference Farid Mukhametshin, chairman of the Republic of Tatarstan Supreme Soviet, commented on the failure of the majority of the republic's inhabitants to turn out at the polling places as follows: We assess the outcome of the referendum as evidence of the growing confidence in the constitutionally elected organs and the popularly elected president of the Republic of Tatarstan and as recognition of their policy and the reforms being carried out in the republic. The speaker of the Tatarstan parliament told journalists that he himself did not take part in the referendum.

The All-Tatar Social Center has circulated a political statement demanding that proceedings be instituted against members of the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium who adopted the decision on the referendum and allowed it to be carried out on the soil of sovereign Tatarstan. The fact that less than one-fourth of the electorate took part in the referendum, the statement says, testifies that the people want to see their republic as strong and independent. The president and Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan are therefore obliged to submit to the will of the republic's citizens and as soon as possible make a new, mighty leap in the direction of strengthening Tatarstan's statehood and independence.

Democratic organization activists explain the failure of the referendum as the result of the efforts of the republic authorities, who did everything to stop the referendum from taking place in Tatarstan, but an official statement by local democrats has not yet ensued.

Volgoda Refuses To Abolish Yeltsin Representative's Post

PM2904120193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Apr 93 First Edition p 2

[Viktor Fillipov report: "Referendum Modifies Inner Soviet's Position"]

[Text] Vologda—Vologda Oblast Inner Soviet, having studied the results of the referendum, has decided not to fulfill the resolutions of the Ninth Congress of People's Deputies on the abolition of the president's regional representatives.

On the eve of the referendum Vologda Oblast Soviet received a letter from Yu. Voronin, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, insisting on the immediate abolition of the post of president's representative. Enclosed with the letter by way of a model was the decision of Voronezh deputies, who executed the congress decree promptly.

However, members of the Vologda Inner Soviet reasoned soundly that interference by them in the affairs of a president in whom the people expressed their confidence at a referendum could be interpreted as disrespect for the will of the people. In Vologda 63.3 percent of those who voted supported B. Yeltsin, and 56.7 percent approved the government's socioeconomic policy. Oblast Soviet Chairman G. Khripel reacted critically to the statement of R. Khasbulatov, the speaker of parliament, that the referendum had split the people and that the referendum's results were brought about by the mass media's one-sided propaganda.

Members of the inner soviet described as improper the attempt by the Supreme Soviet to transfer the resolution of a question which is in the jurisdiction of the president and the Supreme Soviet itself to the representative authority in the regions.

Bashkir Leader Comments on Relations With Moscow

MK2904110093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Apr 93 p 1, 2

[Interview with Murtaza Rakhimov, Bashkortostan Supreme Soviet chairman, by Radik Batyrshin; place and date not given: "The Center Should Respect the Republics. Bashkortostan Supreme Soviet Chairman Murtaza Rakhimov Is Tired of Talking About the Referendum"]

[Text] [Batyrshin] Over 75 percent of the citizens of Bashkortostan who turned out for the referendum voted for the republic's economic independence and treaty-based relations with Russia. As for the four all-Russian questions, the majority of Bashkir citizens said "No." Is this a victory of the Bashkortostan leadership?

[Rakhimov] What victory? Everybody keeps saying: Referendum, referendum, referendum... Does Russia live only by the referendum? Don't we have any other problems? The pauperization of the people is under way, the economy is in crisis, the sowing season is about to begin, but everywhere you go all you hear about is the referendum. Our oil refineries are idle. We do not possess modern oil refining technology in Russia, investment is badly needed, and we have been struggling to obtain them for over a year. An engine- producing plant was burned down at KamAZ, but no large-scale assistance is forthcoming. Is this really the headache of Bashkortostan or Tatarstan alone? Where is the Russian Government, where are the people who think on a state scale? But the government, the president, and parliament turn a deaf ear to all this—they are busy with the referendum, the interpretation of the results and so forth.

[Batyrshin] It was you, however, who proposed that an additional, fifth, question—on Bashkortostan's economic independence—should be put on the ballot. What action will be taken by the republic's leadership now that the results have been counted?

[Rakhimov] Our course will remain unchanged; we have simply received a vote of confidence from our people. This means the continuation of the policy of implementing the Federation Treaty and, what is more important, an annex to it regarding the Republic of Bashkortostan. This way we have countered the reproaches of our opponents who claimed that the Bashkortostan Supreme Soviet did not express the opinions of the people of the republic. Having received such significant support, we will move further on with greater self-confidence. We are also glad that despite a propaganda campaign launched by the leaders of the republic's Russian and Tatar nationalist movements who alleged that the Bashkir nationalists want to secede from Russia, the majority of Russians and Tatars answered "Yes" to the fifth question. Hence, it can be concluded that both the Tatar Public Center operating in the republic and the Rus movement represent only themselves and no one else. As a matter of fact, I am sure that had it not been for the fifth question, the turnout in Bashkortostan would have been similar to what they had in Tatarstan (21 percent—R.B.). I do not understand why the pro- presidential mass media have taken up arms against us, although Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk Oblasts and St. Petersburg had their additional questions, too. This is how disrespect for the people of Bashkortostan is displayed by the center. How can we have any respect for the center then?

[Batyrshin] Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk Oblasts and St. Petersburg lay claims to the rights pertaining to republics...

[Rakhimov] The level of powers is one thing, but official status is something different. An oblast cannot have the status of a republic; for this it would have to be a sovereign state.

[Batyrshin] The interpretation of the referendum's results is the centerpiece of speeches made by Russian politicians...

[Rakhimov] There have been no winners. We have to calm down, to reach understanding, and finally to come to grips with the economy.

Even now, however, people surrounding the president continue to stir up passions. I do not understand the powers of Vyacheslav Kostikov, the Russian president's press secretary. Who gave him the right to judge the Supreme Soviet or the Congress? Of course he has the right to express his own opinion, but only outside the context of his official duties. At present, however, Kostikov's personal opinion is often passed for that of the president, which is intolerable. I believe that Boris Yeltsin would have found his work easier had he gotten rid of such figures as Kostikov.

[Batyrshin] Boris Yeltsin has announced his intention to make public the main principles of a new Constitution...

[Rakhimov] Newspaper publications cannot be a basis for analysis. Once these principles are distributed via official channels, we will start assessing them.

[Batyrshin] How do you plan to achieve economic independence?

[Rakhimov] We have only one way—negotiations with the Russian leadership. In May, the fifth round of talks is to be held; maybe the sixth and seventh rounds will follow... But the center cannot back away from the signatures of Yeltsin and Khasbulatov on the annex to the Federation Treaty regarding the Republic of Bashkortostan. If the center continues to ignore the annex, however, the Supreme Soviet of Bashkortostan may rescind its signature on the Federation Treaty. I hope, though, that we will complete the work on a bilateral treaty in 1993. The center should finally show respect for the republics.

Military Flight Test Center Finds Commercial Work

PM2904142593 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1520 GMT 26 Apr 93

[By unidentified reporter; from the "Business in Russia" program]

[Text] [Reporter] Faced with the need to carry out extensive conversion in market conditions, many Russian enterprises in the military-industrial complex are confronted with the problem of survival. Because of the reduction of military orders, whole production processes are being converted, resulting, in the majority of cases, in a decline in the living standard of skilled cadres and redundancies. But does this mean that the defense sector is incompatible with the market? The Mikhail Gromov Flight Test Institute in Zhukovskiy, a town near Moscow, is evidence to the contrary.

[K. Vasilchenko, chief of the Gromov Flight Test Institute] To preserve the number of staff at the institute and retain the scientific cadres measures were taken to organize commercial work, commercial flights. Conversion as far as we are concerned is a means of survival.

[Reporter] Around 15 joint-stock companies created on the basis of the Flight Test Institute are partly resolving the financial problems that are arising for it in connection with the conversion process and the drastic reduction in the number of military programs. It is their support which is enabling the Institute to continue to the present day with its main area of activity, connected with scientific research and the testing of civil and military aviation equipment, albeit with a different approach to the specialists' work.

[L. Lobas, chief pilot at the Gromov Institute] Commercial flying is also multifaceted. It means not just the transport of freight and passengers but aerial photography, too. We are concluding contracts with firms.

[V. Koshevoy, chief pilot of the Volare air company] The commercial pilot relies on the fact that he has to find himself work and has to ensure that his customers do not leave him.

[Reporter] Indeed, the customers are not leaving. In any event they are not abandoning the Volare Air Transport Joint-Stock Company, set up on the basis of the Gromov Flight Test Institute. Its fleet today consists of 17 aircraft of all types, making domestic and international flights. They do not just carry cargo, furthermore; they also carry passengers—businessmen financing the purchase of aircraft equipment.

[V. Krykov, general director of the Volare Air Transport Joint Stock Company] Our plan is to invest present and planned revenue from the shipment of freight in long-term aviation programs. We have given the money that we have made here to these people to produce goods that are competitive in the market and in this way support aviation.

[Reporter] Thus the potential does exist for the defense industry to survive in market conditions. This promotes the success of daring young entrepreneurs, who have gambled on the experience of the world economy. They have gambled correctly.

International Affairs

People's Deputies Advocate Country's Nuclear Status

AU3004095293 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 27 Apr 93 p 1

["Statement by Ukraine's People's Deputies on Ukraine's Nuclear Status"; place and date not given]

[Text] Following the declaration of Ukraine's independence and the disintegration of the USSR, Ukraine, as one of the states that are successors to the former Soviet Union, became a nuclear power. This is confirmed by Article 12 of the Agreement on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that was ratified by the parliaments of all CIS member states, by the Lisbon Protocol (Article 1) where Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America recognized Ukraine as an equal side to the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons (START I), and by the Vienna convention on the succession of states with regard to agreements that was ratified by Ukraine's Supreme Council.

Unfortunately, today, there is too much speculation and unnecessary emotion surrounding the question of Ukraine's nuclear status and its right to own the nuclear weapons that are located on its territory.

We believe, in this regard, that Ukraine's Supreme Council must, in the very near future, confirm its right of ownership of the nuclear weapons that are located on its territory, having adopted a corresponding decree on the question.

Unless Ukraine's status as an owner of nuclear weapons located on its territory is confirmed, Ukraine's Supreme Council will be unable to proceed to an ultimate discussion of START I. Because Ukrainian and world public is not adequately informed about Ukraine's position, the ratification of the treaty by Ukraine might be regarded as a fact of eliminating by Ukraine nuclear weapons that do not belong to it.

Attempts on the part of some states to force Ukraine to immediately ratify START I, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and the Lisbon Protocol and to give up the status of a power that is, de facto and de jure, an owner of nuclear weapons are inadmissible from the point of view of international law.

A thorough analysis of the aforementioned agreements is being conducted by Ukraine's Supreme Council commissions. It must give an answer regarding the conformity of these agreements to Ukraine's national interests and to the interests of international security. It is clear already now that, even prior to the ratification of START I, a whole complex of problems needs to be resolved. This applies, in particular, to the question of compensation for the nuclear materials that were taken out of the warheads of the tactical nuclear weapons that had been transferred from Ukraine to Russia in the spring of 1992, to the guarantees for destroying these weapons by Russia, and to the enormous financial expenditure on the reduction of the nuclear potential and to other no less important problems.

We are grateful to those states that offer certain capital to Ukraine to cover its expenses on the reduction of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it would be a mistake to agree to promises of insignificant monetary compensation in exchange for Ukraine's immediate nuclear disarmament. The question of nuclear disarmament, state independence, national security, and territorial integrity cannot become an object for bargaining or "monetary compensations."

The instability in the countries of Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and the armed armed conflicts in these regions tend to expand. Territorial claims upon Ukraine are officially stated. Many countries today work on creating their own nuclear weapons (specialists have estimated that, by the year 2000, there may be between 15 or 20 nuclear powers in the world). There is a precedent when a country that had formerly joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty officially declared its intention to withdraw from it.

Ukraine is the first country in the world that declared, at its own initiative, its intention to get rid of its nuclear weapons in the future. It immediately started to implement this intention, having withdrawn tactical nuclear weapons from its territory last year. We hoped that other nuclear states would also follow suit.

Ukraine, with its peaceful external policy and stable internal political situation, is, today, one of the guarantors of stability in Eastern Europe.

We hope that the world community will show understanding and support for our position.

Mostyskyy, Melnychuk, Holubets, Osadchuk, Pushyk, Bohdan Horyn, Kosiv, Drach, Kendzyor, Shvayka, Yukhnovskyy, Khmara, Barabash, Chornovil, Yavorivskyy, Oles Shevchenko, Mykhaylo Horyn, Yakheyeva, Shepa, Chernenko, Shkarban, Pylypchuk, Pavlychko, Yakovyshyn, Tolubko, Yemets, Karpenko.... (162 signatures altogether).

Crimean Parliament Calls For Black Sea Fleet Settlement

PM2904104193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Apr 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by "journalist" Nikolay Semena: "Crimean Parliament on the Black Sea Fleet"]

[Text] The Crimean Republic Supreme Soviet recently adopted a resolution "On Fulfilling the Agreement Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the Principles of the Formation and Operation of the Ukrainian Naval Forces and the Russian Navy on the Basis of the former USSR's Black Sea Fleet."

The Crimean Supreme Soviet, the decree says, expresses serious concern over the absence of a mechanism for the realization of the Yalta agreement and over the vagueness of the status of the transitional period which it stipulates.

Crimean parliamentarians expressed themselves in favor of a meeting being held between the Ukrainian and the Russian Federation presidents with the participation of representatives of the Crimean deputies' corps, in Sevastopol and not some other place. It is necessary to form an effective mechanism capable of speeding up the implementation of the agreement and guaranteeing observance of the principles of forming the Ukrainian Naval Forces and the Russian Navy. They ask that the resolution of issues of dual citizenship and the status of Black Sea Fleet servicemen in the Crimea be accelerated.

The session appealed to the Ukrainian present to suspend the defense minister's order "On Appointing Chiefs of Garrisons," because it contradicts the law on the delimitation of powers between the Ukrainian and Crimean state organs.

Kravchuk Begins Talks With Hungary's Antall

LD3004101693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0956 GMT 30 Apr 93

[By UKRINFORM for TASS]

[Text] Uzhgorod April 30 TASS—Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall have just begun closed-door talks in Uzgorod.

A joint Ukrainian-Hungarian communique is expected to be signed upon completion of the talks.

National Affairs

Cabinet Decree Determines Composition of Presidium

AU2904160993 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 27 Apr 93 p 1

["Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 293 on the Composition of the Presidium of Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers" issued in Kiev on 23 April]

[Text] Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers decrees as follows:

1. To establish that Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers Presidium includes the following officials:

Ukraine's prime minister (chairman), first vice prime minister, vice prime ministers, minister of Cabinet of Ministers, minister of the economy, and minister of finance.

2. To consider Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 635 of 23 November 1992 as no longer valid.

[Signed] Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers

Kravchuk Creates Nationalities, Migration Ministry

AU2904153493 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 28 Apr 93 p 2

["Ukrainian Presidential Edict No. 145/93 on Ukraine's Ministry for Questions of Nationalities and Migration" issued in Kiev on 26 April]

[Text] To further improve work in the sphere of interethnic relations and migration processes, I resolve as follows:

1. To create Ukraine's Ministry for Questions of Nationalities and Migration on the basis of the Committee for Questions of Nationalities at Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers.

In this connection, part one of Article Five in Ukrainian Presidential Edict No. 98 of 25 February 1992 "On Altering the System of Ukraine's Central Organs of State Executive Power" (in the version of Ukrainian Presidential Edict No. 566 of 13 November 1992), after the words "Ukraine's Ministry of Machine Building, Military-Industrial Complex, and Conversion," there must follow the words "Ukraine's Ministry for Questions of Nationalities and Migration."

2. Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers must approve the regulations on Ukraine's Ministry for Questions of Nationalities and Migration within one month.

[Signed] L. Kravchuk, president of Ukraine
[Dated] Kiev, 26 April 1993

Appoints Yemets Nationalities, Migration Minister

AU2904153693 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 28 Apr 93 p 2

["Ukrainian Presidential Edict No. 143/93 on Ukraine's Minister for Questions of Nationalities and Migration" issued in Kiev on 26 April]

[Text] To appoint Oleksandr Ivanovych Yemets as Ukraine's minister for questions of nationalities and migration, having relieved him of his duties as Ukrainian presidential adviser for political and legal questions and chairman of the Ukrainian Presidential Commission for Political and Legal Questions.

[Signed] L. Kravchuk, president of Ukraine
[Dated] Kiev, 26 April 1993

Crimean Supreme Council Discusses 1993 Draft Budget

LD2904090593 Kiev UKRINFORM in Russian 1910 GMT 28 Apr 93

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Lev Ryabchikov]

[Text] Simferopol, 28 Apr—The Supreme Council of Crimea today discussed the republic's draft budget for 1993.

Only the articles that establish norms of allocations to local budgets have so far been adopted. The rest are in the process of finalization and, apparently, will undergo essential changes. However, there remains a general tendency toward forming a budget without deficit, with the amount of expenditure corresponding to the amount of revenue. For this, the strictest regime of the economy will have to be introduced throughout the republic.

The draft law also makes provision for the allocation of a considerable sum to the maintenance of bodies of the legislative and executive power of Crimea, including the permanent mission of the republican government to Kiev. The deputies demanded that further inflating the apparatus of structures of power should stop.

A draft indicative plan of the republic's socioeconomic development for 1993 was also discussed at the session. It is predicted in the plan that the overall volume of industrial production will decrease by three percent, and at chemical enterprises by approximately a third. It is envisaged that electricity generation and gas recovery will increase slightly, and that consumer goods production will increase as a result of conversion at enterprises of the military and industrial complex. The task of increasing significantly the supply of vegetables, fruit and grapes is being assigned.

On the eve of the celebration of Victory Day, parliament resolved that war veterans, as well as invalids with sight and hearing disabilities be covered by concessionary payments for residential accommodation, communal services, and fuel.

The next Crimean Supreme Council session is set for 20 May.

Lvov Rukh Official Comments on Split in Organization

WS2904124793 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian 16 Apr 93 p 2

[Interview with Valentyn Moroz, cochairman of the Rukh Lvov branch, by Alla Topchiy: "Beat Your Own People To Scare The Others"]

[Text] [Topchiy] As you know, the Ukrainian People's Movement [Rukh] has officially split. This has led to the creation of the Rukh in the form of a political party and the National Rukh of Ukraine [VRU] in the form of a public organization. Before this, the Lvov branch of the Rukh was referred to as "dissenters." Do you maintain any contacts with the newly created VRU?

[Moroz] No. When Lvov and Kharkov Rukh organizations merged, I was in Canada, where I am a citizen, notwithstanding my attempts to acquire Ukrainian citizenship. I do not blame the organizers of the VRU; however, I am rather skeptical about the idea of reviving the Rukh's former glory, for "you cannot step twice into the same rivers." With regard to the Lvov branch, I did grant it theoretical and practical assistance, trying to realign it onto nationalistic tracks. Thus, with my direct participation, an association of nationalistic forces of Lvov Oblast was created.

I was elected cochairman of the Lvov Rukh branch, but this happened when I was absent, and I did not strive for this. Although I am not indifferent to the fate of Ukraine, I do not consider myself a professional politician, because my basic vocation is that of a lecturer and a scientist.

[Topchiy] Where did you get your degree and what was the theme of your research?

[Moroz] I am a honorary doctor of Eastern European history. I got the degree at the University of Munich. The theme of my research was "The Ukrainian Ethnohistory on the Basis of Dumas [Ukrainian folk ballads] and Historic Songs."

[Topchiy] You keep emphasizing that you are concerned with the fate of Ukraine, you are not indifferent to its past, present, and future. However, the same can be said about Vyacheslav Chornovil. What is the reason of the misunderstanding and antipathy, to say the least, between the Rukh leader and you?

[Moroz] The point is that we must realize one simple truth: The existence of different political groups leads to competition. This should be treated philosophically. No one should ambitiously demand a monopoly on ideas, leadership, and priority, the way Vyacheslav Chornovil is doing. If I say "Glory to Ukraine" [nationalist greeting] and someone picks these words up, would I have a right to say that he has stolen my idea?

Besides, my personal opinion is that Chornovil can be regarded as a member of the so-called official opposition. Postcommunist and postimperial structures that have peacefully accepted the new type of social relations are playing their game, whose rules stipulate the existence of an opposition. This makes Chornovil an eternal candidate for president.

[Topchiy] What is your attitude toward Chornovil's statement that the Ukrainian Republican Party [URP] has damaged the Rukh leader's prestige in Ukrainian emigrant circles in Canada and the United States? Have you heard anything about an incident between V. Chornovil and L. Lukyanenko during Chornovil's last visit to Canada?

[Moroz] In my opinion, nobody was going to damage Chornovil's reputation. I never heard any discreditable things from either URP members or advocates. I do not know any details on why Chornovil was not received by Lukyanenko at the Ukrainian Embassy in Canada. I presume that Chornovil wanted to be received with honors, music, and the like. However, Lukyanenko is a different kind of man; he wanted the meeting to be of an official and businesslike nature.

[Topchiy] In my opinion, discord between leaders of political parties and public organizations does not

give the average man hope for a better life. Quite on the contrary, it destabilizes the current economic and sociopolitical situation in Ukraine. What are the ways for overcoming the crisis or at least alleviating the situation in Ukraine?

[Moroz] First of all, in order to cure a disease, one should know its cause. Unfortunately, Ukrainian society is sick not only from fighting among different opposing and related political structures, but also because the old postcommunist structures, which should have been replaced, managed to root themselves into the newly built society. It is not easy to replace them rapidly, and this is why in the initial stage, pressure is an admissible method of influencing the administration.

[Topchiy] Do you mean strikes and public disobedience?

[Moroz] Yes.

[Topchiy] Is it true that the transportation workers' strike was organized by postcommunist forces?

[Moroz] No, but these forces used the strike to achieve their own goals. There was no need to organize the strike; the economic situation in the country is extremely tense.

[Topchiy] I know that you were the editor of an Ukrainian magazine abroad. What is the fate of this publication now?

[Moroz] The magazine "SHLACH CHEREZ CHUZHYNU" [ROAD THROUGH THE FOREIGN LAND] has ceased to exist. I think that there is no use in transferring to Ukraine all the things that occurred abroad, because Ukraine has its own problems. People here have there own views, and a different approach is needed in order to solve these problems. I have been dealing with these problems to the best of my ability, knowledge, and potential.

Belarus

U.S. Envoy, Shushkevich Discuss Nuclear Export Assistance

WS2904141593 Minsk BELINFORM in Russian 1113 GMT 29 Apr 93

[Text] Speaking at the 28 April meeting with Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich, U.S. envoy Goodby said: "We could reach an agreement with countries that want to buy enriched uranium from strategic nuclear missiles eliminated by the republics of the former USSR. Belarus, too, has these missiles." Mr. Goodby is the manager of the program implemented under the Nunn-Lugar Law. He is visiting Belarus with a U.S. delegation that arrived to discuss the issues of granting assistance for establishing a system of exports control.

The Nunn-Lugar Law, adopted by the U.S. Congress in December 1991, provides for a grant of about $800 million worth of financial aid from the U.S. Department of Defense budget to the successors of the former USSR for the withdrawal and elimination of nuclear arms and their forms of transportation. In accordance with this law, the United States will grant Belarus about $10 million worth of equipment and services in order to secure the safe withdrawal of strategic arms from its territory. However, following the Belarusian ratification of the START I treaty and participation in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the United States declared its readiness to expand the framework of assistance, also with regard to issues not directly related to the withdrawal of nuclear arms. At the initiative of the Belarusian Foreign Ministry, 11 projects have been drafted that anticipate foreign assistance.

Having mentioned these projects, Stanislav Shushkevich emphasized the 12th project which is now being discussed. The project stipulates [words indistinct] of the Russian officers who have expressed a desire to stay in Belarus. According to the U.S. envoy, this can be done within the "Conversion" project. He emphasized that the U.S. side had highly assessed the "consistent and highly moral" stance of Belarus in the issues of nuclear disarmament and was ready to develop cooperation in the already existing programs of export control. Shipments of the equipment will start as early as June. The next step will be launching the constant communication channel between Washington and Minsk.

U.S. Ambassador to Belarus David Swartz participated in the meeting.

Shushkevich, Parties Unite Against Joint Security Pact

WS2904151193 Minsk BELINFORM in Russian 1113 GMT 29 Apr 93

[Text] A consultative conference of democratic and patriotic parties was held on the afternoon of 28 April. The participants discussed the situation in the Republic with regard to the coming referendum on Belarus signing the joint security treaty with some CIS members.

Supreme Soviet Chairman Shushkevich was invited to be a guest at the conference. He criticized the opposition forces for their dispersion. In his opinion, this facilitates the rule of the former party bosses, who still own property in Belarus. Shushkevich spoke in favor of unification of all the democratic forces and adoption of a new law on elections.

In the opinion of the Supreme Soviet chairman, the discussion around the joint security treaty has been turned into "an outrageous propaganda campaign for joining the treaty, launched by local press."

The leaders of the Social Democratic Gromada, the Belarusian Democratic Party, the Belarusian Peasant Party, and a number of other parties and movements participating in the consultative conference supported the stance of the Supreme Soviet chairman in refraining from signing the joint security treaty and holding an all-national referendum on this issue.

The joint address issued by the participants of the conference calls on all the citizens of Belarus to band together to protect the Republic's neutrality and independence. The address reads: "We cannot let Belarus to be drawn into a military political pact with other states, which will make our children participants in bloody conflicts for the protection of other countries' interests."

Presidium May Ratify Joint Security Treaty

WS3004075293 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0300 GMT 30 Apr 93

[Text] Belarusian Supreme Soviet Presidium held a session on 29 April under the chairmanship of Stanislav Shushkevich. The Presidium members discussed the issues to be included on the agenda of the 12th Supreme Soviet session. At the 12th session, lawmakers will have to discuss more than 90 draft laws, legislative acts, and resolutions. The most important of these include the draft Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, the law on privatization books, on health insurance, on the state's debt to its citizens, on fighting economic crime and corruption, and on a national referendum on important issues of domestic and foreign policy. The Presidium decided that the Supreme Soviet may ratify the joint security treaty with a number of provisos.

Defense Minister Kozlovskiy on Army Reforms

WS3004110093 Minsk VO SLAVU RODINY in Russian 22 Apr 93 p 1

[Interview with Defense Minister Colonel-General Pavel Pavlovich Kozlovskiy by newspaper chief editor G. V. Sokolovskiy under the "Pressing Interview" rubric; place and date not given: "People, State, and Army Are Sacred Notions to Me"]

[Text] [Sokolovskiy] Pavel Pavlovich, a year ago the Belarusian Supreme Council appointed you to this high post. Much water has flowed under the bridge. What are your impressions of this year?

[Kozlovskiy] We worked hard on building and restructuring the Belarusian Armed Forces. The Army personnel have taken an oath of allegiance to Belarus. We have formed small, mechanized brigades that possess mighty combat strength and are capable of being deployed in any region on short notice. In addition, we have had several tactical Army exercises. In short, we have engaged in all kinds of activities that are characteristic of the Army. In addition, the Belarusian Supreme Council has adopted a package of military laws. The program of learning and introducing Belarusian in the Army has been developed and continues.

[Sokolovskiy] Did you manage to resolve the main issues?

[Kozlovskiy] Yes, to a great extent. Some issues are being resolved, but we must still deal with a lot of issues in order to create an Armed Forces that is mobile, at optimum strength, and has a flexible organizational and staff structure. The Supreme Council and the Government are of great help to us. We are looking to the future with optimism and confidence.

[Sokolovskiy] So, what about the reduction in staff?

[Kozlovskiy] This is a difficult process. It is easy to disband a unit, or to transport military equipment—but what do you do with personnel? How do you make the process of transfering officers to the reserves painless? How do you provide them with housing and jobs?

I am speaking to you sincerely: The Defense Ministry is doing everything to reorganize the Armed Forces gradually, within the planned terms, and with as few complaints from the servicemen as possible.

By the way, 179 units have been disbanded. The number of officers in administrative posts has been decreased by 15-20 percent, and the number of positions for generals has been decreased by two-thirds. Nearly 8,000 officers have been transferred to the reserves. In 1993, we will transfer over 10,000 officers to the reserves.

I want to emphasize that we try to draw on the advanced experience of civilized countries in military buildup as we build our national Belarusian Armed Forces .

[Sokolovskiy] Well, what about the return of officers-Belarusians from abroad?

[Kozlovskiy] We are paying great attention to this issue. We must implement the Belarusian Supreme Council decree on the return of our Belarusian officers from "hotspots." We have forwarded the appropriate letters to Georgia, Tajikistan, and other regions. I am frustrated that our servicemen are returning too slowly. Until now, only over 1,600 servicemen have arrived in Belarus.

Nevertheless, despite everything, the Belarusian Defense Ministry will do everything to speed up this process. For example, not long ago, we brought to Belarus nine families of Belarusian servicemen from the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict zone. So, in other words, we feel the pulse of life.

[Sokolovskiy] Pavel Pavlovich, are you satisfied with the supplement to the Law of the Republic of Belarus "On the Status of Servicemen?" How are you going to implement it?

[Kozlovskiy] Sure, I am satisfied. By the way, I proposed to depoliticalize the Armed Forces. Moreover, this is not my caprice. Different political parties and movements increase their political activities. They want to involve the servicemen into their political tricks. We can feel the influence of the Belarusian Association of Servicemen [BAS], Slavic Assembly [SA], Komsomol, and communists.... This is dangerous. Can you imagine the servicemen of one and the same unit being the members of these four political organizations? What can happen? Nobody can answer this question.

As a result, the Defense Ministry Collegium brought in this proposal to the Council of Ministers and the latter forwarded it to the Supreme Council. You know, this supplement has been adopted. Basing on this decree, I issued the order which prohibits the political activities of the servicemen. Commanders will have to hold individual talks with the servicemen-members of parties and other political organizations on the issue of stopping their activities within these political organizations. The order supposes that officers will write reports declaring the cessation of their political activities; otherwise, they will be transferred to the reserves.

I want to stress that many officers have written their reports on stopping political activities. For example, Major S. Voznyak has withdrawn his Komsomol membership. Colonel V. Suryaev has withdrawn his SA membership. I respect their position.

I regret to say it, but the BAS leadership has not yet determined its position on the issue. But they must choose.

[Sokolovskiy] What about the uniform of the Belarusian Army?

[Kozlovskiy] This issue is almost settled. A special commission of the Council of Ministers has come up with models for a uniform and for military symbols for the Belarusian Armed Forces and Belarusian border troops. We have discussed them at the session of the Defense Ministry Collegium. Some days ago, this uniform was presented to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers.

It was approved. There were some remarks about the color of the fabric and some elements of military symbols. After holding consultations and discussions with experts, it will be adopted by the Council of Ministers.

Then, Belarusian garment factories will start producing this uniform. It will be comfortable, elegant, and modern.

The personnel of the Belarusian Army will start wearing a new uniform in 1995-1996.

[Sokolovskiy] The key issue of the last emergency session of the Supreme Council was the matter of Belarus joining the CIS system of collective security. We know that the legislature had voted for this decision. I would like to listen to your point of view on the issue.

[Kozlovskiy] I do not remember the name of a deputy who said that these days we need other approaches and proper financial calculations. I completely agree with him. The Defense Ministry had scrupulously calculated everything before we brought in this proposal. We are unanimous in our decision: In this critical situation, the only way out for our Army is to join this system of collective security. If we make special provisions, we could enter this unity without any harmful consequences for Belarus. In my mind, various speculations about the deployment of our troops in concerned regions are fabricated, and aim at stirring up unnecessary emotions. I spoke about this at the Presidium of the Supreme Council, the Council of Security, and at the session of the Belarusian Supreme Council. This is the position of the Belarusian Defense Ministry.

[Sokolovskiy] Pavel Pavlovich, people are anxious about their housing problems. The editorial board is getting a mountain of letters in which the readers are asking us questions on this issue.

[Kozlovskiy] What can I say? The situation with the housing is really very acute. The Defense Ministry is doing a lot in this sphere and we can be optimistic.

Here are some figures. During 1992, our investments into the housing construction constituted 2.1 billion rubles [R]. Our builders built 123,000 square meters of housing area. In addition, we got three hostels with 134 apartments from the city executive councils.

Foreign companies assisted us a great deal in solving this issue. They built neighborhoods for 780 apartments in Marjina Gorka, for 600 apartments in Baranovichi, and for 1455 apartments in Slonim.

We still have a lot of servicemen without housing. By 1 January 1993, 11,728 servicemen without housing were registered in our Defense Ministry. Servicemen are constantly coming in from outside of Belarus. This is the reality.

The Belarusian Defense Ministry has developed and adopted the program for housing construction during the period of Army reform. It defined the main guidelines in this sphere. In 1993, we are planning to build 5,466 apartments for the servicemen (2,861 apartments will be build by our Ministry; 227 apartments, by shareholders; 2,378 apartments, by foreign companies). So, the perspectives are rather promising. Unfortunately, nobody can guarantee the final terms of this housing construction.

We are expecting a lot from the decree of the Council of Ministers "On Primary Measures for Providing Housing, Social Security for Servicemen" No 241 from 15 April 1993.

[Sokolovskiy] What issue is the most pressing for you now?

[Kozlovskiy] Well, it is easier to say what I am not worried about. Sure, I am anxious about the economic situation in the Republic. We have do not have the entire deliveries of oil products, fuel and lubricants from Russia.... The Armed Forces are also experiencing a lack of fuel resources. That is why we must use our reserves carefully. Nevertheless, we are maintaining the Army's combat readiness at a high level.

I am worried about the constantly increasing crime rate. Arms and ammunition have become targets for theft. Servicemen on guard duty are being attacked; suspected people blackmail privates and warrant officers in an attempt to make them sell the ammunition and other military equipment.

I am worried to hear about death of our servicemen.... Are there any explanations of their deaths? Many of these perished servicemen were highly qualified specialists....

I cannot stand it when the mass media attack our officers and generals, blaming them for corruption. All this humiliates the Army.

I am constantly thinking about the critical financial situation. Currently, all the organizations demand from us advanced payments for their services....

[Sokolovskiy] A year has passed. In the very near future, the second period of reforms starts. In connection with this, what are you thinking about?

[Kozlovskiy] Yes, we have accomplished a great deal. But more interesting and challenging work lies ahead of us. We should not grumble at difficulties, and should work conscientiously. We should not separate, but unite in work. We should revive the prestige of the Army. We should serve Belarus, strengthen the Belarusian Armed Forces, and the defense potential of Belarus.

I am constantly thinking about my people, state, and the Army. These are sacred notions to me.

[Sokolovskiy] Thank you.

One-Third of Air Force Idle Because of Spare Parts Shortage

LD2804212093 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0700 GMT 25 Apr 93

[Summary] Every third aircraft of the Belarus Air Force stands idle today due to the shortage of spare parts. If the situation does not change, in a year the military aviators will have nothing at all on which to learn this art. In five years the air defense system may stop working. Today the military industrial complex of Belarus can provide only 5 percent of what the Belarusian Army needs.

Kazakhstan

Foreign Ministry Notes Significance of Russian Referendum

LD2904143493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1326 GMT 29 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Kulagin]

[Text] Almaty April 29 TASS—The results of the Russian referendum which was an important step toward the establishment of democratic, civilised institutions of power in the Russian Federation was met with satisfaction in Kazakhstan, says a statement circulated by the Kazakhstan Foreign Ministry on Thursday.

The statement expresed the hope that the choice Russian people made on April 25 will ultimately lead to the consolidation of Russia's statehood, will make the socially-oriented economic reforms irreversible and preserve integrity of the Russian Federation. Still a complicated path of shaping institutes of democracy is to be covered after the referendum. The Kazakhstan Foreign Ministry believes that the vote of confidence in President Yeltsin and support for Russian reforms will be implemented in vigorous measures of the country's leadership to deepen transformations.

"There is confidence in Kazakhstan that the results of the referendum will give a new impetus to the widening of Kazakh-Russian interstate relations and traditional friendly ties, will promote the further consolidation of the CIS countries", the statement says.

Supreme Soviet Sets Up Body To Supervise Budget Measures

LD2904192493 Almaty KAZTAG in Russian 1200 GMT 29 Apr 93

[Text] The creation of a supervisory chamber of the Supreme Soviet [Kontrolaya Palata Verkhovnogo Soveta] has begun in Kazakhstan. Under the relevant law, which was published today, its functions will be to monitor the implementation of bills and decisions of the Supreme Soviet and its presidium, which affect the use of republic budget funds.

It will also monitor receipts from the removal of state property from state control and from its privatization and will ensure that such funds are spent legally. It will also supervise the correct spending of budget funds, which have been allocated for various republic programs or to finance state requirements. At the same time, the chamber is obliged to make expert assessments of republic budget projects, to analyze the state of credit and currency relations and to monitor the activities of the national bank and its use of credit and hard currency reserves, issues of currency and state securities, and the formation and use of a gold reserves and diamond stocks.

The republic's new controlling body has been granted fairly wide-ranging powers. In particular, it has the right to demand that any body, organization, or institution into which it is carrying out checks submit any documentation or information necessary to the chamber's work within a period established by the chamber. In the event that violations of the law are discovered to have been committed by the Cabinet of Ministers or other officials, the chamber has the right to present proposals to the Supreme Soviet on submitting the matter of immediately relieving them of their posts to the president of the republic. If instances of pilfering funds or objects of material value or other criminal acts are exposed, the chamber may hand the materials from its examinations and inspections to bodies of law and order.

Complaints against the decisions and actions of members of the chamber may only be made through the courts. The chamber itself is subject only to the control of the parliament, by which it is elected for the duration of its authority.

Kyrgyzstan

Akayev Congratulates Yeltsin on Referendum Win

LD2804154393 Bishkek KYRGYZKABAR in Russian 1233 GMT 28 Apr 93

[By KYRGYZKABAR correspondent Albert Bogdanov]

[Text] Bishkek, 28 April—President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan sent a telegram to Russian President Boris Yeltsin today. It says: "I congratulate you with all my heart on your convincing win in the referendum. It was with deep satisfaction and great hope that I learned of the results. The people of Russia have again demonstrated their resolute support for your firm policy of reform and democratic transformation. As your sincere friends, the people of Kyrgyzstan are sure that under your leadership a lasting foundation will be laid for the rebirth of great Russia. I wish you good heart and the firmness to successfully carry through the results of the referendum."

Turkmenistan

Niyazov, Businessmen Welcome Russian Referendum Results

LD2904082493 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1900 GMT 28 Apr 93

[Text] The results of the Russian referendum have been received in Turkmenistan with business-like understanding. President Saparmurat Niyazov said that it is an indisputable victory of sound forces in Boris Yeltsin's success. The results of the vote in Russia are of great significance to Turkmenistan, which is entering the phase of actively redistributing the functions of partnership between the former republics of the Soviet Union. The business world of Turkmenistan believes justly that the results of the referendum in Russia will speed up reforms in Turkmenistan.